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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation aims at a study of the various aspects of Sino-Indian 
relationship over the period 1996-2009. It emphasizes that despite various 
irritants and problems in the Sino-Indian relations, there is a desire among 
both the giants to promote their relationship in diverse fields particularly in 
economics. It further explores how both the countries could together play a 
leading role in shaping the 21 s' century as an 'Asian Century' and reshape the 
global political and economic order to their advantage. 
Starting from a brief historical background of Sino-India relationship 
from 1949 till 1996, the study takes into account the analysis of foreign policy 
principles of both the states and then their applicability towards each other. 
It analyses how the internal and external factors after the collapse of Soviet 
Union, compelled both the powers to reorient and refashion their foreign 
policies towards each other. Moreover, some limitations in India's foreign 
policy towards China have also been highlighted. Further, the study takes 
into account the background and interests of cooperation and then underlying 
causes for the rivalry between the two states, which is extended to 
contemporary period, so as to comprehend how the most recent events (e.g. 
India's nuclear tests of 1998 and the recent Indo-US Civil nuclear agreement) 
have affected the bilateral relationship between China and India. Besides, 
regional, energy, economic and other factors, the impact of two important 
actors (states) - Pakistan and United States is also taken into account. 
After discussing both the areas of cooperation and competition, 
the future prospects of Sino-Indian relations have been discussed in the light 
of preceding analysis. It ends with the note that though there is still a lot of 
divergence of interests between the two giants on a number of issues such as 
border issues, Tibet issue, Sino-Pak nexus, China's encirclement policy, 
growing Indo-US strategic cooperation, military build up of both the states, 
competition for energy resources and new markets, etc., yet the two will 
cooperate with each other keeping their rivalry and competition as flexible 
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and limited as possible. It is due to the fact that both the states want to 
emerge as major powers in the 21^' century and for that purpose, the peaceful 
environment around their borders and friendly and cooperative relationship 
with each other is widely perceived as necessary. It is also realised and 
acknowledged that with the dawn of 21^^ century, the global political 
architecture is undergoing a transformation with power increasingly shifting 
from west to east and this new century will be an Asian Century. Hence in 
this new century, the relationship between the two Asiatic Giants - namely, 
China and India will be of crucial importance. 
The time period for this study has been delimited from 1996-2009 
because during the early and mid-nineties, foreign policies of both the States 
underwent drastic changes at the internal as well as external levels. At the 
internal level, in India, an era of coalition politics had began which affected 
Indian foreign policy-making in a number of ways e.g., under the coalition 
governments, the foreign policy could not find adequate place on the priority 
basis. The frequent changes of governments at the national level led to the 
adhocism in the foreign policy making. Moreover, in the early 1990's, Indian 
economy was in a bad shape which made India vulnerable to external pulls 
and pressures. In case of China, the economic reforms started by Deng 
Xiaoping in the late 1970's and thereafter, the fast growing economy 
compelled it to forge new relationships with its neighbours. For its peaceful 
rise, it required peaceful environment. However, the seeds of rapprochement 
between China and India were sown in 1988 with the Indian Prime Minister 
Rajeev Gandhi's landmark visit to China. 
Likewise, the changes in external environment also compelled both the 
states to come closer to each other. The most important change in the external 
environment was the end of cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. The changed world power structure was another challenge faced by 
both the states because hegemony emerged as a dominant feature of the 
newly emerged world order. In addition, with a shift from geo-politics and 
geo-strategic to geo-economics, the economic dimension of international 
politics had become prominent with economic issues taking precedence over 
poHtical one's. Thus, all the internal and external developments which were 
taking place during the early and mid-nineties, made it necessary for both the 
States to set aside their political issues and come closer to forge cooperative 
bilateral relations especially in economic. Since, then, despite many ups and 
downs, the normalisation of Sino-India relations had made a tremendous 
progress. It is in the backdrop of above mentioned developments, that the 
periodization for this study has been delimited from 1996 onwards. 
This study is divided into six chapters including the Introduction and 
the Conclusion. 
Chapter I deal with the general introduction and the significance of 
Sino-India relations in 21st century, it has been discussed at length that despite 
the undercurrent suspicion and distrust, the cooperative and friendly 
relations are necessary for the peaceful rise of both the giants. 
Chapter 11 briefly analyses the historical background of Sino-India 
relations. Though scope of this study is restricted to the time period (1996-
2009), but various issues like border dispute, Tibet issue, etc. cannot be 
understood fully without taking recourse to history. Thus, the aim of this 
chapter has been chiefly to supplement the present study and not vice-versa. 
Chapter HI seeks to analyse the principles of Foreign policy of both the 
states and their actual applicability towards each other. Besides, some 
limitations in India's Foreign Policy making vis-a-vis China have also been 
highlighted. 
Chapter IV discusses various areas or fields where there is a lot of 
competition and divergence of interests and also those areas where there is 
possibility of cooperation due to the convergence of interests between both 
the states. 
Chapter V seeks to assess the future prospects of Sino-India relations in 
the light of preceding analyses and observations. 
Chapter VI is the concluding part which also highlights the main 
findings of this study. It ends with the note that the economic cooperation 
can be explored by both the states to mitigate their political issues. 
This study arrives at a number of conclusions from an analysis of the 
available data and facts. These findings are summarised below: 
First, China and India have co-existed peacefully for the last 2000 years. 
The peaceful co-existence of these two great civilizations for such a long 
period of time without coming into conflict with each other is in fact, a great 
and surprising fact in itself. The reasons and manifestations of such a long 
friendly relations have been: Absence of any clear-cut and demarcated border 
as the mighty Himalayas stood between these two great nations as a natural 
barrier; Material and spiritual (Buddhism) links which promoted peaceful 
and friendly relations in the ancient times; Trading and commercial links 
between the two states during the medieval period; Common sufferings and 
humiliations of both the nations at the hands of Europeans and thereafter, the 
struggles for liberation of their motherlands from the colonial powers in the 
modern period. 
Second, in the post independence era, both the states adopted different 
models of development and different political systems. However, in spite 
these divergent paths, both the states maintained good neighbourly relations 
which ultimately resulted into the signing of Panchsheel Agreement between 
the two nations in 1954, which was followed by Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai 
(Indians and Chinese are brothers) phase. The main reason for such a cordial 
and friendly relationship during this period was that both the states were new 
born nations needing peaceful environment so that each side can concentrate 
upon its economic, political and social development with limited resources. 
That is why; the period between (1947-1958) is often described as 
'Honeymoon period' or 'Friendship Hype period' between China and India. 
Third, during the late fifties, Sino-India relations began to deteriorate 
due to the unsettled border and other problems. The growing distrust and 
hostility between China and India culminated in an open armed conflict in 
1962. The Sino-India war (1962) was the watershed in the history of Sino-
Indian relations. From 1962 onwards until 1970, the Sino-Indian relations 
remained in a state of constant suspension due to diplomatic freeze. It was 
during this period that Pakistan factor was born in the China-India relations 
when China supported Pakistan in its war against India in 1965. This Pakistan 
factor continues to haunt the Sino-India relations even today. It was also 
during this period that India leaned towards Soviet Union. Further, during 
this period, both the states adopted various counter-balancing measures 
against each other e.g., China incited naxal violence, trained Naga and Mizo 
insurgents and supplied them arms and ammunition to foment violence in 
India, supported India's arch rival Pakistan against India, etc. These entire 
moves were justified by China against India on the grounds that India was 
following the imperialist policies and is responsible for unrest in Tibet. It is 
due to these hostile attitudes towards each other and particularly the 
diplomatic freeze, the relationship between China and India during this 
period (1959-1970) is often described as 'Animosities period'. 
Fourth, the normalization of relations between China and India began 
after 1970. It was due to the facts that; Sino-India relations were restored at 
the ambassador level in 1976 after 15 years; With the death of Mao Tsung far 
reaching changes were initiated in China's domestic and foreign policies, e.g., 
the modernization programme was started by Deng Xiaoping in the post-
Mao period, an "open door" liberal policy towards trade and foreign 
investment was launched in late 1970's (1978-79), China's desire to improve 
security environment, encouraging trade and commerce and the desire to 
resolve all its outstanding disputes with India amicably, so on and so forth. 
Thus, the normalization and upturn in China's relations with India, has 
therefore, its roots in China's internal power shifts and a new course in 
ideology, economic strategy and defence policies; In addition, the relaxation 
in international tensions as a result of detente in U.S. - Soviet relations, 
improvement of Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-U.S. relations also provided 
impetus for improvement in Sino-India relations. It was in this back drop that 
Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India made a landmark visit to 
China in December, 1988 to further Sino-India relations in a more dynamic 
and positive direction. 
Fifth, in the post-cold war period, the relations between the two giants 
further matured and were advanced in diverse fields. Both the giants reoriented 
and refashioned their foreign policies towards each other due to the changing 
domestic and global, economic, political and strategic environment. 
The most important change at the global strategic level was the end of the 
cold war and the disintegration of Soviet Union which drastically changed the 
global power-structure. The bi-polarity was replaced by uni-polarity with U.S. 
as the sole super power. In fact, it was a big challenge for both the states to 
reframe their foreign policies in such a hegemonic world order. 
Another important factor in the post Cold War era which compelled both the 
states to come closer to each other and to leave aside their political issues was 
the economic factor. With a shift from geo-politics and geo-strategic to geo-
economic, the economic dimension of international politics has become 
prominent with economic issues taking precedence over political ones. To 
take more and more benefits from such a changed global economic order 
which was controlled by the developed world, both the sides felt it imperative 
upon themselves to cooperate with each other. That is why, the ideology of 
non-alignment which was important detriment of India's foreign policy 
during the cold war era, has to be sacrificed. Moreover, at the internal level, 
the era of coalition politics had began especially after mid-1990s which 
affected India foreign policy-making in a number of ways e.g., under the 
coalition governments, the foreign policy could not find an adequate place on 
the priority basis, the frequent changes of government at the national level led 
to the adhocism in the foreign policy-making. Further, the Indian economy 
was in a bad shape which made India vulnerable to external pulls and 
pressures. All these factors both internal and external compelled both the 
states to come closer to each other. 
Sixth, though, India has restructured its foreign policy in a number of 
ways due to some internal and external factors, it has been unable to make a 
clear-cut response towards China that affects its security interests in a number 
of ways. It becomes clear from the fact that China has shown a remarkable 
consistency in its dealing with India but India has remained satisfactory only 
with one high level visit to another. There have been three major reasons for 
such a weak foreign policy in India vis-a-vis China. 
(a) Lack of strategic culture 
(b) Lack of institutionalization of Foreign policy; 
(c) Lack of power and capabilities. 
The natural corollary of these three constraints in India's foreign policy 
have in fact impeded the evaluation of a long term China policy which has 
ultimately led to the confusion in Indian Foreign Policy-making. It is reflected 
by the way India has dealt with China in the past years. For example, though 
it seems overtly that Sino-India relations have improved a lot but it is not 
clear as to what strategic objectives India wants to achieve from this 
improvement. 
For eliminating all these constraints in India's Foreign policy making, it 
is imperative upon India to advance, understand and study not only its own 
strategic culture but also the strategic traditions of other states especially of 
China so that a balanced and effective policy can be evolved regarding China. 
For the institutionalization of foreign policy, the National Security Council 
(NSC) should be made an effective and professional body to study the 
military, economic and political threats to the nation and to advice the 
government to meet these challenges in a coherent and systematic manner. In 
addition, India should enhance its capabilities in various fields because it still 
lags behind China in a number of areas which are a main cause of weakness 
in India's Foreign Policy towards China. 
Seventh, after a brief set-back to the Sino-India relations due to the 
India's nuclear tests in 1998, both the Asian giants entered 21 ^^ century with 
forging a cooperative partnership with each other. During this period, a 
number of high level visits were exchanged by both the states and thereby a 
number of important agreements were signed relating to promotion of trade 
and commerce and enhancing Confidence and Security Building Measures 
(CSBM). 
Eighth, in spite of growing relationship in the 21*^ century between 
China and India, there are still some areas where the respective claims of both 
the states clash with each other and therefore, is a constant source of rivalry 
and competition between them; the most notable among them are: 
(i) Border, Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet issues are the major factors of 
Sino-India unfriendly relations. Border issue is one of the most complicated 
issues between the two states. India still claims 43,180 square kilometres of 
Jammu and Kashmir occupied by China including 5,180 square kilometres 
ceded to China by Pakistan under a 1963 Sino-Pakistan Boundary agreement. 
Likewise, China claims 90,000 square kilometres of territory held by India in 
Arunachal Pradesh. Though the serious attempts were taken by both the sides 
to resolve the border problem with the agreements signed in 1993 and 1996 
and more importantly in 2003 when both the sides appointed special 
representatives. Though these special representatives have held a number of 
talks to resolve the border issue, but so far no breakthrough has been 
achieved. The main reason has been that the unsettled border provides China 
the strategic leverage to keep India uncertain about its intentions and nervous 
about its capabilities and thereby ensuring India's good behaviour on issues 
of vital concern to China. Further, an unsettled boundary also suits Chinese 
interests for the present because China's claim in Western Sector are 
complicated by the Indo - Pak dispute over Kashmir, and China's interest to 
keep India under strategic pressure on two fronts i.e. China and Pakistan. 
Likewise, though India has officially recognized Tibet as a part of China, but 
at the popular level, there remains significant sympathy for the Tibetan cause 
within India. The presence of more than 1, 00,000 Tibetan refugees in India 
and India's continued willingness to provide shelter to the Dalai Lama is also 
a major source of irritation in Sino-Indian relations. In Arunachal Pradesh, 
China demands major territorial concessions in Twang area because Chinese 
claim it to be central to Tibetan Buddhism given that the Sixth Dalai Lama 
was born there. On the other side, India seeks the return of the Sacred Mount 
Kailash Man Sarovar in Tibet since it is a sacred place associated with the 
Hindu religion. Thus, border issue, is one of the prime cause of rivalry 
between China and India which needs a pacific resolution through bilateral 
dialogue so that both the countries can focus on the political and economic 
development of their respective countries. 
(ii) Water issue is another important issue in the Sino-India relations 
which is closely related to border issue. The four main rivers such as Ma Cha 
Khabab, Lang Chen Khabab (Sutlej), Senge Khabab (Indus) and Tackok 
Khabab (Brahmaputra) which originates in Tibet and flows into India gives a 
strategic advantage to China because it is an upper riparian vis-a-vis India. 
This strategic advantage of China on water resources coupled with differing 
positions on Line of Actual Control (LAC) further complicates the water 
issues between the two states. The more and more complicating problem is 
that there exist no agreements between China and India relating to water 
resources. This problem gets more complicated in the absence of any 
international law on shared waters and when one such was attempted, China 
voted against the convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Water Resources in the UN General Assembly in 1997. Though 
India and China have entered into agreements in the recent past (2003) on 
sharing of hydrological data for flood control, but Chinese have not been 
consistent in sharing of the information. China's plan of constructing big 
dams and diverting the water of rivers to its own advantage has created 
discontent in India. More recently, to build a number of water projects in the 
Tibet including a dam on Brahmaputra, Chinese scientists have completed a 
comprehensive satellite study of cross border Tibetan rivers determining their 
exact sources besides measuring the length of their drainage basins. Thus, in 
future, China is likely to use water as a tool to pressurize India and to extract 
concessions on boundary question. 
Ninth, the two important countries that affects the Sino-Indian relations 
are, Pakistan and U.S.A. while Pakistan is an immediate one, with limited 
regional influence, the U.S. remains a long term one with global meanings. 
The inter connection of relations between China, India, U.S. and Pakistan, i.e., 
Indo-U.S., Sino-U.S., and Sino-Pak has a special bearing on the relationship 
between China and India. 
China's unique relationship with Pakistan has been regarded by India as a 
part of China's strategy to contain India within the sub-continent. China 
continues to maintain close relations with Pakistan because of the combined 
strategic and political advantages, it receives from its relationship with 
Pakistan, e.g., China's desire to extend its influence into South and Central 
Asia in order to maintain a stable periphery; gain easy access to markets and 
natural resources and to maintain friendly relations with Muslim Countries 
for reducing the Islamic insurgency in Xingjian province. Above all, Pakistan 
is the only country that can prevent the Indian hegemony, thus fulfilling a key 
strategic objective of China's South Asia Policy. Though China had adopted a 
neutral position over Kashmir issue, rather than siding with Pakistan, but 
China has not completely abandoned its traditional loyalty to Pakistan. China 
continues to use the Pakistan card in showing its displeasure over Indian 
behaviour. Moreover, China's offer to support Pakistan's civilian nuclear 
programme following the conclusion of the Indo-US civil nuclear programme 
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deal proves the fact that China continues its two track approach i.e. to engage 
India economically and also not to displeasure its historical partner 
(Pakistan). It is for these reasons that China continues to supply different 
types of arms and weapons to Pakistan. It is estimated that 80 percent of 
Pakistan military hardware, including 60 percent of military aircrafts has 
came from China. It is due to this whole sale transfer of weapons from China 
to Pakistan that K. Subrahmanyam, a noted defence analyst said that 
Islamabad derives its capabilities to threaten India from China. Thus, after 
Sino-India border issue, Pakistan is the major factor which continues to be a 
major source of irritation in the Sino-India relations. 
Similarly, the USA as the sole super power plays an important role in the 
Sino-Indian relations. The US-China-India strategic triangle has been 
seriously taken by all the three countries. The U.S. plays a complex role in this 
strategic triangle and has a lot of influence on Sino-India relations. When one 
country tries to forge the close relations with USA, it increases the 
apprehensions in the other country. In such a confusing situation, US can 
play the Indian card in its dealings with China or can play the China card in 
developing its relations with India. 
For India, it is possible to make use of US factor in dealing with China 
because both share the same challenge of a rising China to their respective 
dominance in the world and South Asia. China on the other side held the 
perception, that India by virtue of its geopolitical situation, naval capabilities 
and unresolved bilateral disputes with China is an ideal country for the 
United States to have it (India) on its side in the eventuality of any conflict 
with China. China still is not clear that whether India will side with US 
against China or join China and Russia for a multi-polar world order against 
the uni-polar world dominated by U.S. However, China views the US 
attempts to develop a strategic relations with India to contain China. In June 
2005, India and US signed the New Framework for the US - India Defence 
Relationship paving the way for joint weapons production, cooperation on 
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missile defence and in other military fields. Due to China's growing 
dependence on oil imports particularly through the Indian Ocean, the Indo-
U.S. joint military cooperation in this area has become a particular source of 
concern for China. Further, China also expressed her discomfort over the 
Indo-US Civil Nuclear deal in March, 2006. In spite of such close and 
emerging warmth in the Indo-US relations, India is aware of the fact that the 
US and Chinese interests in their mutual relationship are more than that of 
India. This is the main reason that neither China nor US will be ready to 
oppose each other for India. However, if US adopts a policy of containment 
against China and recognizes India as its natural ally, the result would be a 
hostile relationship between China and India as well as between China and 
United States. It is in this respect that China's behaviour towards India is not 
much different from that of United States behaviour towards China for the 
simple reason that China is a status- quoist power with regard to India while 
the U.S. is a status quoist power with regard to China. In such a complex 
situation, India will maintain its strategic independence by following a 
multilayered approach combining both cooperation and competition with 
China in a way that serves its own unique political, economic and security 
interests. 
Tenth, the rise of China and India in terms of economic growth and military 
build-up will have an inevitable regional implication. There are at least three 
sub-regions in Asia namely South Asia, South East Asia and Central Asia, 
where the economic, military, political and energy interests of both the state 
have met or will meet. 
(i) So far as the South Asia is concerned, except Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
Maldives, China shares'borders with the rest of all South Asian states. This 
geographical intimacy between China and South Asian states makes it a 
special area in the Chinese foreign policy considerations. The widening and 
deepening defence cooperation between China and India's immediate 
neighbours are perceived as encircling India. In this regard, Nepal, 
12 
Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka which are perceived by India to be within 
its territorial sphere of influence, have deepened their ties with China. In 
these states, India exercises considerable influence in domestic politics and 
has always opposed outside power's involvement. It is in this context, that 
India has always seen itself as the prime power in South Asia and is not 
willing that China might also have some influence in South Asia while on the 
other side, China is rapidly strengthening its presence in the Indian Ocean 
and South Asia by building ports and military bases in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan and Burma. Though, China have been granted an observer status in 
the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) during 
Dhaka Summit in November, 2005, still both are viewing at each other with 
suspicious motives concerning the region. 
(ii) In the South East Asian region, there has been more competition 
between China and India due to their conflicting and overlapping interests. 
However, in this tussle between China and India to gain more and more 
strategic, economic and political influence in ASEAN (Association for South 
East Asian Nations) region, it must be noted here that China has more 
intimate relations with ASEAN than India. It is reflected from the gradual rise 
of trade between China and ASEAN which reached to US $94.54 billion in 
2004 making ASEAN China's fifth largest trading partner. Moreover, China 
and ASEAN are also cooperating with each other in wider regional 
organizations such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Council of 
Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and Asia Cooperation Dialogue 
(ACD). But at the same time, China does not want India to emerge as an equal 
competitor in South East Asia. That is why, India has on her own part started 
cultivating strong relations with Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, 
etc. for rebalancing Chinese influence in the area. Thus, it can be said, that in 
the South East Asia both states have conflicting as well as overlapping 
interests with China having deep and strong links with ASEAN. 
(iii) Likewise, in the central Asia, the relationship between China and India 
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are same as are in the South and South East Asia i.e., overlapping and 
divergent. The Central Asian region is mostly important for its geo-strategic 
location and natural resources. China shares the border with most of the 
Central Asian states. In order to enhance its influence in the Central Asian 
states, China initiated the Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO). This 
regional forum provides broad perspectives for intimate cooperation betw^een 
China and Central Asian states. This rapidly growing influence of China in 
the Central Asian region is of prime concern for India. Like South and South 
East Asia, in Central Asia also, China has an upper hand vis-a-vis India and it 
has become more pertinent with the establishment of SCO. It is important to 
note here that there have been two reasons for such a close and deep 
relationship between China and Central Asian States which India does not 
have: 
a) Close geographical proximity between China and Central Asian states; 
b) Chinese huge investments in the infrastructure development within 
these countries. 
However, in recent years, India has also intensified its efforts to forge 
cooperative relationship with these countries. In future, there are chances of 
competition and also of cooperation in this part of the world as both India 
and China are major energy consumption countries, both of them will try to 
enhance their influence in this region more and more. 
Eleventh, the energy (oil and gas) factor also assumes an important place 
in Sino-lndian relations because the sustained growth rate of their growing 
economies depends to a large extent on the uninterrupted supply of energy 
like oil and gas as both are major energy importer countries. However, in this 
field also, there has been competitive rather than cooperative interaction. The 
competition for oil assets have been witnessed in different parts of the world 
like Ecuador, Angola, Kazakhstan and in many other countries. As usual, 
China fared well also in this field also than India. The Chinese success has not 
been because it offered higher bid than India but because of its tactics and 
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above all its abilities to integrate financial incentives w i^th aid, infrastructure 
projects, diplomatic incentives and arms packages. However, there have been 
some rare occasions when both the sides cooperated in this field also, e.g., 
Chinese and Indian Companies have cooperated in developing energy assets 
in Syria, Sudan, and Columbia, Iran and in many other countries. 
Nevertheless, it must be reiterated here that China's and India's energy 
interests does not completely converge. China is cooperating with India only 
in those areas where its interests can be best secured than by aligning with 
others (particularly with western companies). Furthermore, China will not 
like that India should became co-equal to it in the energy sector. 
Therefore, in order to acquire and maintain energy resources from outside 
countries in a more coherent and systematic manner without coming into 
direct collusion with China, India should also maintain relations with energy 
exporting countries on the same line on which China maintains i.e., to invest 
into the infrastructure development like roads, railways, pofts, rhinirig/ 
airports, electricity generation, so on and so forth. It will be more 
advantageous for the Indian interests in the long run. . f^}^ '(_/)/ 
Twelfth, the economic reforms in China in the late l^^Ds "^nd^in Indja-
during the initial years of 1990s and thereafter, fast growing economic-griasvz^ 
rates of India and China compelled both the states to shun the political 
inhibitions and forge a more cooperative bilateral relationship especially in 
the field of trade and commerce. Moreover, with the end of cold war, geo-
strategic and geo-political considerations were replaced by geo-economics 
factors which gave further impetus to Sino-India economic relations. Since 
then, both the countries have expedited the process of integration in the 
global economy as well as bilateral economic cooperation. In the beginning of 
1990, bilateral trade between China and India was $ 260 million which crossed 
the $ 60 billion in 2010 and stood at $ 61.74 billion. This makes China the third 
largest export market for India and its single source of imports. India's 
exports to China are mainly natural resources such as iron ore on the other 
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hand. China's exports to India are primarily electronic goods and other 
finished products. However, there have been some limitations in Sino-India 
trade, e.g. 
(i) The trade balance has been tilting consistently against India. 
(ii) The major hurdles in Sino-India trade are China's non-tariff barriers, 
language gap, lack of transparency in rules an smuggling of Chinese 
goods. 
(iii) There is also fear in India that the relatively cheaper Chinese goods 
might displace Indian goods in the international market due to their lower 
costs. 
(iv) The cooperation in the fields of China's hardware and manufacturing 
industries and India's software and service sector expertise which can 
boast the bilateral trade between the two, has been limited so far. 
(v) The only field in which India is ahead of China is the software and 
service sector but it is believed that due to the Chinese impressive record of 
export of hi-tech products, China may overtake that sector (software) also 
from India. 
(vi) Moreover, China has emerged as a major player in strategic and 
economic terms with its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
on December 11, 2001. 
Thus, it becomes evident that since 1990's, Sino-India trade has made 
tremendous strides, but still there are some limitations in such an economic 
relationship which cannot be eliminated totally, nevertheless, their negative 
effects can be minimized. It can be asserted that though the trade related 
competition between the two giants cannot be ruled out in future but at the 
same time, economic sphere is the only sphere where there is more 
convergence of interests since both are developing countries with fast 
growing economies. This convergence of economic interests between the two 
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states can be exploited to create an environment conducive for solving more 
difficult bilateral political and other issues. 
In the concluding remarks it can be observed that despite 
improvement, the Sino-India relations will remain competitive. Both will 
attempt to acquire the power and status which will be suitable to their 
population, geographical location, their country's size, etc. In addition, the 
rise of both the countries in the 21^' century is likely to result in significant 
new geopolitical aligrmnents. Moreover, the military strength and new 
economic prosperity of both the states will create new tensions as both will 
try to register their authority in different parts of the world. 
It is in this context that in the short and medium term, neither side 
would do anything that would destabilize their current bilateral economic or 
other relations, but in the long-term, there is possibility of confrontation and 
even conflict between the two Asian giants over a number of issues ranging 
from border issue to encirclement policies. 
However, the nature and extent of their rivalry is likely to be 
determined by how domestic, political and economic developments in these 
two countries affect their power, their perceptions, their attitudes and above 
all their security policies. Till then, both the states would like to maintain the 
status quo, focusing on their economic, political, military and strategic 
development and keep the competition and rivalry as flexible and un-
provokable as possible in future. 
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PREFACE 
This dissertation deals with Sino-Indian relations during the period 
1996-2009. The period from 1996-2009 is important because during the early 
and mid-nineties, foreign policies of both the States underwent drastic 
changes at the internal as well as external levels. At the internal level, in 
India, an era of coalition politics had began which affected Indian foreign 
policy-making in a number of ways e.g., under the coalition goverrunents, the 
foreign policy could not find adequate place on the priority basis. 
The frequent changes of governments at the national level led to the adhocism 
in the foreign policy making. Moreover, in the early 1990's, Indian economy 
was in a bad shape which made India vulnerable to external pulls and 
pressures. In case of China, the economic reforms started by Deng Xiaoping 
in the late 1970's and thereafter, the fast growing economy compelled it to 
forge new relationships with its neighbours. For its peaceful rise, it required 
peaceful environment. However, the seeds of rapprochement between China 
and India were sown in 1988 with the Indian Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi's 
landmark visit to China. 
Likewise, the changes in external environment also compelled both the 
states to come closer to each other. The most important change in the external 
environment was the end of cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. The changed world power structure was another challenge faced by 
both the states because hegemony emerged as a dominant feature of the 
newly emerged world order. In addition, with a shift from geo-politics and 
geo-strategic to geo-economics, the economic dimension of international 
politics had become prominent with economic issues taking precedence over 
political one's. Thus, all the internal and external developments which were 
taking place during the early and mid-nineties, made it necessary for both the 
States to set aside their political issues and come closer to forge cooperative 
bilateral relations especially in economic. Since, then, despite many ups and 
downs, the normalisation of Sino-India relations had made a tremendous 
progress. It is in the backdrop of above mentioned developments, that the 
periodization for this study has been delimited from 1996 onwards. 
The present study assesses and analyses Sino-lndia relations on the 
basis of available primary and secondary sources. The data collected are 
collated, analysed and used for arriving at conclusions in an objeclJA e^ way. 
For a clear and objective understanding of any subject, paucity of 
authentic information is the major hurdle. Being a communist country with 
single party system, the People's Republic of China has been highly secretive 
on its defence and foreign policy decision making. This study has, therefore, 
used data on Chinese diplomatic thinking and practice to the extent they are 
available in India in the form of publications, writings, articles and through 
interviews and interactions with the experts in the relevant field. Information 
available has been supplemented by relevant data and subsequently analysed 
in order to secure a better understanding of issues and events. 
Thus, a sincere attempt has been made to weave the diverse thread of 
available material in a systematic and coherent fabric. The facts have been 
scrupulously studied and presented with a sense of objectivity. 
This study is divided into six chapters including the Introduction and 
the Conclusion. 
Chapter I deal with the general introduction and the significance of 
Sino-lndia relations in 21st century, it has been discussed at length that despite 
the undercurrent suspicion and distrust, the cooperative and friendly 
relations are necessary for the peaceful rise of both the giants. 
Chapter II briefly analyses the historical background of Sino-lndia 
relations. Though scope of this study is restricted to the time period 
(1996-2009), but various issues like border dispute, Tibet issue, etc. cannot be 
understood fully without taking recourse to history. Thus, the aim of this 
chapter has been chiefly to supplement the present study and not vice-versa. 
Chapter III seeks to analyse the principles of Foreign policy of both the 
states and their actual applicability towards each other. Besides, some 
limitations in India's Foreign Policy making vis-a-vis China have also been 
highlighted. 
Chapter IV discusses various areas or fields where there is a lot of 
competition and divergence of interests and also those areas where there is 
possibility of cooperation due to the convergence of interests between both 
the states. 
Chapter V seeks to assess the future prospects of Sino-India relations in 
the light of preceding analyses and observations. 
Chapter VI is the concluding part which also highlights the main 
findings of this study. It ends with the note that the economic cooperation 
can be explored by both the states to mitigate their political issues. 
First of all, I thank Almighty without Whose blessings this work would 
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I would also like to express my heart felt gratitude to my mentor and 
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for his wise suggestions and counsel. 
I can not forget the help rendered to me by Dr. Mehtab Alam 
(Associate Fellow IDSA) for his crucial and critical views on the Topic and 
also to Mr. G.C.K Rai (Information Officer IDSA) for his kind cooperation in 
allowing me to consult the IDSA library. 
To my good friends Muzamil Mushtaq Naikoo and Javeed Ahmed 
Bhat (research scholars, AMU), who have helped me throughout despite their 
busy schedule. 
My special thanks are due to my parents (Abdul Rehman Gojree and 
Jameela Begum), brother (Riyaz Ahmad), sisters (Rehana, Refat & Muskan) 
and little Riyan for the encouragement given and blessings bestowed upon 
me. The cherished memories of my beloved sister. Late Rohi Jan have always 
remained with me throughout the study. 
I would also like to thank Mr. Abdul Quadir for the typing and 
retyping of successive drafts and binding. 
Last but not least, I acknowledge and express my thanks for the 
support I have received from several institutions during my research on the 
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University) Aligarh. 
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This study analyses and examines the various aspects of Sino-Indian 
relationship over the period 1996-2009. It emphasizes that despite various 
irritants and problems in the Sino-Indian relations, there is a desire among 
both the giants to promote their relationship in diverse fields particularly in 
economics. It further explores how both the countries could together play a 
leading role in shaping the 2V^ century as an 'Asian Century' and reshape the 
global political and economic order to their advantage. 
Starting from a brief historical background of Sino-India relationship 
from 1949 till 1996, the study takes into account the analysis of foreign policy 
principles of both the states and then their applicability towards each other. 
It analyses how the internal and external factors after the collapse of Soviet 
Union, compelled both the powers to reorient and refashion their foreign 
policies towards each other. Moreover, some limitations in India's foreign 
policy towards China have also been highlighted. Further, the study takes 
into account the background and interests of cooperation and then underlying 
causes for the rivalry between the two states, which is extended to 
contemporary period, so as to comprehend how the most recent events 
(e.g. India's nuclear tests of 1998 and the recent Indo-US Civil nuclear 
agreement) have affected the bilateral relationship between China and India. 
Besides, regional, energy, economic and other factors, the impact of two 
important actors (states) - Pakistan and United States is also taken into 
account. 
After discussing both the areas of cooperation and competition, the 
future prospects of Sino-Indian relations have been discussed in the light of 
preceding analysis. It ends with the note that though there is still a lot of 
divergence of interests between the two giants on a number of issues such as 
border issues, Tibet issue, Sino-Pak nexus, China's encirclement policy, 
growing Indo-US strategic cooperation, military build up of both the states. 
competition for energy resources and new markets, etc., yet the two will 
cooperate with each other keeping their rivalry and competition as flexible 
and limited as possible. It is due to the fact that both the states want to 
emerge as major powers in the 21** century and for that purpose, the peaceful 
enviromnent around their borders and friendly and cooperative relationship 
with each other is widely perceived as necessary. It is also realised and 
acknowledged that with the dawn of 21st century, the global political 
architecture is undergoing a transformation with power increasingly shifting 
from west to east^ and this new century will be an Asian Century. Hence in 
this new century, the relationship between the two Asiatic Giants - namely, 
China and India will be of crucial importance. 
Asia is one of the largest continents in the world both in terms of 
population and territory. Out of the total world population i.e., 6,962,500,000, 
Asia has 3,879,000,000 which constitute 55.71% of the world population and 
out of the total land area of all the continents i.e., 148,647,000 square 
kilometres, Asia has the 43,820,000 square kilometres which constitutes 29.54 
percent of the total land mass^. All these facts make Asia as one of the most 
populous and largest continent of the world. Furthermore, it is characterised 
by extra-ordinary diversity in terms of religion, race, ethnicity and culture. 
Whether it is Central Asia and South East Asia, South Asia or West Asia, all 
possesses distinctive characteristics that separate them from one another. 
However, in spite of these diversities, Asia has civilisational commonalities 
that enable it to seek unity in diversity. 
The slow and gradual rise of Asia at the world stage can be discerned 
from the fact that in 1940, Asia accounted for 60 per cent of world's 
population and 19 percent of world's Gross Domestic Products (GDP). This 
changed to 57 percent of the world's population and 37 percent of world's 
GDP by 1995. Now it is estimated that the Asian population will account for 
55 percent of the world population and Asian GDP will increase to bl percent 
of the global GDP by 2025 .^ In addition, Asia accounts for the world's largest 
energy resources be it oil, natural gas, or hydrocarbons. The world's fastest 
growing economics and markets are also found in Asia. 
It is evident, therefore, that the fulcrum of political and economic 
activity is shifting towards Asia and away from the traditional centres of 
North America and Europe^ 
In the Asian Continent, China and India occupy a pre-eminent position 
due to their strategic, economic, political and demographic position. Both the 
giants together comprise 36.62 percent (India 17.38 and China 19.24) of the 
world population^ their combined area is 8.64 percent (India 2.2 and China 
5.2) of the total land area of the world. They have the two fastest growing 
economies in the world GDP and it is estimated that their share might exceed 
20 percent by 2025. It is in this backdrop that the America's National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) report on emerging global trends, indicated that by 
2015, international community will have to confront the military, political and 
economic dimensions of the rise of China and India-^ Further in December 
2004, the report of NIC argued that the rise of both China and India could be 
compared to the uniting of Germany in the nineteenth century and the advent 
of a powerful United States in the early twentieth Century, with a similar 
potential to transform the global landscape with impacts potentially as 
dramatic as those in the previous centuries'' Thus, the congruence and 
cooperation between the policies of these two states would make a formidable 
combination in the emergence of 21 s* century as an 'Asian Century'. 
Back to pre-independence period, the leadership of Indian National 
Movement visualised an active role for India in Asian affairs. It was conscious 
of the need for a wider Asian unity in building a new Asia after the overthrow 
of colonial powers. At the 1922 annual session of the congress, C.R. Das urged 
Indian participation in an Asian Federation, which he regarded as inevitable^. 
The talk of Asian Federation was again heard at the Congress sessions in 1926 
and 1928. 
It was after the attairunent of freedom from the British that India under 
the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru began to pay attention towards the 
problems facing the developing countries especially the newly emerging 
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countries of Asia. For that purpose, he initiated a number of measures for 
ensuring peace and security in Asia. That is why; Nehru stressed the need for 
Asian Unity and announced the arrival of Asia on the world stage at the 
Asian Relations Conference (Delhi), on the eve of Independence. While in 
Paris (1948), addressing the UN General Assembly, Nehru declared 
"The world is something bigger than Europe Asia counts in world affairs. 
Tomorrow it will count much more than today" ^  
However, since then the political situation in the world has changed a 
lot. Although cold war has come to an end, but instead of multipolarity, there 
is the growing doniinance of the sole super power (USA) and its interference 
in other state's internal affairs in the name of "War on Terror" and 
"Promoting Democracy"io. The political developments in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and more recently in Libya after the overthrow of their established regimes 
are the glaring examples in this direction. Likewise, the United Nations which 
was established to promote international peace and security in an impartial 
and effective maimer, has became a tool in the hands of some powerful 
nations to further their own interests rather than the common interests of the 
world community. Moreover, the issues like human rights, climate change, 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc. are some other instruments which are 
frequently applied by the Western Countries against the non-cooperating or 
against those states who try to act independently. In addition, globalisation 
instead of benefiting the poor countries is generating more and more 
problems for them. Unfavourable trade practices and unequal trade 
agreements are putting the developing countries in a more disadvantageous 
position in a globalized world order.^ ^ 
It is against this backdrop that the present study investigates into the 
problems and prospects of cooperative and friendly relations between the two 
Asian giants - China and India for ushering a new world order based on 
equality and justice and for democratising the international system. 
Sino-India Relations: A theoretical Perspective 
Though Sino-Indian relations have made tremendous improvements 
since the last two decades, but there is still undercurrent of mistrust, 
suspicion, rivalry, competition and even hostility between the two Asian 
giants. This sort of mixed interactions between the two states makes the Sino-
Indian relations a complex one. Here, three theoretical frameworks namely 
Structural Realism or Neo- Realism, Economic Interdependence, and Security 
Dilemma can be applied to study and understand Sino-Indian relations. 
Let us first see what sort of relations between China and India have or will 
emerge under the structural framework. 
The proponents of realist school held that power is the currency of 
international politics. Major Powers, which are the main actors in the realist 
view, pay a very careful attention to how much economic and military power 
they have relative to each other. It is important not only to have a substantial 
amount of power but also to make sure that no other actor (state) sharply 
shifts the balance of power in its favour. According to classical realists 
especially Hans J. Morgenthau, states are always led by individuals (human 
nature) who always tries to dominate their rivals^^ j ^ g instinct of power 
among individual is too strong to be eliminated. 
However, structural realists or neo-realists, on the other side argue that 
it is the structure or the architecture of the international system that forces the 
states to pursue power. In a system where there is no higher authority that 
can guarantee the security of all states or where there is no guarantee that one 
state will not attack another, each actor (state) tries to be powerful to protect 
itself if any other state attacks it. Moreover, they (structural realists) do not 
give any importance to regime type, mainly because the international system 
creates the same basic incentives for all major actors whether they are 
democrats or communists. However, the structural realists do not hold the 
same view regarding how much power is enough for a major state. 
Thus, according to defensive realist like Kenneth Waltzi3, it is unwise for 
states to maximise their share of world power because there are other actors 
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who will check that state from gaining disproportionate power. On the other 
side, offensive realist like John Mearsheimer^^ take the opposite view and 
argues that states always desire to gain as much power as possible and if 
circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony. The argument is not that 
conquest or domination is good or right, but instead that having 
overwhelming power is the best way to ensure one's own survival. That is 
why, for classical Realists like Morgenthau, power is an end in itself and for 
neo-realists or structural realists, power is a means to an end and the ultimate 
end is survival. 
China's rise and its implications for its neighbours especially 
India- through Realist Perspective.^^ 
Regarding the potential of China, Napoleon Bonaparte once described 
China as a sleeping gaint.^^ Today China has come a long way and has 
emerged as one of the formidable powers in Asia and the world. China's 
rising military and economic power is a cause of concern not only among its 
neighbours particularly India and South East Asian states but even for the 
world's only super power USA.i'' In this context some realist theorists predict 
that China's rise will lead to serious instability while other argue that a 
powerful China can have relatively peaceful relations with its neighbours. 
In accordance with the realist version as discussed earlier, the ultimate 
goal of the great powers is to gain hegemony because that is the best 
guarantor. However, in practice, it is almost impossible for any actor (state) to 
achieve global hegemony because it is too hard to sustain power on distinct 
lands. That is why the best alternative is to establish a regional hegemony, 
which implies dominating one's own geographical area. Regional hegemons 
do not want peer competitors. Instead, they want to keep other regions 
divided among several major states that will then compete with each other 
and not be in a position to focus on them. According to this version, a rising 
China will attempt to become a regional power in Asia. For that purpose, it 
will maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours especially 
India, Japan and Russia. Moreover, it will try to make itself, so powerful that 
no state in Asia can challenge it. Such a situation would, surely be alarming 
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for China's neighbours who will do whatever they can to prevent it (China) 
from achieving regional hegemony. In fact, countries like India, Japan, Russia 
and some other Asian Tigers are worried about China's ascendancy and are 
looking for ways to contain it and there is likelihood that they will join U.S. 
led balancing coalition to check China's rise. 
In contrast to offensive realism, defensive realism offers more 
optimistic picture about China's rise. Though the defensive realists recognise 
that the security competition will not disappear altogether from Asia as China 
grows more and more powerful, but they argue that such a security 
competition surrounding China's rise will not be intense and that China 
should be able to co-exist peacefully with its neighbours. Moreover, the 
presence of nuclear weapons is another cause of optimism. India, Russia and 
U.S.A.18 all have nuclear arsenals and it will not be easy for China to be 
aggressive against its neighbour or resort to force. Further, it is difficult to 
realise that what China will gain by conquering other Asian states. In this 
regard, the defensive realist point-out that China's economy has been 
growing at an impressive pace without foreign adventures. 
Thus, in the end, it can be argued that there is no consensus among 
structural realists about whether China can rise peacefully without 
threatening its neighbours or not. The only important point on which both the 
sides agree is that the structure of international system forces great powers to 
compete among themselves for power. 
Finally in this study, an attempt has been made to highlight different 
areas, regions and fields in which both the Asian Giants - China and India, 
will and are competing with each other to gain more and more influence, 
power and strategic importance relative to each other in accordance with the 
above discussed Structural Realist Rules. Again, cooperation in some other 
arenas can not be ruled-out between the two giants. 
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Economic Relations between China and India in a Theoretical 
Perspective 
The idea of trade and economic relations between nations being 
conducive to international peace can be found in the writings of English 
thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. In the modern times, 
liberal theorists view the gradual erosion of 'high politics' such as formal state 
to state diplomacy in favour of 'low politics'^^. In such a situation, nation-
states are caught in a web of 'complex interdependence'^^ where conventional 
representations of state power have lost much of their former relevance. 
Accordingly, the proponents of liberalism would assert that these new 
economic ties would ultimately lead to the peaceful relations among nations. 
Realising that India and China have made tremendous progress in the 
field of trade, which stood more than $ 60 billion in 2010,^ 1 the proponents of 
liberal economic interdependence theory argue that the two states linked by 
strong bilateral trade would prefer to stay at peace rather than resort to 
conflict so as to guarantee their continued strong economic links. In spite of 
that, direct applications of the 'economic interdependence theory' have 
certain limitations in case of India and China due to the following reasons. 
Firstly, the two states are not mutually dependent. In spite of surge in 
Sino-India trade in recent years, India is a secondary source of commerce for 
China when compared with USA, European Union and Japan. 
Secondly, the trade relations between the two states is profoundly 
unbalanced.^ 
Thirdly, Indian exports to China are mainly raw materials like iron are. 
The Chinese on the other side have flooded the Indian markets with hi-tech 
and cheap finished products. 
Fourthly, one more important point to note is that liberal economic 
theory believes in the interconnectedness of political and economic aspects, 
i.e., economic incentives can lead to reduction of political hostility, but this 
liberal principle does not hold strong ground in case of China. This can be 
discerned from the fact that despite China's trade with India, Japan and 
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Taiwan have substantially grown over the past few years, but the political 
issues between China and these states are intact and often remain volatile. 
The underlying assumption of the liberal version of international 
economy is harmony of interests at the economic level. The aim of economic 
activity is described as the maximisation of collective wealth, however, as 
John Stuart Mill pointed out in "Principles of Political Economy", the 
harmony of interests at the economic level is effective only if there is a 
symmetrical interdependence among states but as economic power is not 
equally distributed among them, this harmony is difficult to built.23 In case of 
Sino-lndia relations, the balance of power is favourably tilted towards China 
vis-a-vis India - economically, politically, strategically and even militarily. In 
this context, it might not be consistent to assume that free trade between the 
two states will promote harmony of interests. Keeping in view this theoretical 
background, an argument has been put forward in this study that India 
should niake its position strong vis-a-vis China. It should erihance its military, 
political, economic and human resource power so that any cooperation or 
interaction in any field whether political or economic would be 
interdependent in nature, which is the best guarantee for the peaceful rise of 
both the states. In this regard, Alka Acharya argues that though there is, as 
yet no 'Complex Interdependence' between China and India, both appear to 
have embarked on this path and ultimately when the relationship between 
the two states based on economic interdependence will be final, it would 
serve as a mitigating factor in Sino-Indian relations.^-! 
Security Dilemma in Sino-lndia Relations 
The security dilemma is a concept in international relations theory 
according to which the means by which one state seeks to increase its security 
have the unintended effect of decreasing the security of another state, which 
in turn, makes a similar response having a similar effect leading to a cycle of 
competitive moves that in the worst case result in conflict.^s More generally, a 
security dilemma arises out of the anarchic nature of the international system. 
In the absence of a common and superior power, which can protect it, each 
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state tries to maintain its own security for its survival and existence. Faced 
with the great responsibility, state try to expand their power- economically, 
politically, militarily and strategically, so as to defend them should the need 
arise.26 However, by increasing their own power in this way they may make 
their neighbours less secure. This compels those neighbours to take counter-
measures to enhance their own power. Thus, a common search for security 
creates a situation in which both powers feel less secure. For example, 
the weapons that a state can use for their own self-protection, potentially or 
actually threaten to harm others^^. 
Since the inception of the People's Republic of China and the Republic 
of India, on the world stage in 1949 and 1947 respectively, both the states have 
been forging relations with other powers regional or otherwise, to increase 
their security perceptions. After the Indo-Pak war in 1965 and in 1971, 
Sino-Pak cordial entente came into existence. This Sino-Pak nexus alarmed the 
Indian security perceptions which compelled her to lean towards Soviet 
Union and which ultimately led to the Indo-Soviet Friendship and Peace 
Treaty in 1971. Both the sides realised that their bilateral relationship was 
increasingly sensitive to their relationship with other major powers. During 
and after the cold war, both the giants used their relationship with the U.S.A. 
to gain strategic advantage over the other. That is the main reason, when one 
state tries to forge the close relations with U.S.A. it tremendously increases the 
security apprehensions in the other country. It can be illustrated from the fact 
that the growing relations between China and U.S. after the end of cold war, 
increased apprehensions among India and about the prospect of a 
Sino-American Joint hegemony over the Sub-Continent. On the other hand, 
warming relations between India and U.S. in the recent years have raised 
apprehensions in China about India joining the American containment plan 
against China. Thus, the fear of hostile strategic aligiunents by the other has 
gained ground in both the states and laid the basis for what international 
relations theorists call the "Security Dilemma"28. What one nation sees as a 
necessary step in protecting its own interests be it upgrading their weapons, 
building infrastructure along the Sino-India border, gain access to new 
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markets or regional organisations like Association for South East Nations 
(ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and 
other organisations, building strategic relations with other countries like 
U.S.A., Japan and Pakistan, are seen by other as an aggressive move to 
undermine its position. The Security Dilemma, thus, sets-off the two mutually 
suspicious nations on an ever escalating competition resulting in reducing 
security for both. It is under these theoretical perspectives that some analysts 
predict in Asia a coming battle for supremacy between India and China.^ ^ 
They maintain that the overlapping areas of influence between China and 
India and the determination of both the countries to emerge as major powers 
on the world stage, will ultimately result into the open conflict between the 
two giants. 
It cannot be refuted that there are divergence of interests between the 
two states. They have been wary at each other since 1962. However, the 
nature of their rivalry is different today as compared to pre-cold war period. 
Today, rising China and emerging India are more powerful nations, have 
wide ranging interests, are driven by strongest nationalist impulse with high 
economic growth rates. They have repeatedly found themselves at odds in 
reshaping regional and global international institutions. India has been wary 
of China's increasing influence in the South Asian Association Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC). While as China has sought to limit India's role in East 
Asian institutions, both have clashed over the reform of global nuclear regime 
and UN Security Council.^o India watches China carefully and keeps a close 
watch on China's military assistance to Pakistan. China has also its own 
concern e.g., India's hosting of the Tibetan government in exile. Both the 
countries pay careful attention to each other's military developments, 
whether nuclear capabilities, planned blue water navies, missile tests or the 
exercises of troops along their common border.^^ 
Thus, it becomes clear that these three theoretical frameworks do not 
provide an optimistic or bright picture of Sino-Indian relations. However, in 
spite of all these facts, the civilisational and cultural links between the two 
countries provide India and China with the foundation to build a strong 
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relationship. Besides, the present global economic drive has made it essential 
for both the states to look afresh at each other as friends and cooperate with 
each other in order to address varied problems at the bilateral, regional and 
global level. Hence in the contemporary international scenario, they can not 
afford any potential confrontation which may upset their economic 
development and their ambitions of big power status. Within these 
parameters, substantial measure of success has been achieved by now in the 
endeavour to establish mutual understanding. The two countries have been 
successful in maintaining relative peace and tranquillity along the Sino-lndia 
border though there are material differences in perception regarding the exact 
demarcation of boundary. Moreover, Sino-lndia relations have been 
diversified in various other fields and a series of dialogue mechanisms are in 
place including on subjects such as counter terrorism, security issues, and 
joint stand on global issues. High level visits are also being exchanged 
regularly. However, the fact that Sino-lndia relation today seem to be better 
than at any time during the last four decades, should not lead one to assume 
that all hurdles in the relationship have been overcome. Despite improvement 
in Sino-Indian relations, an under-current of mutual mistrust continues to 
haunt Sino-lndia relations due to various facts as discussed in the preceding 
page. It can be asserted that the Sino-Indian current relations are complex 
where competition and cooperation, suspicion and trust, friendliness and 
rivalry co-exist side by side. 
If the rivalry culminates in war, it is bound to diminish both China and 
India. Thus, the big question is whether the two can manage their rivalry by 
keeping it limited and peaceful. Without, the wisdom to do so both will find it 
difficult to realise their larger global aspirations. 
In the 21st century, as both the giants will emerge as the great powers, 
both have the responsibility to reshape the world in a more positive and 
equitable manner. In future, both the states will play an important role in 
framing the international rules (the current international negotiations on 
global warming are main example in this regard). It will be even more evident 
in the future, as China and India position themselves at the top of global 
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power hierarchy, peaceful co-existence and deeper bilateral cooperation 
between China and India, are then the primary pre-conditions for stable and 
sustainable world order in the 21^' century and most importantly for the 21 ** 
century itself, to be regarded as an 'Asian century'. 
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SINO-INDIA RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW 
Pre-Independence Era 
Sino-Indian relations or China-India relations, for the purpose of this 
study imply the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the 
Republic of India. Both the giants of Asia are two of the oldest and living 
civilizations of the world. They have religious, cultural and trading links 
dating back to 2500 years. Their interaction was a two way traffic and the 
two elenients of this exchange were material and spiritual, which were 
mainly facilitated by the central Asian route which is also known as the 
'Silk Route'-1 
In the sphere of material exchange, India supplied the trade items such 
as corals, pearls, glass and fragrances while silk was the major item 
transported from China to India. Besides material exchanges, it was the 
spiritual linkage (primarily based on Buddhism) that altogether transformed 
the relationship between the two ancient civilizations. During this period, 
many Chinese pilgrims visited India and also some Indian pilgrims visited 
China. The most noteworthy anaong the Chinese pilgrims were Fa-Hien 
(399-414 A.D.), Yuan Chwang (630-643 A.D.) and I- Tsing (671-695 A.D.) 
Among the Indian Scholars who went to China were Kumarajiva (401 A.D.) 
Guna Verma (431 A.D.) and Dharmagupta (590 A.D.)2. These spiritual visits 
from India to China and from China to India enhanced and strengthened 
mutual understanding, which acted as a means in modern history of China 
and India for extending mutual help and understanding to each other's 
peoples during their respective liberation struggles. 
Though, these material and spiritual interaction between the two 
civilizations continued during the first few centuries of the Christian era, the 
process ceased after about tenth century A.D. Since then, both the states lived 
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as if they were unaware of each other's existence for over a thousand years, 
until about the advent of nineteenth century when both came under the 
influence of European powers. After that, India was totally colonised by the 
British and China was slowly and gradually transformed into semi-colonial 
society. Though the colonialism did not completely turn off the centuries old 
relationship between China and India but made its pace slow and sluggish. 
However because of their long association and having suffered the same fate, 
they extended moral support and sympathy to each other in their respective 
anti-imperialist struggle. They became natural allies and devised various 
ways to push the imperialist out of their countries. 
Jawaharlal Nehru based his vision of 'Resurgent Asia' on friendship 
between the two largest states of Asia. He was aware of the fact that after the 
liberation of both the states from the Western clutches, the tremendous 
potential of economic cooperation would necessarily bring India and China 
closer to each other and politically too, the two would play an important role 
in world affairs. However, after the end of the War, China plunged into Civil 
War between ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communists. The 
well armed KMT army was backed by the Americans, but in spite of that the 
Communists eventually, on 01 October, 1949 defeated the Kuomintang 
regime and came to power in China. In pre-Communist China, India had 
established very cordial relations with KMT government especially after 1939 
when Jawaharlal Nehru visited China. However, after the Communist 
establishment in China, Nehru was convinced that public opinion in India 
was against KMT and lending support to it, would not be favoured in India. 
Thus respecting the victory of Communist party of China (CPC) over KMT, 
India recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate 
government of China on April 1, 1950. On this occasion Nehru remarked, 
"When it was clear that the new Chinese government was in possession of 
entire mainland of China, when it was quite clear that there was no force 
which was likely to supplant it or push it away, we offered recogrution to this 
new government and suggested that we might exchange diplomatic 
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missions "3. After Burma, India was the second non-Communist country to 
recognize the new People's Republic of China. 
Post-Independent Era 
After their independence, India in 1947 and China in 1949, both 
initiated the process of nation-building. They adopted different models of 
development as their political systems were not similar. India adopted the 
path of parliamentary democracy, mixed model of economy and 
non-alignment, while as China fallowed one party rule of communism, 
state-controlled economy and joined the communist camp of Soviet Union^. 
However, the difference in their political systems did not hinder in any way 
the growing friendly relations between the two states. 
In 1948, India established diplomatic relations with China. The first 
Prime Minister of independent of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, viewed Indian 
independence and the Chinese revolution as parallel expressions of new and 
resurgent Asian nationalism and thereby visualized that in new Asia, China 
and India were destined to play a vital and competitive leadership roles. 
He therefore, wanted the two nations to be friendly to each other. In this 
regard, India adopted several positive postures towards China such as India's 
efforts for localizing the conflict in Korea, its advocacy of China's entry into 
the United Nations and its consistent support to China on the question of 
integration of Taiwan. All these moves, on the part of India were highly 
appreciated by the Chinese. These developments helped in the enhancement 
of friendly relatioris between India and China which led to the exchange of 
state visits by the Prime Ministers of the two nations. Jawaharlal Nehru 
visited China twice in 1954 and in 1956 and the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai 
paid four visits^ to India between June 1954 and January 1957 .^ 
Tibet Issue 
The issue of Tibet has been a major irritant in the cordial relations 
between India and China. In fact, it is a British legacy that led to the stress 
and strain in the friendly relations between the two states even after their 
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independence. Back to pre-independence period, the British India recognized 
the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet subject to internal autonomy and British 
presence in Tibet. Naturally, after independence India inherited from the 
British the political and economic rights in Tibet. In line with the British, India 
also acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but subject to Tibet's status 
as an autononious unit. 
On the other side, all Chinese leaders from Kuomintang nationalists to 
Communists regarded Tibet as an integral part of China. Tibetan liberation 
became the most important issue on the agenda of liberating the Chinese 
territories lost in the past. To this effect, the Chinese leadership enunciated 
the "Five Finger Theory", that Tibet is China's Palm and Nepal, Bhutan, 
Sikkim and NFEA are its five figures^. Thus the Chinese leadership declared 
that liberation of Tibet was one of the basic tasks of the PLA. Finally on 
October 7,1950 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Tibet contrary to 
the mutual understanding between India and China over Tibet. The Indian 
government sent a special note to China expressing its shock and regret over 
the decision to liberate Tibet by force. India argued that the Tibet problem 
should be resolved by peaceful negotiations and the legitimate Tibetan claim 
to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty. However, China 
regarded it as an Indian interference into its internal affairs and stated that 
Tibet is an integral part of China besides the problem of Tibet is entirely a 
domestic problem. In this regard, India maintained that it had accepted Tibet 
as a part of China and that Dalai Lama was being treated in India as head of 
religion, the Chinese continued to suspect India's bona fides. Chinese 
representatives in UN openly stated that it was India that provoked the revolt 
in Tibet which led to the exodus of Dalai Lama as well as several thousand 
refugees from their country. They were given shelter and treated as 
government in exile^. However, India while accepting Chinese suzerainty in 
Tibet made it clear that she had no territorial and political ambitions in Tibet. 
India was particularly concerned about Tibetan autonomy and certain Indian 
commercial and cultural rights inherited from historical usages, traditions 
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and agreements. 
There was a great demand from several quarters in India particularly 
from the public that India should change its policy towards China, but its 
policy of peaceful settlement of differences with China did not change. 
Jawaharlal Nehru was of the view that militarily weak India could do nothing 
other than accept the fait accompli in Tibet. In this way Tibet fell completely 
into the hands of Communist China. It was left with no other choice than to 
negotiate on Chinese terms. In order to live peacefully under Chinese 
suzerainty, Tibet found it necessary to develop friendly relations with China 
and accordingly signed the 'Sino-Tibetan Seventeen Points Agreement'^ in 
1951. By this agreement, the Tibetans lost the virtual de facto independent 
status. Though this Treaty brought Tibet into Chinese fold, but it also 
guaranteed Tibet's regional autonomy. 
The occupation of Tibet by the China had far-reaching implications on 
Sino-Indian relations. The two nations were now face-to-face in the 
Himalayas with the disappearance of Tibet as a Buffer State. After Tibet 
ceased to act as buffer state between China and India, their problems began to 
take shape. This was because the Tibetan borders became an issue directly 
between the Chinese and Indian governments and this enhanced the security 
perception of India regarding its northern frontiers. 
"India-China Agreement on Trade and Intercourse'' (1954) or 
Panchsheel 
The beginning of a new phase in Sino-India relations was initiated 
with the signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse 
between India and the Tibet Region of China on 29 April, 1954. Article I of the 
Agreement provided for the establishment of Chinese Trade Agencies in 
New Delhi, Kalimpong and Calcutta, while India was to have its Trade 
agencies in Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok^o. With the signing of this 
Agreement, India renounced the traditional position it had enjoyed in Tibet 
as inheritor in British Treaty rights. Moreover, as per the Preamble to the 
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Agreement the two states have resolved to enter the present Agreement 
based on the following Principles: ^^  
(a) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; 
(b) mutual non-aggression; 
(c) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 
(d) equality and mutual benefit and 
(e) Peaceful co-existence. 
The agreement was regarded as the most important step by India 
towards world peace and mainly between China and India. Thus, while 
suggesting the incorporation of Panchsheel in the Preamble of the 
India-China Agreement, Nehru contemplated that this would ensure peace 
and friendship between India and China as the latter would abide by the 
principles which have been authored by its Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. 
He was hopeful of its positive impact on the political environment of Asia 
and thought that the implementation of Panchsheel would generate peace in 
the region. 
Although this treaty was regarded as the landmark in strengthening 
the mutual relationship between the two nations, there were also some critics 
of it. Nehru's faith and trust in China made him face sever opposition in the 
Parliament which was extremely critical about the clause related to Tibet. 
While criticizing Nehru in the Parliament on 15th May 1954, Acharya 
Kripalani who was opposition deputy said, "China has demolished a Buffer 
state; in international politics when a buffer state is abolished by a powerful 
nation that nation is considered to have aggressive designs on its 
neighbors. "12 p^ g ^vas particularly referring to the conceding of Chinese 
claims over Tibet. Through this Agreement, India has recognized Chinese 
suzerainty over Tibet. Nevertheless, the general reaction in India to the new 
pact was favourable. In this regard, Nehru said, we have done no better thing 
than this since we became independent. Subsequently, bi-lateral relations 
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between India and China were marked by the Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai (Indians 
and Chinese are brothers) phase till it rapidly deteriorated from late fifties. 
Deterioration of Relations 
(a) Tibet Uprising 
China's imposition of centralized state structure provoked a Tibetan 
national uprising in 1959. The Sino-Tibetan Agreement of May 23,1951 had 
included Tibet into the 'big family of motherland'- The People's Republic of 
Chinai3. The Treaty however, granted Tibet regional autonomy and 
continuation of existing political system. However, China soon after 
tightening its grip over Tibet step by step eliminated Indian influence from 
Tibet. All these developments have a direct bearing on India's political 
interests. Apart from close cultural contacts between the Indian people and 
Tibetan people, India has also inherited, as a successor state, certain political 
and economic rights in Tibet from the British Indian government. The Indian 
sympathy towards Tibet and the political asylum to Dalai Lama and his 
followers (nearly ten thousand) bewildered China. Indian public was very 
much concerned about the Chinese denial of autonomy and repressive 
military measures against the Tibetans. China responded with an extreme 
anger and started taking anti-India moves both at regional as well as 
international level. The Indian traders and nationals in Tibet were also 
harassed. China initiated a steady build-up of army in Tibet. India's relations 
with China deteriorated further when the later crushed the Tibetan uprising. 
(b) Boundary Dispute 
It was on January 23, 1959 that Mr. Chou Enlai, in a letter to 
Mr. Nehru, for the first, questioned the established boundary between India 
and China.i4 Further, it was on September 1959, the Goverriment of China, for 
the first time, laid a formal claim to 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in 
the Ladakh and in North-East Frontier Agencies.is The boundary between 
India and China has been divided into three sectors- the western sector, the 
middle sector and the eastern sector in the North India. Small clashes 
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between China and India in all these sectors along the McMahon Line began 
from mid and late fifties. China adopted the position that its boundary with 
India had never been formally delineated.!^ Therefore, it called for 
negotiations and compromise on the basis of traditional customary lines. 
India however, argued that the boundary was well defined on both natural 
historical grounds in the west and juridical grounds in the east and it refused 
further negotiatioris for the border. The border conflict is rooted in the 
disputed status of the McMahon Line, which defines the border between 
India and Tibet according to the 1914 Simla Convention between British India 
and Tibet.1^ The territorial claim of India is based on this agreement. 
However, China considers Tibet as a local Government without treating-
making authority and thus challenges the validity of the colonial era 
boundary agreement involving Tibet^ ^ jt must be reiterated here that neither 
the Kuomintang (KMT) nor the communist regimes of China ever 
acknowledged the McMahon Line. 
In 1954, the border issue was raised by Prime Minister Nehru. 
He brought into the notice of Zhou ErJai certain Chinese maps which showed 
the large areas of Indian Territory within China. In reply, Chou Enlai said the 
map was an 'Old' reproduction of a publication from the "pre-liberation 
period" and that as his government was busy it would do the needful soon.^' 
Again in December, 1958 Nehru pointed out that the continued 
misrepresentation of India's border in Chinese maps should be rectified as 
soon as possible. In reply, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai claimed some forty 
thousand (40000) square miles of Indian Territory in the eastern and western 
sectors. 
. The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited India on April 1960. He held 
discussions with Nehru and other Indian leaders on the boundary issue. 
Though it was a serious attempt to settle the border issue, but the parties 
could not reach an agreement on boundary dispute. A brief joint 
communique issued on 25 April, stated that the talks did not result in 
resolving the differences that have arisen. However, both sides agreed that 
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officials examine all the historical evidence including documents and records 
and submit report for the consideration of two governments. It was in 
December, 1960 that the two divergent reports were published by two sides. 
Thus the officials failed to reach consensus on any of the fundamental issues 
on agenda. It failed because "neither side was willing to surrender its 
territorial claims or make reasonable concessions, for to do so would be 
against the national security interests of each other."2o 
The Border War and Colombo Proposals 
It was on 8 September, 1962 that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
marched across the well established McMahon Line in the eastern sector and 
thereafter, the Chinese invasion on 20 October, 1962 all along the border from 
eastern sector to western sector changed the entire complexion of India-China 
relations overwhelming the limited Indian frontier posts.^i 
At the same time Chinese Premier Chou En-lai proposed a three-point 
cease fire formula on 24 October, 1962. 
1. Pending a peaceful settlement both parties would respect the Line of 
Actual Control (LAC) between the two sides along the entire 
Sino-India border and the armed forces of each side would withdraw 
20 kilometres from this line. 
2. Provided the Indian government agreed to this proposal, China would 
withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector to the north of the 
line of actual control, while both China and India would 
simultaneously undertake not to cross the line of control in the middle 
and western sectors. 
3. Talks between the two Prime ministers would be held once again to 
seek a friendly settlement.22 
However, Nehru while rejecting the proposals replied on 27 October, 
that India would welcome any Chinese representatives for peaceful 
settlement, provided China reverted to the position as it prevailed all along 
the boundary prior to 8 September 1962. Meanwhile once again China 
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launched a massive attack on the eastern front on 15 November 1962 on the 
Sino-Indian border which resulted in the quick dissipation of Indian 
resistance in other regions also. On November 21, 1962 the Chinese 
goverrunent unilaterally announced a ceasefire along the entire border and 
withdrawal of armed forces to twenty kilometres behind the 1959 Line of 
Actual Control as existing on 7 November 1959. The statement further 
warned that if Indian troops continue their attacks after the ceasefire or cross 
the Line of Actual Control and recover positions prior to 8 September, 1962 
China would fight back. The Chinese also expressed the hope that if Indian 
government agreed to take corresponding measures, Sino-Indian negotiations 
could be initiated, which would include twenty kilometres withdrawal by 
both the sides and setting up a demilitarized zone, the establishment of check 
posts by each party on its side of the Line of Actual Control. However, Nehru 
while rejecting the Chinese proposals once again said that, "there could be no 
negotiations unless the position existing on 8 September 1962 was restored."^3 
As a result of the war, India and china withdrew their ambassadors from the 
respective countries but their embassies continued to function in a routine 
manner. 
Colombo Proposals 
In order to break the stalemate and provide a basis for agreed ceasefire 
arrangements, the representatives of Six afro-Asian countries (Ceylon now 
Sri Lanka, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, U.A.R. and Ghana) met at Colombo 
between 10* and 12* December, 1962 and made certain proposals.24 The six 
Afro-Asian nations called on both India and China to settle their differences 
peacefully by evolving a 'Ceasefire Formula' which was later known as 
Colombo proposals. The Colombo proposals provided that: 
(1) In the western sector, the Chinese should withdraw twenty kilometres 
of the traditional customary line as claimed by China without any 
corresponding withdrawal on the Indian side. The vacated areas 
would be demilitarized zone to be manned by civilian posts of both 
sides. 
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(2) In the eastern sector, the line of Actual Control (LAC) which was 
recognized by both the sides was to be treated as a ceasefire line. 
(3) So far as the middle sector was concerned, the proposals 
recommended the status quo to be maintained. 
"The Conference believes", said this unanimously adopted document, 
"that these (Colombo) proposals, which could help in consolidating the 
cease-fire, once implemented, should pave the way for discussion between 
representatives entailed in the cease-fire position, "^ s Thus, these proposals 
attempted to provide an equitable and fair basis for further negotiations 
between the two nations. While India accepted these proposals after seeking 
some clarifications, China rejected it and asked for negotiations without any 
pre-condition. Further they refused to let Indian troops reoccupy and 
establish civilian check posts in Chinese vacated areas and they also refused 
to accept India's continuous demand of seven civilian posts in Ladakh 
(Western frontier) .26 
Post-war Relationship 
The stalemate in the Sino-Indian relations continued in the years 
following the death of Jawaharlal Nehru. The new Prime Minister, 
Lai Bhadur Shastri, reiterated the Indian government's willingness to 
consider China's vacation of its civilian posts in Ladakh as fulfilment of 
Colombo proposals'. However, China showed no inclination to accept the 
Colombo Proposals as a basis for negotiations with India. It continued to keep 
the tension on the Sino-Indian borders alive and also carried on hostile 
propaganda against India's domestic and international policies. The relations 
between China and India further deteriorated when on October 16, 1964 
China exploded atom bomb and thereby conducted its first nuclear tests. 
The nuclear tests conducted by China increased the level of India's threat 
perception. Further during Indo-Pak war in September, 1965 China 
supported Pakistan and used every possible means to pressurize India. 
It even accused India of intruding into Chinese territory. Prior to Indo-Pak 
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War, China and Pakistan concluded a boundary protocol on March, 1965 
which involved the territory in Jammu and Kashmir. China which was 
already in possession of about 15000 square miles of Kashmir territory, 
through this Sino-Pak Protocol, Pakistan had handed over another 2000 sq. 
miles to it. India termed it as "legally invalid and politically mischeives."27 
and categorically rejected the protocol. China also reiterated its territorial 
claims on the eastern and western sectors of the border and carried out a 
series of minor intrusion across the border. Thus, after the Sino-India war, 
Chinese hostile activities kept the fear alive on the border. 
In 1969, the Cultural Revolutions^ came to an end in China. 
China began modernization in its internal and external policies. China 
showed more flexibility in its approach towards India and maintained that 
status-quo should be maintained on the Sino-India border. India responded 
favourably to the Chinese post-revolution mood of moderation and 
conciliation. 
However, this warmness in the relations between the two states during 
1970's was short lived due to the developments in East Pakistan. China 
accused India of interfering into the internal affairs of Pakistan. On December 
3, 1971, the war between Indian and Pakistan broke out in the Eastern and 
western fronts. During the Indo-Pak war, China adopted various techniques 
to pressurize India but played a very limited role in the war as compared to 
1965 Indo-Pak war. All these developments gave a big jolt to the process of 
normalization of relations between India and China. However, with the 
conclusion of Simla Agreement (1972) between India and Pakistan, China 
slotted its attitude towards India. 
Normalization of Relations 
During the mid seventies, there took some significant changes in both 
the China's and India's internal politics. These changes which were mostly 
political in nature provided an opportunity for both the states to reorient their 
policies towards each other. In China the new leader Deng Xiaoping started 
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the programme of modernization. For this purpose, China took steps to 
improve its relatioris with all its neighbours because peaceful border was 
necessary for the moderruzation. Moreover, China comes to realize the India's 
new role and status. To begin with, India's refusal to sign Soviet sponsored 
Asian Collective Security Treaty convinced China of India being independent 
in its foreign policy choices. Again India had become the most dominant 
power centre in South Asia after the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971. 
Further Chinese linked Indo-Soviet friendship with Indo-China hostility and 
improvement of Indo-China relations was considered necessary in distancing 
India from Soviet Union. It was in this Context that the demand far 
improvement of Indo-China relations gradually became stronger. 
In 1977, for the first time the non-Congress party (Junta Party) came to 
power at the Union in India. China looked at the change of government from 
Congress to non Congress as positively and hoped that the new government 
would reorient its foreign policy positively towards China. The Junta 
government was certainly interested in strengthening India's relation with 
China. It was prepared to respond positively to every little gesture from the 
Chinese side and do everything possible to sustain the atmosphere of 
expectation utilizing every possible opportunity to consolidate and carry 
forward the efforts for improved relations 9^. For this purpose, Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee the then Indian External Affairs Minister paid a visit to China in 
1979. The main agenda of his visit was to exchange views with Chinese 
leaders regarding the normalization of relations between the two states. 
During these talks, Vajpayee identified the border problem as the key 
obstacle to the normalization of Sino-India relations. The Chinese also agreed 
that the boundary question should not prevent us from improving our 
relations in other fields. It was agreed that the five principles of peaceful 
co-existence should be the basis of normalization of bilateral relations and 
settlement of border disputes. 
While Vajpayee was still in China holding discussions with the 
Chinese leaders, China attacked Vietnam. Deng Xiaoping Chinese Premier 
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while talking to the press said "We shall teach Vietnam a lesson as we have 
taught one to India in 19623°. Subsequently, Vajpayee had to cut short his 
visit. Under severe criticism in Parliament, the government of India finally 
denounced the Chinese action as an aggression against Vietnam. Thus, the 
Chinese aggression on Vietnam halted the positive environment which was 
created by Vajpayee's visit to China. 
The Junta regime collapsed in 1979 and Mrs. Indira Gandhi once again 
came to power in January, 1980. The Chinese premier Hua Guofeng on 15 
January, 1980 congratulated Mrs. Gandhi on her assumption of the office of 
premiership. Though India and China differed considerably on various 
international issues (Afghanistan and Vietnam's role in Cambodia), yet both 
countries had been realizing the need to get away from conflictual 
relationship and to reduce the tension. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was aware of the 
fact that any policy of leaning towards the Soviet Union would not serve 
India's long term security interests. She realized that India's long term 
interests could be served only by expanding its ties with the United States 
and improving relations with China. China, on the other hand also came to 
the conclusion that more it denounced India, the closer it would push it 
towards Soviet Union. After Deng Xiaoping emerged as the supreme leader 
of China and his launching of modernization, this thinking was in 
consonance with the general thrust of economic taking precedence over 
politics. It was during mid-eighties that China began to cultivate balanced 
relations with both Super Powers- U.S.A. and Soviet Union and advocated 
peaceful co-existence. It was necessary from the Chinese view point because it 
helped in weakening Soviet opposition to Sino-India friendly relations and 
mitigated Indian fear of US-China-Pakistan axis against India. 
*•? In order to resume negotiations on border issue, it was on June 
1980 that the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping revived Zhou Enlai's "Package 
proposal" of 1960 by proposing that "Beijing would recognize the Line of 
Actual Control in the eastern sector if India recognized the status-quo in the 
western sector."3i But the package deal was rejected by India as it aimed to 
35 
legitimize Chinese occupation in Western Sector between 1959 and 1967. 
While rejecting the Deng's Proposal, Indian government maintained, after all 
late Premier Zhou Enlai had proposed particularly the same thing in New 
Delhi talks of 1960 and the Indian side had rejected it. Deng now proposed 
that in the Eastern Sector, China could recognize the McMahon Line as 
demanded by India; in return India could concede Aksai Chin to China in the 
Western Sector.32 However, it did not offer any territorial compensation to 
India. On the other hand, India wanted to settle the border question in 
accordance with the national honour and interests of both the sides on the 
basis of equality. 
On 16 June, 1981, the Chinese Vice premier and Foreign Minister, 
Houng Hua visited India. It was the first important visit of India by a Chinese 
leader since the late premier Zhou Enlai's visit in 1960. Haung Hau held 
exterisive talks with Indian leaders on international and bilateral issues. 
After the visit of Haung to India, both sides held eight rounds of talks 
concerning border negotiations between December 1981 and November, 1987. 
Though these talks initially raised hopes for resolving the border dispute 
between India and China but these talks achieved nothing because both sides 
charged one another of military intrusion into each other's territory. 
Sino-Indian relations deteriorated further during mid-1980's fallowing the 
Indian allegations about Chinese intrusion in the Sumdurong Chu Valley in 
the Twang area which India claimed to be within its territory. Besides it, there 
were two other developments that strained the Sino-Indian relations further. 
The first was the conferment of statehood to Arunachal Pradesh by India and 
the second was to organize military exercise (Operation Chequer Board 
1986-1987) along the Sino-India border.33 The Chinese regarded these moves 
as provocative and started moving troops to Tibet. With these developments, 
the second Sino-India border war became inevitable. However, both the states 
had embarked on plains for economic modernization and required peace for 
the pursuit of these goals. It was this realization that had pulled the two sides 
away from the path of military confrontation. 
36 
The relaxation in international tensions as a result of the detente in 
U.S.-Soviet relations, improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and other 
international factors provided a fresh initiative for improvement in 
Sino-Indian relations. It was in this context that Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 
December 1988. Following his visit, Sino-lndia relations became more cordial 
than at any time since the mid-1950s.34 It was the first visit to China by an 
Indian PM Prime Minister since Jawaharlal Nehru (1954).35 During his visit 
both sides agreed that the boundary question should be settled through 
peaceful and friendly negotiatioris on the basis of Panchsheel. Besides, both 
the sides decided to set-up a Joint Working Group (JWG) on boundary issues, 
which will make recommendations for the overall solution of the boundary 
question. They also agreed to develop relations in the other fields as well like 
science and technology, civil aviation to establish direct air links and on 
cultural exchanges. The major factor which compelled both India and China 
to move in the direction of normalization of relation was their common 
pre-occupation with the tasks of development. Rajiv Gandhi talked much 
about Indian going into 21st Century^^. For this purpose, he called for a 
process of modernization on all fronts. The convergence of this approach with 
Deng Xiaoping's approach to modernization in Post-Mao China represents a 
significant trend. All these developments gave new impetus to the process of 
normalization of relations between the two states. 
V During his visit to China, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has invited the 
Chinese Premier to pay a return visit to India which was accepted by the 
latter. It was on December, 1991 that the Chinese Premier Li Peng paid a visit 
to India. It was the first visit by a Chinese Prime Minister to India since Zhou 
Enlai's visit in 1960. During his visit to India, the two leaders held extensive 
talks and reiterated that efforts would be made to arrive at mutually 
acceptable solution to the boundary question. On the question of Sino-lndia 
Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary question, both sides believed 
that it had enhanced mutual understanding. Further, they agreed to maintain 
peace and restraint clashes with each other in the area along with the Line of 
37 
Actual Control (LAC). It was also agreed upon by both the sides that the 
periodic meetings between the military personnel in the border areas should 
be held on regular basis. 
In the light of above mentioned developments, it becomes clear that 
both sides had taken a step by step approach to resolve the boundary 
questions. Though the process of resolving the border dispute was slow one 
with its phases of ups and downs, but the differences on the border issue had 
not been allowed to affect the overall progress of rapprochement between 
India and China. 
Relations in post Cold War era till 1996 
The normalization of Sino-India relations gained momentum in the 
post-Cold War period wherein the global strategic environment had come 
under considerable realignments. To begin with, the end of Cold War 
brought dramatic changes in the global strategic environment. The Soviet 
Union was no more and the U.S.A. emerged as the sole Super Power. The 
bi- polarity was replaced by uni-polarity. China and India found themselves 
at the receiving end in such a uni-polar global order. China was especially 
perplexed with U.S.A.'s pronouncements on the issues of human rights, trade 
issues, and nuclear technology transfers and weapons sale and India which 
was regarded as the close ally of former Soviet Union has also come under 
pressure from U.S.A. on a range of issues like nuclear weapons and missile 
proliferation, economic liberalization and intellectual property rights.^^ China 
and India were fully aware that the main objective of American strategy in 
the post-cold war world was to check the emergence of any great power that 
can challenge American dominance in anywhere in Europe or in Asians. 
Further both China and India aspire to emerge as an independent power 
centres in a multi-polar world where regional powers will dominate in their 
respective spheres of influence. Thus, both China and India aspires benefit in 
making common cause with each other so as to resist arm -twisting by the 
United States. It was this realization which led to the rapprochement in the 
Sino- Indian relations in the post cold war era. The rapprochement process 
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was initiated with the Indian president R. Venkataraman's visit to china in 
199239 During his visit both nations expressed satisfaction at the working of 
the Joint Working Group (JWG) and agreed to deepen economic cooperation. 
They also laid emphasis on taking concrete steps to promote mutual 
confidence Building Measures (CBM's) including mutual troop reductions 
and regular meetings of local military commanders. Border trade was also 
resumed in July, 1992 after a gap of more than 30 years. The Indian initiative 
of sending its Defence Minister Sharad Pa war to China in July 1992 was a 
milestone in Security Building Measures (SBM's) between two neighbours. 
During his visit, the two sides agreed to develop academic military, scientific 
and technological exchanges between the two states. 
The major step forward in strengthening the growing process of 
Sino-India rapprochement was the visit of Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao 
to China in September, 1993. During his visit, the prime Minster Narsimha 
Rao and Chinese premier Le Peng signed the "Agreement on the 
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity" along the Line of Actual Control in 
the India-China border areas. This agreement proved to be a significant 
development in the history of bilateral relations between the two nations as it 
stabilized relations on the one hand and initiated numerous Confidence 
Building Measures (CBM's) on the other hand. 
Further, an India-China Expert Group was setup by both the nations to 
demarcate the line of Actual Control (LAC) and discuss troop reduction. This 
group held two meetings, one in February, 1994 and another in April, 1994. 
The ways and means about the maintenance of peace and tranquillity over 
the common border were also discussed by them. Moreover, India and China 
relations witnessed exchange of visits throughout the year 1994. These visits 
included the important ones like the Indian Chief of Army Staff General B.C. 
Joshi's and the Chinese Defence Minister Chi Hation's to each other's 
countries. The Indian Vice President K.R. Narayan also paid a three day visit 
to China from 21, November. For promoting cultural ties between India and 
China, a cultural festival namely "Festival of India" was held in Beijing on 
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May 6. All these factors and more importantly the two visits by Indian Prime 
Ministers Rajiv Gandhi (1988) and Narsimaha Rao (1993) to China proved to 
be landmarks in the normalization process of Sino-India relations. 
Conclusion 
After a brief historical background of Sino-lndia relations, it can be 
asserted that though the Sino-lndia relations have existed for the last two 
thousand years, but with their independence in the mid-twentieth century, 
both the states developed a very close bilateral relations characterized by 
mutual support and cooperation on many decisive national, regional and 
international issues. However, in the late fifties the relationship between the 
two states deteriorated over the border and Tibet issue which culminated in 
the 'Mini Sino-lndia War' (1962). Thereafter, the mutual relationship between 
the two states entered an era of cold war characterized by mutual distrust, 
suspicion and hostility which lasted for about two decades. The process of 
normalization of Sino-lndia relations started from late 1970s. During the late 
1980s and especially after the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's landmark 
visit to China in 1988, the complete normalization of Sino-lndia relations was 
reached. After the end of Cold War and the disintegration of Soviet Uruon, 
India and China are on the way to turning a new page of their relations by 
striving to dissolve the barriers in Sino-lndia relations left over by history and 
resume their traditional friendship and confidence in maintaining peace in 
the region and the world. 
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Chapter-Ill 
FOREIGN POLICIES OF CHINA AND INDIA: 
PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES 
Nations exist in a particular environment and any change in the 
environment requires change in the behaviour of the nations. Though the 
country's foreign policy is generally governed by numerous historical, 
political, economic, geographic, cultural, religious and other corisiderations, 
but the real motivation is always national interest.^ The desire to fulfil this 
national interest and the inability to achieve all the goals of foreign policy 
independently, gives rise to the configuration called 'interdependence of 
nations'.2 That is why every nation tries to establish bilateral and multilateral 
relations with other natioris because in the contemporary globalised world, no 
nation can survive in isolation. 
Each nation adopts its own foreign policy which is a set of principles 
and a plan of action. It is with the help of this foreign policy that a nation 
formulates, adopts and attempts to achieve the goals of national interest 
vis-a-vis other nations. It is for this reason that the behaviour of each nation at 
the global level is always determined by its foreign policy which moulds itself 
in accordance with the changes in the external environment. 
Foreign policy can be defined as a synthesis of end and means. The end 
is the national interest of a state and the means are the power and 
capabilities.^ Thus, foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives 
to be achieved and the means for achieving them. More generally, foreign 
policy can be defined as the sum-total of the principles, interests and 
objectives which a state formulates in conducting its relations with other 
nations. All these activities are evolved by nations for influencing and 
changing the behaviour of other nations and for adjusting their own activities 
to the international environment because in addition to the domestic factors, 
the international envirormient also plays an important role in foreign 
policy-making. 
44 
Principles of China's Foreign Policy 
It is important to understand the foreign policy of China in general and 
its foreign policy-making towards India in particular to appreciate and 
analyse the problems and prospects of Sino-India relations. However, it is not 
easy to understand the foreign policy of China fully as compared to India 
because while India is a democratic country with freedom of speech and open 
press, China's Communist politics is more closed in which the state has upper 
hand in each and every field. Moreover, the political stability owing to 
Communist rule and commonality of culture has allowed China to follow a 
consistent and effective foreign policy on many issues and towards many 
countries. The continuity of one-party rule i.e. Communist Party has provided 
an opportunity to People's Republic of China to develop consensus on 
important pillars of foreign policy. This is the reason that despite guided by a 
particular political ideology, the political establishment has found it easy to 
accommodate and confront the dynamics of international and regional 
politics without any strong opposition at home. 
Keeping in view the above mentioned facts, periodisation of Chinese 
foreign policy has been deliberately avoided because in China, the change of 
guards does not mean change of major policy decisioris. Many changes were 
witnessed in foreign policy of China only after the death of Mao and since 
then a kind of consistency and coherence is maintained despite change in 
political leadership of the country. 
So far as Chinese foreign policy towards India is concerned, after a 
brief honeymoon period of intimate friendship, it has been consistently mixed 
with hostility and counter balance. Thus in post 1962 period, the Sino-India 
relations have never been the much awaited and the most desirable intimacy 
and close cooperation. Nevertheless, a brief analysis of the principles of 
Chinese foreign policy is necessary to appreciate its policy towards India. 
The Peoples Republic of China was called the Peoples Democratic 
Dictatorship or a New Democracy as opposed to Western Democracy.* 
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The Foreign Policy of this New Democracy, as stated by Mao Tsung was to 
fight against imperialists and isolate and defeat the internal and external 
reactionaries. Mao himself outlined the Foreign policy of PRC in these words: 
"to unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world who treat us 
on the basis of equality, and peoples of all countries. This is to ally with Soviet 
Union, to ally with the new democratic countries of Europe and to ally with 
the proletariat and masses of the people in all countries."^ Further, it was to 
establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries on the basis of equality, 
mutual benefit and mutual respect for integrity and sovereignty. It is evident 
from the statement of Liu Thao-Chi as he noted, "since the founding of the 
People's Republic of China, the basic policy of our international relations has 
been to develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation 
with the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries; to strive for 
peaceful co-existence with countries of different social systems on the basis of 
the Five Principles and to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and 
war; to support the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed peoples and 
nations against imperialism. This is the general line of our foreign policy."^ 
After the establishment of People's Republic of China on October 1,1949, this 
guideline became the firm foundation of its Foreign Policy. 
The main principles of China's Foreign Policy can be summarised as 
under: 
Maintaining Independence, Self-Reliance and National Sovereignty; 
Opposition to Hegemonism, Safeguarding World Peace; Adhering to the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, Establishing a New Model of 
International Relations; Strengthening Unity with Developing Countries, 
Jointly Opposing Imperialism and Colonialism; Improving Relations with the 
Developed Countries to Promote Common Development; Eliminating 
Outside Interference, Promoting the Reunification of the Mother land.'^  
In addition to these Principles, there are some objectives which the 
Chinese Foreign Policy makers strive to achieve; these are: 
a) The security of their motherland; 
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b) To acquire the formerly lost Chinese territories and their unification 
with the china; 
c) To support the socialist revolutionary movements throughout the 
world; and 
d) To attain hegemony in Asia in accordance with the traditional 
Chinese empire. The Chinese feel that they must be recognised as 
equal to any great power like the United States.^ 
However, in the post-Cold War era, like many other states, China has 
to readjust its foreign policy. Broadly, without compromising it's carefully 
pursued long term objectives and goals as a major global actor, China saw 
two noteworthy changes both at the internal as well as at the external level. 
First, strategic level was marked by the disintegration of Soviet Union and the 
political plane was marred by the pro-democracy movement in 1989.^  Second, 
it saw the unfolding of economic globalisation in a steady manner.^" 
These two important changes influenced Chinese foreign policy in many 
ways. From now onwards internal stability was keyword for the domestic 
political order which was important for the continuation of economic 
modernisation. Moreover, the end of bi-polarity and the emergence of U.S as 
the sole super power, compelled China to think on the alternative approach 
and it initiated a policy of engagement with sober thinking about India. In 
this regard, the silent features of China's foreign policy were to: 
(a) Develop friendship with every surrounding country. 
(b) Balance strategic relations with major world powers. 
It was in this backdrop, that China in the post-Cold War period sought 
to improve its relations with all major countries of the world including its 
dominant south Asian neighbour, India. China's policy of maintaining good 
neighbourly relations with India followed from its conscious strategy of 
seeking peaceful environment in its surrounding areas. 
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Principles of India's Foreign Policy 
After India became independent in 1947, the Indian government had to 
chart-out its own foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of 
India as well as the first Foreign Minister, shaped the nation's foreign policy.^ ^ 
It was framed in an environment characterized by imperialism, bi-polar 
world, and racialism and in an uncertain world due to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. It was in this context that India adopted the 
policy of anti-imperialism, non-alignment, anti-racialism and championed the 
cause for peaceful and nuclear free world. Mair\ly, its foreign policy was 
based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (Panchsheel). Thus, the 
main principles of India's foreign policy were: Preservation of Territorial 
Integrity and freedom of Policy; Promotion of International Peace; Economic 
Development of Country and Freedom of dependent Peoples and Elimination 
of racial discrimination.^^ In the light of above of mentioned principles, the 
main objectives of India's foreign policy were: 
(a) To protect India's core national interests; 
(b) To preserve the autonomy of decision-making process; 
(c) To give priority to the economic diplomacy; 
(d) To strengthen ties with neighbours through mutually beneficial 
cooperation; 
(e) To work towards the goal of global disarmament; 
(f) To promote more equitable equation between the developed and 
developing countries.^' 
Due to its unique and independent foreign policy, India was regarded 
as the leader of the third world countries. But the radical changes all over the 
globe in the recent past especially after the collapse of bi-polar world have 
compelled India to review its established foreign policy principles and 
refashion them in the context of changing global scenario. 
During early and mid-nineties, the foreign policy of India confronted 
drastic changes both internal as well as external.i^ At the internal level, the era 
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of coalition politics had began which affected Indian foreign policy-making in 
a nuniber of ways e.g., under the coalition governments, the foreign policy 
could not find adequate place on the priority basis. The frequent changes of 
government at the national level led to the adhocism in the foreign policy-
making. The ideology of non-alignment which remained an important 
determinant of India's foreign policy during the cold war era has also to be 
sacrificed. Moreover, in the early nineties, India's economy was in a bad 
shape which made India vulnerable to external pulls and pressures. 
Likewise the external environment exposed the foreign policy of India 
to various challenges and external pressures. The most in\portant change in 
the external environment which affected the India's foreign policy was the 
disintegration of Soviet Union due to which India lost the external source of 
strength of its foreign policy. The changed world power structure was 
another challenge to the foreign policy because hegemony emerged as a 
dominant feature of the newly emerged world order. Indeed, it was a serious 
challenge for India to frame her foreign policy in such a hegemonic world 
order. In addition, with a shift from geo-politics and geo-strategic to geo-
economic, the economic dimension of international politics has become 
prominent with economic issues taking precedence over political one's.^^ xhis 
new economic system was more beneficial to the developed countries than to 
developing one's because the global economy and international monetary 
bodies (World Bank, WTO, IMF) were controlled by the former. In such a 
state of affairs, how India was able to persuade other developing countries 
like China, Brazil, and many others to create a just and equitable economic 
order was indeed a big challenge before the foreign policy makers of India. 
Thus, the changed domestic and external environment brought visible 
change in both China's and India's foreign policy. Both the states devised 
various methods to meet these challenges. Furthermore, the emergence of an 
Asian centred international order will have far reaching implications for the 
world. It will play an important role in reducing the exploiting influence of 
the developed world over the developing world. To achieve this end, it is 
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necessary for China and India to cultivate more cooperative and friendly 
relations with each other. The close relations with China would be beneficial 
not orily for India's strategic interests but also for its economic interests. In the 
following pages, an attempt has been made to analyse how India has been 
able to achieve that end with the help of instrument of its foreign policy. Here 
special emphasis has been laid on the foreign policy of India towards China 
and not vice versa because it is very difficult to have a coherent view about 
China's foreign policy towards any state due to its (China's) being highly 
secretive on its foreign policy making and diplomatic process. 
Limitations in India's China Policy 
It will be more pertinent here to point-out some weakness in India's 
China policy. As we know, India and China are the two ancient, largest and 
emerging super powers of the contemporary world, but the main point is that 
both are neighbours with fastest growing economies. Although, both can 
cooperate in a number of ways but competition or even conflict in many other 
yields carmot be ruled-out.*^ In this respect, how India is able to preserve and 
promote its national interest without coming into direct conflict with her 
mighty and powerful neighbour (China) depends mainly upon the 
instrument of its foreign policy. 
According to the international structuralism or neo-realism,i^ states 
always respond to their structural condition and do their best to secure the 
national interests by meeting the challenge to their security. India's foreign 
policies towards China have been unable to make a clear-cut response 
towards China that affects its security interests in a number of ways. 
It becomes clear from the fact that China has shown a remarkable consistency 
in its dealings with India but India seems satisfactory only with one high level 
visit to another. Harsh V. Pant in his article^s puts forth the following three 
constraints that impede the development of a clear-cut China policy in India. 
The first important variable which he analyses is the strategic culture. 
It plays an important role in determining state behaviour in the international 
relations. Strategic culture consists of widely shared beliefs, world views. 
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traditions, attitudes, symbols, and identity in terms of self-representation of 
the nation and its proper role in the world politics.^' Moreover, the way, a 
country's interests are conceptualized, defined and defended is influenced by 
its unique cultural experiences. Analysing the observations made by Andrew 
Scobell, Pant argues that China's foreign policy is irifluenced not only by the 
elite understanding of China's own strategic tradition but also by their 
understanding of strategic cultures of other states.^o That is why Chinese 
continue to consider India unstable and militaristic power who always wants 
to dominate its smaller neighbours and that is the major reason that China 
considers India as its rival and competitor not only in India but in other parts 
of the world as well. On the other side, India has not shown much inclination 
towards systematic and coherent foreign policy towards China. The natural 
consequence of such a state of affairs has been that India has been on the 
strategic defensive and reluctant to assert throughout its history. 
The second important impediment in the foreign policy making is the 
lack of institutionalization of foreign policy making in India. It is the natural 
corollary of the lack of strategic culture. To institutionalize the foreign policy 
making in India, an attempt was made by Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) 
led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in the late 1990's 
by establishing a National Security Council (NSC) to study military, 
economic and political threats to the nation and to advise the government to 
meet these challenges in an effective marmer.^^ However, it neglected the 
institutionalization of the NSC and building up its capabilities to play the 
supposed role. Thereafter, the Congress led UPA government also tried to 
make NSC an effective and professional institution. However, like its 
predecessor goverrunent (NDA), it has also failed to make it work in a desired 
manner whereby NSC could anticipate national security threats and 
coordinates long term planning.22 Thus, so far as India's China policy is 
concerned, this lack of effective institutionalization of foreign policy making 
has made it difficult for India to assess the implications of a rising China on its 
frontiers. 
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The third important variable which Harsh Pant analyses in his article is the 
power and its pursuit in international politics. In this regard, though India is 
regarded as the rising power both militarily as well as economically but it still 
remains behind China in terms of capabilities. The advantageous military 
capabilities of China vis-a-vis India can be discerned from the below 
mentioned comparative table of military might of India and china. 
MILITARY MIGHT 
CHINA 
Defense budget - $91.5 billion 
Large nuclear missile arsenal, 
with ICBMs and SLBMs - Road 
mobile DF-31A niissile has a 
11,200 km range, while JL-25LBM 
has a reach beyond 7,200 km. 
Armed Forces- 2.25 million active 
troops 
Submarines - 62 (10 nuclear 
powered, at least three with long 
range ballistic missiles). 
Major warships - 75 (one air craft 
carrier began sea trails recently). 
Fighter jets -1,680 
Main Battle Tanks - over 7,000 
INDIA 
Annual defense budget - $36 billion 
Limited nuclear arsenal, no ICBMs 
and SLBMs 3, 500 km Agni-III missile 
not yet operational, while 5,000 km 
Agni-V to be tested for first time in 
December. 
Armed Forces - 1.3 million active 
troops 
Submarines - 14 (all conventional, 
none nuclear-powered). 
Major warships - 30 (one air-craft 
carrier). 
Fighter jets - over 500 
Main Battle Tanks - over 3,000 
Notes: 
ICBM - Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles 
SLBMs - Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles 
JL - Julang (Great Wave) 
Agni - Fire 
DF - Dang Fenz (East Wind) 
Source: The Times of India, New Delhi, August 27, 2011, p. 6 (Pentagon's latest 
assessment of the expanding military might of China). 
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It is with the help of these capabilities that China has achieved most of 
its strategic objectives vis-^-vis India. That is the main reason that China does 
not regard India as its serious rival in the security field because of its low 
opinion of Indian capabilities. Thus, unless and until, India achieves higher 
economic growth rates and modernizes its military, its foreign policy will 
struggle to achieve the results it desires. 
Thus, all the above mentioned constraints have in fact impeded the 
evolution of a long term China policy in India which has ultimately led to the 
confusion in Indian foreign policy making. It is reflected by the way India has 
dealt with China in the past few years. Though it seems that Sino-Indian 
relations have improved a lot but it is not clear as to what strategic objectives 
India wants to achieve from this improvement. Here it can be argued that 
India is and has been following a policy of cooperation with China for 
building its capabilities, achieving higher economic rates, strengthening its 
defence and building the necessary infrastructure like roads, air strips, 
bridges, etc. or its northern borders and further enhancing its reach and 
influence in other strategically important location in Asia and other parts of 
the world till such a time when India will be in a position to challenge China's 
primacy openly. 
India's Foreign Policy towards China from 1996 Onwards 
(1) The United Front Government and its China policy 
The end of bi-polar world with the disintegration of Soviet Union and 
the dramatic changes which brought it to the world politics as discussed in 
the preceding pages, have far reaching implications for India's foreign policy. 
These created a new environment which compelled India to reorient its 
foreign policy towards China. India initiated a more pragmatic approach as 
regards its China policy. It started the process of economic reforms that also 
demanded a refashioning of its foreign policy. During early 1990's especially 
after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's and Prime Minister Narsimaha Rao's visit 
to China in 1988 and 1993, respectively, a number of Confidence and Security 
Building Measures (CFSBM's), high level military and political exchanges. 
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rising trade and cooperation in Science and Technology laid basis for more 
comprehensive relations between the two states. On the other side, some 
tangible shifts in China's South Asia policy were also discernable. According 
to an Indian analyst, some more noticeable examples of this shift were; First, 
the People's Republic of China has been notably mild in its reactions to India's 
stand on CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty); Second, China voted 
against Japan in support of India's bid for a non-permanent seat in the 
Security Council; and its approach to the handling of territorial disputes was 
also different now, as witnessed in its stand on the Kashmir issue.23 
Although, there were still some differences over a number of issues, 
but there was also a growing recognition in both the states that improvement 
in the bilateral relations between the two major Asian states has wider 
implications not only for the people of these two largest states, but also for the 
rest of the world especially for the developing countries. 
It was with this realization the United Front Government^^initially 
under the Prime Ministership of Mr. H. D.Deve Gowda and then under the 
Prime Ministership of I.K. Gujral continued the policies of the previous 
government. 
As a Prime Minister, Mr. I.K. Gujral outlined a broader regional policy 
which came to be known as Gujral Doctrine.^s The Doctrine implied that India 
was prepared to extend unilateral concessions to its smaller neighbours, 
because Indian realized that it could not fulfil its aspirations of becoming a 
global power as long as it was involved in the conflicts with its immediate 
neighbours. However, one of the most important and mighty neighbour, 
China could not be sidelined. Thus, it became the cherished goal of the United 
Front Government to cultivate friendly relation with all the neighbouring 
countries more particularly with China for creating a peaceful and stable 
environment for the Socio-economic progress and development. In this 
direction, the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India in 1996 was an 
important event in the bi-lateral relations between the two states. During his 
India visit, both the states signed four important agreements.^^ 
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1. The Agreement of Confidence Building Measures (CBM's) in the field 
of military development along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the 
India-China border areas, 
2. The Agreement concerning the maintenance of Consulate General of 
India in Hong Kong (special Administrative Region) of the people's 
Republic of China, 
3. The Agreement on Cooperation for Combating illicit trafficking in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance, 
4. The Agreement on Maritime Transport. 
Among these four Agreements, the Agreement on CBM's was an 
important one as it provided for a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable 
settlement of the boundary question. Further, the importance of paying 
adequate attention to each other's concerns on vital issues affecting unity, 
territorial integrity and security were also underlined. The Agreement to 
work towards building a Constructive and Cooperative relationship into the 
21^ * century.27 While continuing to address outstanding differences was 
reaffirmed during high level political and official contacts. 
Thus, in a period of constant change in the global, political, and 
economic and security environment, there was a need for constant assessment 
of the emerging situation for protecting India's vital national interests. This 
fluctuating international order also offered many opportunities for India. It 
was the major policy of United Front Government to fully utilize these 
opportunities to advance India's national interests in a more dynamic 
manner. 
However, it must be reiterated here that the United Front Government 
under the Prime Ministership of I.K. Gujral was a weak minority government 
which depended for its survival upon the outside support of the Congress 
party and it was not in a position to take any major decision on the foreign 
policy issues.28 It was for this reason that it basically continued the existing 
policies which were established by the Narsimaha Rao government. 
55 
(2) The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) Led National Dei»>9£r£tic'.lJli|^ 
NDA Government and its China Policy 
From the very beginning, the BJP has projected itself as a nationalist 
party that seeks the vigorous pursuit of India's national interest along with 
more assertive role for India in the international system. Nationalist overtone 
forms an integral of the BJP's foreign policy thinking. Nationalism in the 
context of foreign policy, essentially equates to an explicit emphasis on 
national security issues and territorial integrity.^^ Thus, it can be argued that 
there are/is remarkable continuity in the BJP's foreign policy especially with 
regard to China. China on the other side, while pursued independent foreign 
policy of peace, perceived four major threats to its security. These were the US 
on the issue of Taiwan, Japan on the issue of Diaoyutai islands, Japan-U.S 
renewal of security treaty in 1997 and India on the issue of border dispute.^o 
Therefore, India was viewed as one of the potential nations with which 
border conflict was possible. However, along with this strategy, China also 
perceived policy of improvement of relations with India. Here, it becomes 
clear that China's foreign policy with regard to India was based on both 
engagement and balance of power. This double strategy of China also 
compelled India to chart-out new course towards China along with 
continuation of policy of engagement. 
After the fall of United Front Government in November 1997, the new 
parliamentary elections were held in February, 1998. BJP got the largest 
number of seats in parliament (182) but this fell far short of majority. On 
March 20, 1998 BJP formed the coalition government with Mr. Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee as the Prime Minister. In April, 1999 the BJP led government fell 
once again leading to fresh elections in September.^i Again, the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA), a new coalition led by the BJP gained majority to 
form the government with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister on October, 
1999.32 As stated earlier, the BJP's emphasis on nationalism and national 
security in its foreign policy making, made the NDA government's foreign 
policy more realistic than idealistic. The reorientation of the Indian Foreign 
Policy during the early 1990's and at the beginning of the 21^' century under 
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the Vajpayee government was response to the changes within the 
international system after the end of cold war.33 It was in this context that the 
NDA government conducted two rounds of nuclear tests on 13* and 14'*' 
May, 1998 respectively. Before nuclear tests, the relationship between China 
and India was proceeding in a right direction. However, with the conclusion 
of nuclear tests, China raised its concern by saying that the nuclear tests by 
India goes against the international trend and was detrimental to the peace 
and stability of the South Asian region.^ Prior to the conducting of 1998 
Nuclear tests, George Fernandez, the then Defence Minister of India declared 
that China is India's number one threat.^s The message he wanted to convey 
to the international community was that India had developed nuclear 
weapons in defence against China's arsenal. The relations between the two 
states further deteriorated when the Prime Minister Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
in a letter to US President Bill Clinton stated that we have an overt nuclear 
weapon state on our border, a state which committed armed aggression 
against Indian in 1962. Further, the country has materially helped another 
neighbour of our (Pakistan) to became a covert nuclear weapons state which 
has also committed three aggressions against us in the last 50 years.^^ China's 
reaction to this letter was harsh and strong which gave a further set back to 
the already deteriorating Sino-Indian relations. However, this bitterness in the 
bilateral relations between the two states was mitigated as India later on 
downplayed the significance of Vajpayee's letter and also George Fernandez's 
remarks about China being India's threat number one. The initiative was 
taken by India when it expressed its intention to enhance the bilateral friendly 
relations with China. On the other hand, China thought that it could not 
isolate India for long because India had withstood the pressure (international) 
and USA and other powers were softening their attitude towards India. Thus, 
the Sino-Indian relations once again came back on the track of normalization. 
The two sides officially resumed talks in February, 1999 after a gap of 
months. It was agreed by both the sides to resume the Eleventh Joint Working 
Group 0WG) meeting that was to be held in the second half of the 1998 but 
was postponed due to setbacks. 
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During the BJP led NDA government's tenure, one of the main aims of 
India's foreign policy was to settle the border issue with China. In order to 
accelerate the talks on boundary issue, the Indian Foreign Miruster Mr. 
Jaswant Singh visited China in 1999. He accelerated the pace of talks on the 
clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). There was agreement on 
promoting Confidence Building Measures (CBM's) thereby initiating a 
security dialogue and expanding economic and trade relations.^^ During his 
China visit, he made it clear that India does not consider China as a threat to 
it. Thus, his China visit created a friendly atmosphere in the deteriorating 
relations which have developed after the post nuclear tests. China on its part 
also expressed its willingness and readiness to discuss any matter arising out 
of India's security concerns. 
Further during the Kargil war in May, 1999 between India and 
Pakistan, China adopted a neutral position which further normalized the 
relations between India and China.'^ The nuclear tests by both India and 
Pakistan and thereafter, their conflict over Kargil proved to make the past two 
years - 1998 and 1999 very crucial years for India-China relations. The )/ear 
1998 was very difficult year for Sino-India relations. However, developments 
during the 1999 especially Kargil conflict provided an opportunity for India 
and China to mitigate the irritants in their bilateral relationship in the 
following year (2000). 
Thereafter, the President of India Mr. K.R. Narayan paid a visit to 
China on May, 2000. This was considered as an important visit because it was 
the first visit by a highest level leader since the May, 1998 tests and 
reciprocated Jaing Zemin's 1996 visit to India.^^ During his visit, he met 
Chinese President Jaing Zemin and had a constructive discussion with him. 
Mr. Jiang Zemin outlined four steps to develop their bilateral relations with 
each other, ^ o these were: 
a) increase of mutual visits; 
b) expansion of trade and economic relations; 
c) strengthen cooperation and coordination in international affairs; 
d) to remove the irritants in bilateral relations properly. 
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The two Presidents also agreed to enhance bilateral interaction and 
cooperation in many other fields. 
Sino-India relations further improved following Indian Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee's landmark visit to China in June, 2003.'*^ During his 
visit, Vajpayee met the new Chinese leadership.^^ jhe Joint Declaration issued 
by both sides laid a roadmap to build a qualitatively new relationship and 
develop a long term cooperative partnership. During his China visit, twelve 
agreements were signed which were expected to make Sino-lndia relations 
more cordial and friendly. Important among them were: *^ 
(a) Agreement on political parameters and guiding principles for the 
settlement of the India-China Boundary dispute. 
(b) Report of the India-China Joint Study Group on Comprehensive Trade 
and Economic Cooperation. 
(c) Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of CBM's in the Military 
Field along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas. 
(d) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Launch of India-China 
Financial Dialogue and, 
(e) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on provision of Hydrological 
Information of the Sutlej/Langgen river in the Flood Season by China 
to India and, 
(f) MoU on Civil Aviation. 
Besides, it was also decided that the Joint Study Group (JSG) should be 
established by both the states.^ This JSG was to search-out areas where more 
and more economic cooperation is possible and thereby suggest measures 
which could increase bilateral trade and encourage cooperation between the 
business communities of both the countries. As per their rapidly growing 
economies, it was an important advancement in the economic field. Likewise, 
another important decision was taken to appoint a Special Representative 
from each side to explore the framework for a boundary settlement. 
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The Indian National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, and the Chinese Senior 
Vice-Minister, Dai Bingguo were appointed as Special Representatives 
charged with resolving the border issue.^s The appointment of the two 
negotiators reflected a political will on the part of both sides to solve the 
boundary problem. 
The BJP led NDA Government showed more flexibility in its foreign 
policy when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee recognized Tibet 
Autonomous Region as an inalienable part of China. India was expecting that 
in return, China should also recognize Sikkim as an Indian State. However, 
despite this India's unilateral soft move, the Chinese did not recognized 
Sikkim as an integral part of India. This is the reason that BJP is still not very 
clear as for as its policy in dealing with China is concerned. 
(3) The Congress led United Progressive Alliance (UPA-I) government 
and its china policy 
The Congress led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government 
under the Prime Ministership of Dr. Manmohan Singh unlike the previous 
governments opted for a cautious foreign policy. The various issues relating 
to foreign policy were discussed while drafting the "National Common 
Minimum Programme" with the coalition partners even before the formation 
of government.*^ The main aim was to evolve corisensus on critical issues 
which were directly related to foreign policy issues. 
Thus, the foreign policy of UPA government was framed under the 
framework of Common Minimum Programme (CMP) which was more or less 
same as the policies of the previous government (BJP led NDA). The CMP of 
the UPA government pledged to pursue an independent foreign policy and 
there was a commitment to promote multi-polarity in world politics and 
oppose all attempts at unilateralism.*^ Like the foreign policy of its 
predecessor (NDA), the foreign policy of UPA government was also guided 
by a sense of realism in response to the emerging global environment. The 
major aim was to build a diverse relationship with the rest of the world, based 
on a contemporary assessment of bilateral, regional and global geo-political 
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and economic environment. Thus, the UPA-I Government formulated its 
foreign poHcy approach towards China on the basis of power pohtics and in 
consonance with the existing global power relationships. In this direction, the 
signing of Nuclear Deal with USA in July, 2005 was a landmark event. 
The USA recognized India as a nuclear power which was to get same benefits 
as other nuclear weapon states. The Indo-US cooperation was also enhanced 
in other fields like terrorism, economy, science and technology and other 
field. But on the other hand, these growing close relationships between India 
and USA were not allowed to hinder in any way the friendly relations with 
China. The bilateral relations were continued with the visit of India Chief of 
Army Staff (COAS) to China on December, 2004. His visit to China gave a 
boost to the growing military contacts between India and China. Moreover, as 
part of Confidence Building Measures (CBM's) interactions between the 
border persormel on both the sides were organized. 
In order to enhance further the bilateral relationship between the two 
states, the Chinese premier Wen Jiaboa visited India in April, 2005. While 
speaking in India for the Sino-India cooperation in hi-tech industries, 
Wen stated that cooperation is just like two Pagodas (temples), one hardware 
and software. Combined we can take the leadership position in the world. He 
further stated that the 21*' century will be the Asian century of IT industry.^ 
During his visit, the Chinese President/premier formally recognized Sikkim 
as a part of India. Thus Sikkim ceased to be an issue in the Sino-Indian 
relations. In the Joint Statement, signed by premier Wen Jiaboa and Prime 
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, both sides agreed to establish a strategic and 
cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity.*^ For the settlement of 
border issue, an agreement was also signed which laid the guidelines for the 
resolution of border issue.^ o It was further agreed that the border issue should 
not be allowed to affect the overall development of bi-lateral relations. 
The main aim of Wen's visit to India was to promote trust and to give 
boast to the bilateral cooperation between the two states. It was also meant to 
convey India that bilateral ties with other regional states like Nepal, 
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Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, etc. will continue even if it expands its ties 
with India. More importantly, China also wanted to send a message to the 
United States that India and China could get along well despite their 
unresolved border issue. China was aware of the fact that India and the 
United States share important democratic values and certain common 
strategic interests and there was possibility that the United States might enlist 
India as a counter weight to China.^i On the other side, India has a lot of 
expectations from Wen Jiaboa's visit to India. To begin with, India wanted 
that China should recognize Sikkim as an integral part of India which China 
ultimately did during Wen's India visit. India was also desirous of using the 
visit to seek more flexibility from China on border so that negotiations could 
move forward in a desirous manner. Moreover, India also wanted to convey 
to the United States that it should not assume that India would automatically 
participate in its balancing game.52 His visit was also meant to reaffirm the 
Sino-India views about the importance of a multi-polar world. The visit 
enhanced the ongoing cooperation and good will between the two states. 
However, the real motivator behind the increasing intimacy between India 
and China was trade and commerce. Bilateral trade stood at $ 13 billion in 
2004, representing 1% of China's global trade and 9% of India's.53 After Wen's 
visit, the trade relations improved substantially as the bilateral trade crossed 
50 billion U.S. dollars in 2009. 
Further to create more friendly relations between India and China, it 
was decided during Wen's India visit to mark the 2006 as the "India-China 
Friendship Year."54 For the resolution of border issue, special representatives 
of both the sides held discussions in New Delhi in March, 2006. The two 
special representatives held their discussions in a constructive and friendly 
atmosphere. 
In order to promote cooperation in the defence field and reduce tension 
on the Sino-Indian border, the Indian Defence Minister Mr. Pranab Mukherjee 
visited China in May, 2006. During his visit, the two sides signed a 
Memorandum of understanding (MoU) 55 on Defence Cooperation, 
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established annual defence dialogue, formalized Joint Military exercises and 
training programmes, counter terrorism and called for study tours by senior 
and mid-level officials of each other's countries. All these CBM's in the 
security field were reached out so that both the countries would be able to 
utilize their scarce resources for the overall development of their respective 
countries. India was also aware of the fact that China despite its being a 
source of arms supply to Pakistan, was interested in building good relatioris 
with India. Asked if India and China could jostle for supremacy in future, Mr. 
Mukherjee agreed that China's economic strength is more compared with 
India's but the impression that they have outspread us in the region or on the 
world stage is not correct. They are playing their role and we are playing 
ours.^ Further, he said that world has enough space for both the state to 
flourish without collusion. So far as the economic relation was concerned, 
India was following a policy of closer economic engagement with China. The 
trade with China showed a rapid increase. It approached $ 25 billion in 2006, 
making China India's second largest partner and India China's tenth largest 
partner.57 
To give further boast to Sino-India relations, the China's president Hu Jintao 
visited India in November, 2006. Both the governments attached great 
importance to this visit because this was the first visit by a Chinese President 
to India since President Jiang Zemin's visit in 2006. The visit highlighted the 
resolve of both countries to work towards the further consolidation and 
diversification of India-China relations. Moreover, in order to promote the 
sustainable socio-economic development of India and China and to further 
reinforce their strategic and cooperative partnership, the two sides issued a 
Joint Declaration containing the following ten pronged strategy .58 
(a) Erisuring Comprehensive Development of Bi-lateral Relations. 
(b) Strengthening Institutional Linkages and Dialogue Mechaiusm. 
(c) Consolidating Commercial and Economic Exchanges. 
(d) Expanding Ail-Round Mutually Beneficial Cooperation. 
(e) Instilling Mutual Trust and Confidence through Defence Cooperation. 
(f) Seeking early settlement of outstanding issues. 
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(g) Promoting Trans-border connectivity and cooperation. 
(h) Boosting Cooperating in Science and Technology. 
(i) Revitalizing Cultural ties and nurturing people to people exchanges. 
(j) Expanding cooperation on Regional and International Stage. 
Thus, Hu Jintao's visit to India was an important milestone in bilateral 
relations. The visit indicated that both sides wanted to keep the irritants aside 
and move forward to promote cordial relations with one another. The year 
2006 was infact an important year in the Sino-India bilateral relationship 
because it was celebrated as a "China India Friendship Year''^ ^ and further 
witnessed the signing of MoU on Defence Cooperation which was a major 
step in bilateral relations. However, there were many apprehensions on both 
sides that the Indo-US nuclear deal, China's continuing defence assistance to 
Pakistan and the Changing East and South Asian landscape may retard the 
pace of their bilateral relationship.^" Though the above analysis is true to some 
extent but there was also greater willingness and convergence of interest to 
carry forward the bi-lateral relations between the two states. For resolving the 
border issue through consultations and peacefully, the Ninth Round of talks 
between the special Representatives of India and China was held in New 
Delhi from January 16-18, 2007.^ 1 The two special Representatives^^ continued 
their discussions on a framework for the boundary settlement on the basis of 
the Agreement on political parameters and guiding principles. It was also 
decided that unless and until, border issue was not resolved amicably and 
peacefully, both sides shall maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas 
in accordance with the agreements of 1993,1996 and 2005. 
Furthermore, if the year 2006 was celebrated by both the states as 
'Friendship Year' between India and China, the year 2007 was celebrated as 
the "India-China Year of Friendship through Tourism- 2007" by both the 
states.^3 xhe main purpose of celebrating this special year was to introduce the 
peoples of both the states to each other's cultural heritage and thereby 
enhance the cultural ties between the peoples of both the states. Moreover, the 
Great Wall of China and the Taj Mahal of India were adopted in the Joint 
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Logo that Commemorated the Friendship through Tourism Year- 2007. 
Oil February 11, 2007 the Chinese Foreign Minister Mr. Li Zhao Xing 
paid an official visit to India at the invitation of the external Affairs Minister 
of India. The two Ministers then held extensive discussions covering bilateral, 
regional and international issues. Moreover, as both India and China were 
celebrating a "Friendship Year through Tourism- 2007" both sides decided 
that cooperation in Tourism and people to people exchanges would be 
intensified and for that purpose they decided to set up their respective 
tourism offices in each other's countries during 2007.^ To add another feather 
in the Sino-lndia relations president of the Indian National Congress and the 
Chairperson of the United Progressive Alliance (UFA), Sonia Gandhi visited 
China on October, 2007.^ ^ she was the first world leader to meet the newly 
elected Chinese leadership and renewing Sino-lndia friendship. Among the 
new leadership were Communist Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng and 
President Hu Jintao as CPC General Secretary as they were elected and re-
elected to these posts respectively after the conclusion of 17* National 
Congress on October 22, 2007. Sonia held discussions with Chinese leadership 
on a wide range of issues both regional and global and more particularly the 
global trade negotiations and to work closely in World Trade Organization 
(WTO) for securing the interests of developing countries were also discussed. 
Thus, Soma's China visit in 2007 renewed the friendly relationship that India 
had with China since Rajiv Gandhi's visit in 1988. 
After Sonia Gandhi's China visit in October, 2007, there were reports of 
Chinese intrusions in the Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim areas. The Indian 
Defence Minister A.K. Anthony while replying to the questions relating to 
these intrusions said, there was no intrusion either in Sikkim or in Arunachal 
Pradesh.^^ However, he added that there might have been isolated incidents 
arising out of the differences of perception on territorial jurisdiction between 
two countries and such differences of perception would be resolved through 
discussions. Later on, the armed forces of two countries held a joint military 
exercise in the second half of December in order to understand each other. 
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During the Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to India in 2006, he had 
invited Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to pay a return visit to China which 
was accepted by latter. Thus, the Prime Minister Mamnohan Singh paid the 
visit to China on 13-15 January; 2008.^ ^ Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 
visit came at a time when the Sino-Indian relations were rapidly growing and 
was followed by Sonia Gandhi's visit to China last October, 2007. 
While in China, he met premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao. 
A Joint document entitled "A Shared Vision for the 21^ * Century of the 
People's Republic China and the Republic of India"^ was issued during the 
visit which outlined common positions on a number of issues both bi-lateral 
as well as international. It emphasizes that both sides will seek to strengthen 
ties while preventing differences, such as border conflict, from undermine an 
improving bilateral relationship. The Joint statement covers key issues 
including trade, international relations, energy, and climate change and 
security relations.^^ However, Prime Minister's visit achieved little to resolve 
the most contentious issues like China's support to Pakistan and the 
unresolved Sino-India border issue, China's military, nuclear, economic, 
political and diplomatic support to Pakistan is a major cause of concern for 
Indians. Likewise, border issue is the perpetual source of distress and 
suspicious among Indians. Though the special Representatives from both the 
sides held number of meetings till 2008 to find an amicable solution to the 
border issue but nothing forward progress was achieved except for holding 
one meeting after another. Moreover, Prime Ministers visit to disputed 
territory of Arunachal Pradesh soon after returning from China was a clear 
signal to Beijing that the border issue is far from resolved.^" The question of 
Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh also figured in Lok Sabha on February 
27, and the external Affairs Minister re-emphasized that Arunachal Pradesh is 
an integral part of India and the government has conveyed this fact to the 
Chinese side.^ The Chinese regarded the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as their 
own territory which they considered have been occupied by India illegally. 
However, despite these irritants in the bilateral relations, the cooperation in 
other fields continued throughout 2008. The army to army cooperation as a 
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part of Annual Defence Dialogue (ADD), conunenced between China and 
India in December, 2008. The Joint Defence on Sino-India Training exercises 
were code named "Hand-in-Hand 2008"72 The Ex-Hand-in-Hand 2008 aimed 
at expanding and strengthening military to military ties between the two 
armed forces. Speaking about these military exercises. Brigadier S.K. Patiyal 
said, "The prime goal of the training was to acquit the armies with each 
other's operating procedures and is also a part of the ongoing efforts of both 
nations to share their experiences and technological in curbing terrorism."^' 
(4) UPA-II and Her China Policy 
In 2009, the Congress led UFA government completed its five year 
tenure and fresh parliamentary elections were announced. The congress party 
once again emerged as the largest political party and formed the government 
second time in coalition with other ally political parties. 
However, during the second term of UFA government, it did not like 
the first time, spell out a Common Minimum Programme (CMF). Instead, 
it announced that it would take up those policy measures which it caimot 
complete in its first term in office. So far as the foreign policy was concerned, 
the government stated that it would adhere to the path taken by the UFA-I 
goverriment.^^ After coming into power, Sonia Gandhi Chairperson of India's 
Congress led UFA government during a meeting with visiting Chinese state 
Councillor Dia Bingguo, said that there exists a very solid basis for 
developing friendly and cooperative relations between India and China.^^ 
On this occasion, she also said that as the 60* armiversary of establishment of 
diplomatic relations between India and China is nearing, the peoples of both 
states should increase people-to-people contacts for enhancing cordial and 
friendly relations between two states. On the other side Dia Bingguo also 
conveyed special greeting from Chinese leaders to the UFA for wirming a 
second term of government in the general elections in 2009. 
The strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity 
between the two states continued in 2009 with the close and high level 
exchanges. On IS^ ^^  June, president Hu Jintao met with Frime Minister 
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Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) Summit and the first BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) summit in 
Yekaterinburg (Russia) 7^  Further, Chinese premier Wen Jibao met with Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh during the Summits of East Asian leaders in Hua 
Hin and the United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNCCC) on 24* 
October and 18* December respectively.'^ It was thought by both sides during 
these meetings that good neighbourly relations and mutual cooperation were 
necessary for the peace and stability not only in Asia but also in the whole 
world. Besides political contacts, the military, economic and cultural contacts 
continued throughout 2009. However, amidst these growing relations 
between the two states, the relations deteriorated from the mid-2009 over a 
range of issues like Chinese incursions into the Indian territory, China's claim 
of Arunachal Pradesh as being a part of South Tibet, China's issue of stapled 
visas to the residents of Jammu and Kashmir and China's highway 
construction in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK). For the encirclement of 
India, China has already built ports in the Indian periphery The most 
important port which China have build around India are Gwadar in Pakistan, 
Marao in the Maldives, Hambantota in Srilanka, Sittwe in Myanmar, 
Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Coco Islands in Burma.^^ Likewise, China 
attempted to block a $2.9 billion loan to India from the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) which was meant for Arunachal Pradesh for the apparent 
reasons. Alarmed by these moves, India started to build-up the roads and air 
fields on its borders with China. Further it deployed to the north-east two 
divisioris of mountain units and a squadron of Sukhoi 30 MKI. With these 
moves, the atmosphere on Sino-India border became very tense and recalled 
the days of 1962. 
However, regional, global and more importantly economic 
compulsions once again compelled both the states to soften their attitude 
towards each other, since both countries saw trade and economic contacts as 
the main factors in their bilateral relations. It was in this context that the 
Chinese premier Wen Jiaboa's visit to India on December, 2010 provided 
another opportunity for both the sides to rethink the current status of their 
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relationship and reassess the vitaUty of the relationship both in the global and 
bilateral context. In the Joint Communique, ''^ the two sides reaffirmed their 
commitment to abide by the basic principles concerning the development of 
India-China relations set-out in the Declaration of principles for Relations and 
Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China in 2003, the Joint 
Statement of India and China in 2005, the India and China Joint Declaration of 
2006 and Shared Vision for the 21*' century of India and China of 2008. 
Further, they decided to erOiance strategic communication, broaden cultural 
exchanges and deepen the India-China strategic and cooperative partnership 
for peace and prosperity on the basis of the five principles of Panchsheel. It 
was also decided to set a new bilateral trade target of $100 billion by 2015. 
However, analyzing deeply the visit of Wen Jiabao's to India, it becomes clear 
that the visit was limited to strengthening relations in the economic field and 
ignoring the geo-political and geo-strategic issues that are the major irritants 
in the Sino-Indian relations. Here the question is to what extent economic 
cooperation can overshadow political issues in the future. It mainly depends 
on how rising China manages its economic diploniacy to counter the China 
threat theory and to what extent India maintains its independent foreign 
policy approach vis-a-vis China, without allowing itself to be part of any U.S. 
containment strategy in the region.^" 
Conclusion 
Thus, with an India-China emergent rapprochement that focused on 
economic and de-emphasizing their border issues have transcended bilateral 
issues and have acquired a global and strategic perspective.^^ It is for this 
reason that there has been talk of '(Chindia)'.^^ Therefore, while there are still 
some issues between India and China (most notably the border issue) both 
nations are experiencing an unparallel convergence of interests in the rapidly 
changing economic, political and strategic environment. 
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Chapter IV 
MAJOR AREAS OF COOPERATION 
AND CONFLICT BETWEEN 
CHINA AND INDIA 
The chapter under the study does not seek to trace out the evolution of 
the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of 
India as it has been substantially analysed and discussed in the preceding 
chapter. Here an attempt has been made to elucidate whether China's and 
India's paths will lead them to interact as rivals or partners. 
After a brief study and analysis of the internal and external 
compulsions in both the states towards forging the close and cooperative 
relations, the chapter concludes by asserting that despite conflicting interests 
and competitive interactions that currently characterise the bilateral relations 
between these two states, a collaborative but still delicate scenario in which 
both the states play a leading role is more likely to happen. 
China and India, the two largest developing countries in the world, 
share a number of interests especially in the field of domestic development, 
and economic reform. They are experiencing a period of rapid economic 
growth. However, both the states are also struggling to define their role in the 
world given their new profound influence on the global economy. Both 
promote the notion of a multi-polar world in which they each may serve as 
major international players alongside the United States. 
So far as the China is concerned, its strategic interests in India follows 
from its desire to maintain a peaceful international environment, create 
friendly relations with the nations and especially with neighbours, prevent 
any attempt towards the formation of anti-china blocs and finally develop 
new markets, investment opportunities and resources to fuel its economic 
growth. It also wants to address its critical domestic problems in a coherent 
manner. To achieve all these objectives, it is necessary for China to have 
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friendly relations with India, despite India's growing political and strategic 
relations with the United States in recent times. 
On the other side, India's own focus on internal development 
encourages it to cultivate positive relations with China. However, the 
attitudes within India towards forging cordial relations with China remain 
mixed to some extent due to the historical legacy of Indo-China relatior\s. 
While the left parties such as the communist party of India (Marxists) has 
always sought the friendly relations with China, but the right wing parties 
and some people within the security establishment view china as a major 
security threat. 
Though the above analysis shows a trend of mutual trust and respect 
between China and India, but the growing competition between the two 
states to affirm their presence from an economic, political and military point 
of view in Asia and other parts of the world constitutes the other side of the 
same coin. From this perspective, it would be pertinent here to state these 
areas in which both the sides compete with each other and which is a major 
source of distrust, suspicion and misunderstanding between them and also 
those areas where there is possibility of convergence of interests through 
which both the states can cooperate with each other to harness the mutual 
benefits from such cooperation. In the end, as earlier stated, the chapter 
concludes with the assertion that despite conflicting and divergent interests 
and competitive interactions, a collaborative scenario in which both China 
and India will play a leading but cooperative role is more likely to happen. 
Bilateral Issues between China and India 
There are various issues which still affect the Sino-India relations, the 
border and Tibet issues are more prominent and recently, the water issue has 
also surfaced in the bilateral relations between China and India. These 
bilateral issues will affect not only future relations between the two, but also 
the process of their rise and then peace and stability in the Asia and 
ultimately in the world. 
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Border Issue 
The main problem between the two countries is the Sino-India border 
question, which is a historical one. The Border issue is rooted in the disputed 
status of the McMahon Line, which defines the border between India and 
Tibet according to 1914 Simla Convention between British India and Tibet. 
India recognises this agreement as the basis for its territorial claim while 
China out rightly rejects the validity of this agreement because it does not 
recognise Tibet as a sovereign entity and treats it as a part of China. India 
claims 43,180 square kilometres of Jammu and Kashmir occupied by China 
including 5180 square kilometres ceded to China by Pakistan under a 1963 
Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement. On the other hand, China claims 90,000 
square kilometres of territory held by India in Arunachal Pradesh.^ There has 
not been a remarkable progress in resolving the border dispute between the 
two sides due to the importance of Aksai Chin to China and Arunachal 
Pradesh to India.^ 
After their brief border conflict in 1962, relations remained hostile 
between China and India for several decades. India's grant of statehood to 
Arunachal Pradesh in the late eighties (February 1987) which China claims as 
a part of South Tibet caused the friction in the bilateral relations to such an 
extent that another border war seemed imminent. China demanded major 
territorial concessions in populated areas of Arunachal Pradesh particularly 
Twang because Chinese claim it to be central to Tibetan Buddhism given that 
the sixth Dalai Lama was born there.^ In the same way, as China seeks return 
of Arunachal Pradesh on religious grounds, India seeks the return of the 
sacred Mount Kailash Mansarovar in Tibet, since it is a sacred place 
associated with the Hindu religion.* However, ease on border and overall 
border relations began to improve following the border agreements in 1993 
and 1996 between India and China.5 Since then, both sides have agreed to 
keep working on the border issue and resolved that any disagreement on 
border issue should not be allowed to affect the overall bilateral relations. The 
two sides have also pursued Confidence Building Measures (CBM's) along 
17 
the border which includes muhial troop cut, regular rn^^tings Qfefec?§l military 
commanders and other confidence enhancing measures. Further, an 
additional step was taken to solve the Sino-India border issue in 2003 when 
both the sides appointed Special Representatives to address the border issue. 
Since then, the Special Representatives have held a number of talks to resolve 
the border issue, but so far no breakthrough has been achieved. Here the main 
reason has been that the unsettled border provides China the strategic 
leverage to keep India uncertain about its intentions and nervous about its 
capabilities and ensuring India's good behaviour on issue of vital concern to 
China. Further, an unsettled boundary also suits Chinese interests for the 
present because China's claims in the Western Sector are complicated by the 
India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, and China's interest to keep India 
under strategic pressure on two fronts - China and Pakistan.^ Moreover, it 
should also be taken into consideration here that although India has 
recognised Tibet as a part of China, at the popular level, there remains 
significant sympathy for the Tibetan cause within India. Further, the presence 
of more than 1, 00,000 Tibetan refugees in India and India's continued 
willingness to provide shelter to the Dalai Lama is a continued source of 
irritation in Sino-Indian relations.^ Due to the nationalist feelings among the 
peoples of both the sides and the national security considerations and 
interests, neither side is willing to give away their claims to disputed territory. 
However, it may be once again reiterated here that from the India's point of 
view, "Tibet is not a critical issue in Sino-India relations because Indian 
government is neither abetter nor instigator of political cause of the 
Tibetans."^ For India, resolving the border issue ranks higher than the status 
of Tibet. That is why, during the Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee's 
visit to China in 2003, India formally recognised Tibet as an integral part of 
China. 
However, in recent years, China has shown more assertive policy 
towards border issues with India. In May 2007, the Chinese government 
refused a visit to an Indian official to China on the grounds that he was from 
Arunachal Pradesh which China considers its own territory. In addition, there 
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have been continued media reports of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) 
encroachments across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This recent 
increasing assertiveness over the disputed borders has led to a rapid melt 
down in Sino-India border talks and a 'mini-cold war'^ on the border issue 
was prominently visible. Again in March, 2009 China attempted to block a $ 
2.9 billion loan to India from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) on the 
grounds that it was destined for development of Arunachal Pradesh.^o 
Continuing the claim on Arunachal Pradesh, in June, 2007 Chinese Foreign 
Minister again insisted that the mere presence of Indians would not dissuade 
China from claiming Arunachal Pradesh. On the other side, India regards 
Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of Indian Union which merged with 
Indian Union in 1987 constitutionally and in accordance with the consent of 
the people of Arunachal Pradesh. Therefore, India is firm on its stand on 
Arunachal Pradesh and it is unlikely that India will toe to the Chinese line on 
this issue. Thus, border issue between China and India is one of the delicate 
issues and needs immediate resolution so that some long lasting peace can be 
brought in this part of the world. 
Water issues between China and India 
In the contemporary times, water is regarded as a precious commodity 
and is essential for human existence. That is why, its possession bestows 
power. The preciousness and possession in geopolitical mechanics makes 
water a strategic commodity and its role as a strategic asset or vulnerability 
cannot be over-estimated. Thus, seen in this context, water can become a 
source of both contention and cooperation^i in the context of contemporary 
world. 
In case of china and India, water issues are becoming major area of 
concern between the two states. In fact, many strategic thinkers are arguing 
that disputes relating to water will be major source of conflict between the 
two countries in the future. China's plan of constructing big dams and 
diverting the water of rivers to its own advantage has created discontent in 
India. As there are four rivers that flow from China and enter into India, the 
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two countries must have a better understanding relating to water sharing and 
other attending benefits out of these rivers. However, China's strategic 
advantage over these rivers makes it possible for her to counter-balance India 
on many other issues. A deep analysis of the water issues between the two 
countries is quite relevant here. 
Rivers flowing from China to India 
There are four rivers descending from four directions of Mount Kailash in 
the Ngari region of Tibet to the Indian Sub-continent.^^ 
1) The Tackok Khabab originates in the East of Mount Kailash and flows 
from upper region of Ngari down to the valley of Tsang, where it merges 
with Kyichu River of Central Tibet fallowing through Yarlung Dagpo and 
Kongpo. It then winds to the right of the Namchang Barwe Mountain into 
Hustang and flows through the eastern region of India becoming the 
Brahmaputra. It then descends into Bangladesh and finally into Bay of 
Bengal. 
2) The Ma Cha Khabab originates into the South of Mount Kailash and flow 
from the region of Purang into Nepal and then through the state of Uttar 
Pradesh into India. It merges with Ganga and ends up in Bay of Bengal. 
3) The Langchen Khabab originates in the North of Mount Kailash and 
flows through Dhapa Thoding of Ngari region and becomes Sutlej River 
flowing through Rampur and the Kannuar valley in Himachal Pradesh 
and then into Punjab from where it flows through Pakistan into Arabian 
Ocean. 
4) The Senge Khabab originates in the West of Kailash and flows through 
Ngari Gar and then becomes the Indus flowing through Ladakh, Kashmir 
and then through Pakistan finally descending into the Arabian Ocean. 
This is a brief hydrological chart of Tibet which was necessary to show 
for better understanding of Sino-India water issues. As stated above, the 
immense water resources in Tibet are a critical factor in Chin's Tibet policy. 
Further, China's territorial position on Tibet has a significant bearing on the 
current and future water issues with India, which is a lower riparian vis-a-vis 
China. 
This strategic advantage of China on water resources coupled with the 
differing positions on Line of Actual Control (LAC) and China's claims on the 
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territories that are parts of India further complicate the water issues between 
the two. However, the more and more compUcating problem is that there 
exist no agreements between China/Tibet and India pertaining to water 
resources. There is no reliable information on the present or proposed water 
related developments and projects in the upper regions of the rivers that flow 
into India from Tibet have not been addressed. 
India being the lower riparian, will be vulnerable to any major storage 
projects planned on the Yarlung Tsangpo. Due to the political situation 
between two countries, it is hard to imagine China playing the role of a 
responsible upper riparian by releasing re-regulated flows from power houses 
immediately book into river. China's consumption requirements and long 
distance transfer of waters will undoubtedly hurt interests of not only India 
but also of Bangladesh.13 The problem gets more complicated in the absence 
of international law on shared waters and when one such was attempted, 
China voted against the convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational uses 
of International water courses in the UN General Assembly in 1997.14 j ^ spite 
of India and China having entered into agreements in the recent past on 
sharing of hydrological data for flood control,!^ the Chinese have not been 
consistent in sharing of the information. In order to build a number of water 
projects in Tibet including a dam on Brahmaputra, Chinese scientists have 
recently completed a comprehensive satellite study of cross border Tibetan 
rivers determining their exact sources besides measuring the length of their 
drainage basins.^^ Besides mapping-out the course of Brahmaputra, the 
researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) also collected 
details about the flow of Indus which flows through India and Pakistan and 
Salween and Irrawaddy rivers, which flow through Burma.i'' 
Finally, it can be argued that India's long standing border dispute with 
China particularly China's claims on Arunachal Pradesh through which the 
river Brahmaputra flows, comes in the way of meaningful cooperation on the 
water issues. Here it can be said that border issue and water issues between 
both the two states is closely interlinked with each other. In future, China is 
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likely to use water as a tool to pressurize India and to extract concessions on 
boundary question. Thus, water will be the prime issue, apart from the border 
issues, that will determine the future relations between the two largest states 
of the world- India and China. Besides, these life sustaining rivers coming 
from Tibet region of China into India will be the major stimulant of 
cooperation or conflict between the two. 
The Impact of outside countries on the China-India Relations 
So far as the external factors are concerned that may impact the future 
Sino-India relations, Pakistan and U.S. are more prominent. While Pakistan is 
an immediate one with limited regional influence, the U.S. remains a long-
term one with global meanings. The interconnection of relations between 
China, India, U.S. and Pakistan i.e., Indo-US, Sino-US, and Sino-Pak has a 
special bearing on the relationship between China and India. 
The Pakistan Factor in China-India Relations 
The China's unique relationship with Pakistan and particularly the 
former's nuclear and missile assistance to the latter has been regarded by 
India as a part of China's strategy to contain India within the sub-continent.^^ 
However, China has always denied that its special relation with Pakistan is 
aimed against India and further maintains that it had developed its friendly 
relations with India and Pakistan under the same 'Five Principles of peaceful 
co-existence.'i9 Further, it holds that China does not seek discord between 
India and Pakistan nor does it want to reap advantage from Indo-Pak 
confrontation.2o The special relationship between China and Pakistan 
developed especially in the post 1962 Sino-India war years. After that, both 
the states developed a strategic alliance which continued even after the end of 
Cold War and still continues uninterruptedly. The main reason and motive of 
such a long lasting strategic partnership can be summarised as: 
(a) To deny strategic space to India in the South Asian region, 
(b) to request for oil from the gas reserves in Baluchistan province of 
Pakistan, 
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(c) To obtain information on teclinologies of western weapons acquired by 
Pakistan and Pakistan's help in neutralising Islamic terrorist elements 
in Xingjian. 
(d) To use Gwadar for access to West Asia and keeping track of U.S. naval 
ships in the Gulf, and 
(e) To seek a land route in the event of Malacca straits being denied to 
them. In recent years also, China's relationship with Pakistan has been 
further motivated by its desire to extend its influence into South and 
Central Asia in order to maintain a stable periphery; gain easy access to 
markets and natural resources and maintain friendly relations with the 
Muslim countries for reducing the Islamic insurgency as already said in 
Xingjian province.^i 
Therefore, it becomes clear from the above discussion that Sino-Pak 
relationship is multi-dimensional and China will continue to maintain close 
relations with Pakistan because of the combined strategic and political 
advantages it receives from its relationship with Pakistan. Above all, Pakistan 
is the only country that can prevent the Indian hegemony, thus fulfilling a key 
strategic objective of China's South Asia policy.22 It is due to this strategic 
importance of Pakistan that the relationship between the two has been often 
described as an "all-weather relationship."23 Further during his November, 
2006 visit to Pakistan, President Hu Jintao described the relationship between 
Pakistan and China as, "higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the Indian 
Ocean and sweeter than honey ."24 However, due to recent developments in 
the region especially India's growing economic and strategic potential in the 
wake of improving Indo-US relations on the one hand and on the other, 
China's desire to maintain amicable relations with all states along its 
periphery, has motivated China to adopt a more balanced approach towards 
its relationship with India and Pakistan. This shift in China's foreign policy is 
reflected over the issue of Kashmir. From 1999 (Kargil Conflict between India 
and Pakistan) onwards, 25 China had adopted a neutral position over Kashmir 
issue rather than siding with Pakistan. However, it must be reiterated here, 
that China has not completely abandoned its traditional loyalty to Pakistan. 
China continues to use the 'Pakistan card' in showing its displeasure over 
Indian behaviour. Moreover, China's offer to support Pakistan's civilian 
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nuclear programme following the conclusion of the Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear 
deal testifies to the fact that China continues its two track approach i.e., to 
engage India economically and also not to displease its historical partner 
(Pakistan). China continues to supply different types of weapons to Pakistan 
ranging from Light Machine Guns to Aircrafts.26 It is due to this wholesale 
transfer of weapons by China to Pakistan that K. Subrahmanyam, a noted 
defence analyst noted that 'Islamabad derives its capability to threaten India 
from China.'27 Further to give boast to Pakistan's stand on Kashmir, China has 
recently once again changed its Kashmir policy when it began issuing 
stippled (irregular) visas for the residents of Jammu and Kashmir and in 2010 
shocked India by denying a visa for the Indian Army General in charge of the 
northern areas.^s It clearly reflected that China wanted to reopen an issue that 
was thought to be settled in the last decade. Thus, after a brief analysis of 
Pakistan's influence on Sino-India relations, it can be observed that after the 
Sino-India border issue, Pakistan is the major factor which continues to be the 
major source of irritant in the Sino-India relations and the continuing growing 
multi-relationship between China and Pakistan is the perpetual source of 
conflict, suspicion, distrust and apprehension in the minds of Indians. 
The U.S. Factor in China-India Relations 
The U.S.A. as the sole super power is deeply engaged in South Asia 
with its military presence in South and Central Asia due to war against 
terrorism and plays an important role in the Sino-India relations. The U.S.-
China-India strategic triangle has been seriously taken by all the three 
countries. The U.S. plays a complex role in this strategic triangle and has a lot 
of influence on Sino-India relations. When one country tries to forge the close 
relatioris with U.S., it increases the apprehensions in the other country. The 
above statement can be illustrated with an example; when in June, 1998 U.S. 
President Bill Clinton visited China; it increased the apprehensions among 
Indians about the prospects of a Sino-American joint hegemony over the sub-
continent. On the other hand, warming relations between India and the U.S. 
in the 21^' century raised the apprehensions in China about India joining the 
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American containment plan against China.29 
Thus, from the above analysis, it becomes clear that China and India 
are sensitive tov/ards the improvement of relations with U.S.A. In such a 
confusing situation, U.S. can play the India-card in its dealings with China or 
can play the China-card in developing its relations with India. 
For India, it is possible to make use of the U.S. factor in dealing with 
China because both share the same challenge of a rising China to their 
respective domains in the world and South Asia. It was with this 
consideration that there was talk of U.S.-India plus Japan and Israel, "Asian 
NATO" or "Asian Democratic Uruon". However India also knows that the 
U.S. and Chinese interests in their mutual relationship are more than that of 
India. That is the main reason that neither China nor U.S. will be ready to 
oppose each other for India. 
Chinese on the other side held the perception, that India by virtue of its 
geo-political situation, naval capabilities, and unresolved bilateral disputes 
with China, is an ideal country for the U.S. to have it (India) on its side in the 
eventuality of any conflict with China.^o China still is not clear that whether 
India will side with U.S. agairist China or join China and Russia for a multi-
polar world order against the uni-polar world dominated by U.S. However, 
China views the U.S. attempts to develop a strategic relations with India since 
2001 as an attempt to develop a strategic relations with India to contain 
China. In June 2005, India and U.S. signed the New Framework for the U.S. -
India Defence Relationship paving the way for joint weapons production, 
cooperation on missile defence and in other military fields. Due to China's 
growing dependence on oil imports particularly through the Indian Ocean, 
the Indo-U.S. joint military cooperation in this area has become a particular 
source of concern for China. Further, China also expressed her discomfort 
over the Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear deal in March, 2006.3^ The conclusion of this 
nuclear deal between India and U.S. was compared by Chinese analysts to the 
'Strategic tilt' towards China executed by former U.S. President Richard 
Nixon in 1971 to contain the Soviet threat^^ and warned that such 
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developments have negative and destabilising implications for their country's 
future. However, later on, China softened its attitude towards this agreement, 
realising that constant opposition can create irritation in the bilateral relations 
between China and India on the one side and China and U.S. on the other 
side. In both these cases it was not good for Chinese economy. Here, an 
important question arises that will India really align itself with U.S.A. or any 
other power to contain China? The answer will be in negative because as a 
legacy of non-aligned country and independent foreign policy, India has 
always distanced itself from open alliances particularly those which are 
perceived as counter-balancing other countries.^^ That is why, India has 
always kept itself aloof from both China- centred forums such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and U.S.- centred organisations such as the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the U.S. Japan-Australia Trilateral 
Strategic Dialogue.^ 
Thus, according to Surjit Mansingh, the key difference is to be found in 
the respective equations between the U.S. and China on the one hand and the 
U.S. and India on the other.^s He further states that, China's investment of 
effort, time and money in cultivating good will or limiting opposition in the 
U.S. is enormous; India's is not. For historical reasons, American perceptions 
of China, despite distortions, reflect greater respect than equally muddled 
perceptions of India. International status is another important 
difference. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a recognised 
nuclear weapons power with a spectacularly dynamic economy, China 
appears to deal confidently on terms of political parity with the U.S., India 
does not" .3^  In such a complex situation, India will maintain its strategic 
importance/independence by following a multilayered approach combing 
both cooperation and competition with China in a way that serves its own 
unique political, economic and security interests. 
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Regional Cooperation and Competition between China and 
India 
In the 21^ * century, the rise of China and the emergence of India in 
terms of economic growth and military build-up will certainly have an 
inevitable regional implication. There are at least three sub-regions - namely. 
South Asia, South East Asia, and Central Asia where the economic, military, 
political and energy interests of both the states have met or will meet 
(I) South Asia 
In the South Asia, except Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives, China 
shares borders with almost all the South Asian states that is Pakistan, Nepal, 
Bhutan, and Myanmar. This geographical intimacy between China and South 
Asian countries makes the South Asia a special area in the Chinese foreign 
policy considerations. India views Chinese activities mostly its military 
doctrines or economic interests in the South Asian region as a matter of 
concern. Both, China and India, the two rising Asian giants are and will 
compete for attracting smaller countries and strengthening and enhancing 
their respective influence in the South Asian region. In this regard, John W. 
Graver argued that while India believes that the sub-continent and its 
environments are its natural security zone, China believes that it cannot let 
India exercise dominance on its southern borders.^^ The widening and 
deepening defence cooperation between China and India's immediate 
neighbours are perceived as encircling India. In this regard, Nepal, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka which are perceived by India to be within 
its territorial sphere of influence, have deepened their ties with China. In 
these states, India exercises considerable influence in domestic politics and 
has always opposed outside power's involvement. 
Thus, it is in this context that India has always seen itself as the prime 
power in South Asia and is not willing that China might also have an interest 
in South Asia while on the other side, China is rapidly strengthening its 
presence in the Indian ocean and South Asia. The 'string of pearls' a nexus of 
Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence along its sea lines of 
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communication is seriously viewed in India because the Indians view that the 
Indian ocean can be used as a source of power projection against India and 
that Indian sea lines could themselves be severed in the event of war.^ ^ 
General Lhao Nangi was quoted in 1993 as saying that China would extent its 
naval operations farther than the South and East China sea to check attempts 
by India to dominate the Indian Ocean and other regional waters. He further 
said, "this is something which we cannot accept.... we are not prepared to let 
the Indian Ocean become India's ocean."^^ Though, China has been granted 
an observer status in the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) during Dhaka Summit in November, 2005 (besides China, the 
European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea and United States are also 
observer nations) but still both are viewing at each other with suspicious 
motives concerning this region. 
(ii) South East-Asia 
South East Asian Region has been historically an area of competition 
and influence between China and India due to their overlapping and 
conflicting interests in this region. 
The then Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee on November 9, 
2002 stated at the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh that there was a 
competition between India and China in cultivating the relationship with the 
ASEAN nations and that this competition was healthy .'^ o Thus, India openly 
regarded China as a competitor in the East Asian region, not only in economic 
terms but also in security related areas. 
In the initial stage, China did not have good relations with most of the 
East Asian countries, but with the dawn of 21*' century, China is attempting to 
tie-up with ASEAN'^ ^ countries to increase its economic and political influence 
in the area and on the other hand, India is following the same path in the 
region. With the conclusion of Free Trade Zone agreement between China and 
ASEAN, India followed the same path with a 'me too' policy of signing a 
similar agreement with ASEAN. When China began to hold every year 
summit with all South East Asian countries in 2000 within the framework of 
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ASEAN-l and ASEAN-3 on various bilateral issues,42 India also, in the effort 
to strengthen its Look East Policy, held annual summit with ASEAN. So far as 
the ASEAN Regional Forum is concerned (ARE) ^3, China has actively taken 
part in its activities since late 1990's while India joined ARE in the mid 1990's. 
However, in this tussle between China and India to gain more and 
more strategic, economic and political influence in ASEAN region, it must be 
noted here that China has more intimate relations with ASEAN than India. It 
is reflected from the gradual rise of trade between China and ASEAN which 
increased from US $390 million in 1976 to US $7959 million in 1991 and again 
in 2004, it reached to US $94.54 billion making ASEAN China's fifth largest 
trading partner.'^ This is also reflected from the fact that China was the first 
non-ASEAN country that joined the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation for 
South East Asia in 2003. Moreover, China and ASEAN are also cooperating 
with each other in wider regional organisations such as Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) "^ ^ Council of Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP), and Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD). In addition to it, Chinese 
communities also play a bigger role than Indian ones in ASEAN countries. 
It is also observed that China does not want India to emerge as an 
equal competitor in South East Asia. This realisation was further strengthened 
from China's opposition to India's membership in ASEAN (Asia-Europe 
Summit), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Summit) .^ ^ That is why, India has on 
her own part started cultivating strong relations with Thailand which is 
regarded as one of the most important countries which can help India to forge 
close relationship with ASEAN. Similarly, India is also strengthening its ties 
with Myanmar in the energy and trade sectors so that it did not fall under 
China's influence. Similarly, India is also enhancing its commercial relations 
with Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore for rebalancing Chinese influence in 
the area. Thus, from the above analysis it is evident that India and China have 
both conflicting as well as overlapping interests in the South East Asian 
region with China having deeper and stronger links with ASEAN. 
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(iii) Central Asia 
So far as the Central Asia is concerned, the relationship between India 
and China are same as are in the South East Asia that is, overlapping and 
differing interests. The Central Asian region is mostly important for its geo-
strategic location and rich natural resources. China and India as rising powers 
need energy security to fuel their economies and in this regard Central Asia is 
given pre-eminent place in the foreign policy making of both the states. The 
importance of this region enhanced after the disintegration of Soviet Union in 
the early 90's when there emerged a number of independent states like 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. China shares the border 
with most of these states. In order to settle mutual disputes with these states 
and to enhance its influence both economic and political in this newly 
emerged region, China initiated the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO) .47 Its main aim was to institutionalize regional cooperation with the 
Central Asian states and to implement the Cooperative Security Concept. In 
this way, this regional forum provides broad perspectives for intimate 
cooperation between China and Central Asian states. However, this rapidly 
growing influence of China in the Central Asian region is of prime concern for 
India. India believes that the real motives of China in SCO are to bring the 
new states under its strategic fold. So far as India's joining of SCO is 
concerned, there are both positive as well as negative views about it in India.^s 
Thus, from the above analysis it can be concluded that like South and South 
East Asia, in Central Asia also, China has upper hand vis-a-vis India and it 
has become more prominent with the establishment of SCO. There are two 
reasons for such a close and deep relationship between China and Central 
Asian countries which India does not have; 
a) Close geographical proximity between China and Central Asian countries, 
and 
b) Chinese huge investment in the infrastructure development within these 
countries. 
However, in recent years, India has also intensified its efforts to forge 
cooperative relationship with these countries. There are plans to supply gas 
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from these countries to India via Afghanistan, Pakistan and China. In future 
also, there is chance of competition and cooperation in this part of the world 
as both India and China are the major energy consumption countries, both of 
them will try to enhance their influence in this region more and more. 
Cooperation or Competition in the Economic and Energy Fields 
Another two important areas, where there are chance of both 
cooperation as well as competition between China and India are in the 
Economic and Energy fields. 
Economic Sphere 
Though, the political relations between India and China are not smooth 
and have been characterised by competition, suspicion, distrust and hostility 
towards each other, yet in the economic field there is some convergence of 
interests due to the internal and external factors. For example, the economic 
reforms in China in the late 70's and in India during the initial years of 90's 
and thereafter, their fast growing economic growth rates, compelled both the 
states to shun the political inhibitions and forge a more cooperative bilateral 
relationship especially in the field of trade and commerce. Moreover, as stated 
earlier*^ that with the end of cold war, geo-strategic and geo-political 
consideration were replaced by geo-economic factors - Globalisation, 
Privatisation and Liberalisation were the catch words of the newly emerging 
global economic order. The above situation has been best illustrated by Alka 
Acharya, "as the forces of economic globalisation have pushed the majority 
of the countries towards greater economic integration within an increasingly 
global market economy, a process of homogenisation has taken place in which 
countries tend to converge on a similar model of economic development, 
namely the modern, industrialised, open capitalist market economy."5° It was 
in this context that India and China built a new economic relationship and 
pledged that the political issues between the two states should not be allowed 
to come into the way of economic relations. 
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Since then both the countries have expedited the process of integration 
in the global economy as well as bilateral economic cooperation. In the 
beginning of 1990, bilateral trade between China and India was $260 million 
which increased to $25 billion by 2006 and thereby making China India's 
second largest trading partner and India China's tenth largest partner.^i In 
2008, the bilateral trade between China and India surpassed 50 billion dollars. 
This makes China the third largest export market for India and its single 
largest source of imports.^^ India's exports to China are mainly natural 
resources such as iron ore. On the other hand, China's exports to India are 
primarily electronic goods and other finished goods. In spite of such a 
positive trend in Sino-India economic relations, there are also some 
limitations which can cast negative effects on Sino-India economic relations. 
For example, though it is argued that the China's hardware and 
manufacturing industries and India's software and service sector expertise 
can boost the bilateral economic ties between the two, but in real practice, the 
cooperation in this field has been limited so far. Moreover, given the Chinese 
impressive record of export of hi-tech products, it is argued that China may 
even overtake that sector also from India (software sector) .^ 3 Further, trade 
balance has been consistently tilting against India. The major hurdles in Sino-
India trade are China's non-Tariff barriers, language gap, lack of transparency 
in rules and smuggling of Chinese goods.^ To complicate the situation, there 
is fear in India that the relatively cheaper Chinese goods might displace 
Indian goods in the international market due to their lower costs. Moreover, 
China has emerged as a major world player in strategic and economic terms 
with its entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on December 11, 
2001. Thus, from the above discussion it can be assumed that though India 
and China has built a new economic relationship since the end of cold war 
and are determined to lead it to the new heights, still there are some 
limitations in such economic relations which cannot be eliminated out rightly, 
but their negative effects can be minimised. Moreover, the above analysis also 
reflects that China enjoys the advantageous position in the economic sphere 
also vis-a-vis India. In the end, it must be reiterated that the trade related 
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competition between the two sides cannot be ruled out in future but at the 
same time, economic sphere is the only field where there are more 
convergence than divergence of interests since both are fast growing 
developing economies and this convergence of economic interests between 
the two can be exploited to create an environment conducive for solving more 
difficult bi-lateral political problems. 
Energy Sphere 
The sphere of energy has been dealt separately here given its 
importance in the China's and India's emerging economy and over all 
development. The sustained growth rate of their economies depends to a 
large extent on the uninterrupted supply of energy like oil and gas as both are 
major energy importer countries. In 2001, the total energy consumption of 
China and India was 39.7 and 12.7 respectively in Quadrillion British thermal 
Units and it is estimated that this figure will increase to 60.3 in case of China 
and 23.5 in case of India, by 2025. 
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Hence, the energy factor assumes a crucial factor in Sino-India 
relations. However, in this field also, there has been competitive rather than 
cooperative interaction. The competition for oil assets have been witnessed in 
different part of the world like Ecuador, Angola, Kazakhstan and many other 
countries. As usual, China fared well also in this sector than India. The 
following table shows the competition between Chinese and Indian 
companies and also China's success in securing more bids than India. 
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The Chinese success has not been because it has offered higher bid 
than India but because of its tactics and above all abilities to integrate 
financial incentives with aid, infrastructure projects, diplomatic incentives and 
arms packages. Furthermore, in most of the bids Chinese companies have felt 
it more convenient to join hands with the Western partners than with their 
Asian neighbour, India. 
However, in recent years, there have been some particular occasions 
when both the sides cooperated in this field also. This is reflected from the 
way, Chinese and Indian companies have cooperated in developing energy 
assets in Iran, Sudan, Columbia, and Syria and many other countries. The 
limited cooperation between Chinese and Indian companies can be illustrated 
from the below mentioned table. 
Cooperation Asset 
Greater Nile Oil Project 
(Sudan) 
Petro-Canada-37% (Syria) 
Omimex de Colombia 
Ltd- 50% (Colombia) 
Yadavaran oil field (Iran) 
Sino-Indian Bid 
OVL- 25% ($750 million), 
CNPC- 40% ($441 million) 
$573 million (OVL-CNPC-
Himalaya Energy) 













China National Petroleum Corporation (China) 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (China) 
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (India) 
ONGC Videsh Limited (India) 
Source: Derek J. Mitchell and Chietigj Bajpaee, "China and India", p. 169, at 
http://csis.org/files/niedia/csis/pubs/090212-08China-india.pdf 
Further, in 2006, both the states signed five memoranda of cooperation 
in the energy sector, pipeline projects, research and development, non-
conventional sources of energy and environmental protection. Both the states 
also share the same interest in securing the safe sea-lanes to protect their oil 
imports which are often vulnerable to obstruction from Persian Gulf to the 
Strait of Malacca.^^ However, it should be also taken into consideration that 
the Chinese and India's Energy interests does not completely converge. China 
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is cooperating with India only in those areas where its interests can be best 
secured than by aUgning with others. Moreover, China will not like that India 
should become co-equal to it (China) in the energy sector. Therefore, it 
becomes imperative upon India to secure, acquire and maintain energy 
resources from outside countries in a more coherent and systematic manner 
without conning into collusion with China. India should also maintain 
relations with the energy exporting countries on the same lines on which 
China maintains, i.e., to invest into the infrastructure development like roads, 
bridges, railways, posts, mining, airports, electricity generation and in many 
other areas. It will be more advantageous in the long run. 
Conclusion 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that Sino-India 
relationship can't be considered a relationship of equals because it is clear 
from each and every field ranging from multilateral relations with Asian 
countries to economic and security field where India lags behind China. The 
only field, in which India is ahead of China to some extent, is the software 
industry. However, in that field also, it is predicted that China will overtake 
India sooner or later due to its hi-tech products. That is why, the relationship 
between India and China cannot be regarded as a relation of equals. 
Moreover, among the geo-political factors, the 'all-weather Friendship' 
between China and Pakistan and the sense of competition between China and 
India as a rising powers may lead to hostility in the Sino-India relations. At 
the same time, rather than simply appearing as a counter weight to China, 
India would like to play a leading role in the region. Further, the Indo-U.S. 
strategic rapprochement would have far-reaching implications for China 
because in the light of improvement of Indo-US relationship, it might become 
even more dangerous for China to keep a hostile attitude towards India. This 
thinking and this attitude will ultimately compel India and China towards 
becoming partners rather than competitors or rivals. 
In the end, it might be concluded with the remarks of Sanjoy 
Majumdar that, "despite all reasons for concern, distrust and dispute China 
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and India have over Kashmir, Pakistan, U.S., Tibet, influence in Myanmar and 
Nepal, many in India believe that it is possible and in fact important to do 
business with China."^^ Though, there would be competition between the 
two, but reciprocity and cooperation cannot be out rightly ruled-out. Further, 
promoting common interests and reducing differences, the peaceful co-
existence and peaceful rise of China and India in Asia or elsewhere in the 
world also need better relations and mutual understanding. 
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This chapter seeks to assess the future prospects of the relationship 
between the two rising giants of Asia namely India and China. As they both 
are rising as great powers, their mutual relationship will have a significant 
impact not only on Asia, but on the whole world. At present, the nature of 
their relationship is something mixed as mentioned in the preceding chapter 
i.e., growing cooperation in the field of trade and commerce along with 
distrust and mutual suspicion in the strategic fields whether political or 
geographical. Thus, it is in this above mentioned perspective, it can be 
asserted that the future relationship between China and India will be 
characterised by the cooperation in those fields whether mutual, regional, or 
international which may be beneficial for the peaceful rise of both the states 
and confrontation, competition, and even hostility in some other areas where 
the respective interests of both the giants clash with each other, for example, 
the border issue, relationship with other countries particularly US and 
Pakistan, their encirclement policies, competition for energy resources, 
nuclear arms race, etc. However, at the international level, both the countries 
would find convergence of interests by cooperating with each other on the 
issues like international terrorism, climate change, restructuring of 
international institutions, reducing dependence of developing countries on 
developed countries, taking joint stand on human rights violations, 
promoting multi-polar world order, and on some other fields also. 
India and China Looking Towards Future 
In the 21^ * century, India and China has emerged as the two visible 
powers in Asia and in the world with huge populations, growing economies 
and expanding markets.^ Though their past relations were bitter and were 
characterised by hostility towards each other but since 1988, with the Indian 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China and more especially with the 
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dawn of 21** century, both the states began to shed their past hostilities 
towards each other by initiating a number of Confidence and Security 
Building Measures (CSBM's) in various fields like economics, politics, 
strategic affairs, culture, defence, etc. to stabilise their relationship. This turn 
of positive development was based on the mutual need to focus on social and 
political stability, strong economic growth and a sense of security so that each 
side can avoid the dangers of stagnation and decline. 
The rapprochement in the bilateral relations between China and India 
has been viewed differently by different observers. For example, some argue 
that close relations between the two Asian giants can radically alter their 
security environment and restructure Asian geopolitics. But so far as the long 
term observers of Sino-India future relations are concerned, they maintain 
that Sino-India ties remain weak and vulnerable to sudden deterioration as a 
result of misperceptions, unrealistic expectations, accidents and eruption of 
unresolved issues.^ The simultaneous rise of both China and India are bound 
to result in realignment of geographical equation and power relations in Asia. 
It is due to this complex nature of Sino-India relations that it cannot be 
explained in simplistic format of 'friend' or 'foe'. Instead, both constitute a 
mosaic of cooperation, co-existence, coordination, cooption, competition and 
even confrontation.^ 
Although, it is a recognised fact that China and India are competitors 
for influence and power in Asia, nevertheless, both share common goals of 
maintaining regional stability, fighting terrorism, taking advantages from 
globalisation and maintaining access to capital and markets, taking joint stand 
on climate change, issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc. Further, 
mutual cooperation between China and India will be more effective in 
balancing U.S. influence in the region and also increase their negotiating 
position with the sole super power. 
It is in this convergence of interests between the two Asian giants that 
the joint document entitled, "A Shared vision for the 21 »* century of the 
Republic of India and the people's Republic of China"4 was signed on January 
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14, 2008 at Beijing by India and China to Chart-out the future roadmap of 
bilateral relations between the two. The document provides that India and 
China (hereafter called the two sides) will: ^ 
(a) Promote the building of a durable peace and common prosperity 
through developing the strategic and cooperative partnership for peace 
and prosperity between the two countries. 
(b) For removing mutual suspicion, the two sides are convinced that it is 
time to look to the future in building a relationship of friendship and 
trust based on equality in which each is sensitive to the concerns and 
aspirations of the other. Such a close relationship will have a positive 
influence on the future of International system. 
(c) On the issue of constituting foreign policy, the two sides believe that in 
the new century, Panchsheel, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence, should continue to constitute the basic guiding principles for 
good relations between all countries and for creating the conditions for 
realising peace and progress of human kind. 
(d) On the future of 21«' century, the two sides believe that the continuous 
democratisation of international relations and multi-literalism are an 
important objective in the new century. 
(e) On the international economic issues, both states believe that the 
establishment of an open, fair, equitable, transparent and rule based 
multi-lateral trading system is the common aspiration of all countries. 
(f) Further, the two sides are convinced that it is in the common interest of 
the international community to establish an international energy order 
that is fair, equitable, secure and stable to the benefit of the entire 
international community. 
(g) Further, the two sides take the issue of climate change seriously and 
reiterate their readiness to join the international community in the 
efforts to address climate change. 
(h) On the arms race, the two sides appeal to the international community 
to move forward the processes of multi-lateral arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation. 
(i) So far as the terrorism is concerned, the two sides pledge to work 
together and with international community to strengthen the global 
framework against terrorism in a long term, sustained and 
comprehensive manner. 
(j) On the question oi boundary issue the two sides remain firmly 
committed to resolving outstanding differences, including the 
boundary question, through peaceful negotiation. 
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This document can be regarded as a blueprint for the future bilateral 
relation between China and India as the document stressed that the two sides 
are convinced that it is time to look to the future in building a relationship 
and trust based on equality, in which each side is sensitive to the concerns 
and aspirations of the other and their common and simultaneous 
development will have a positive influence on the future of international 
community. On the day its signing, Hu Shishang (Chinese scholar) wrote, 
"The rise of the world's two most populous nations is of a revolutionary 
significance" hoping that Sino-lndia relations should "over step limits of 
geopolitics" and "should especially exceed the security predicaments and 
grudges against each other in the history." ^ 
However, in spite of such a convergence of interests, India remains 
uncertain about China's long term intentions. To eliminate such future 
apprehensions, India's strategy for future remains three fold.'' India is using 
its growing economic strength to fund and facilitate the modernisation and 
expansion of its military strength and presence in its immediate and extended 
neighbourhood. However, along with such strategy, there is also a desire for 
cooperation on trade and commerce along with some shared interests like 
safeguarding sea lane, combating terrorism and so on. The bilateral 
cooperative relationship can be advantageous for both the states. In this 
regard, 'The Shared vision for the 21^' century' as mentioned above, reflects 
such a sense of mutual simultaneous peaceful rising of both the states. As 
stated earlier, the document provides that it is the time that China and India 
should look to the future in building a relationship of friendship and trust 
based on equality in which each is sensitive to concerns and aspirations of 
others. That is why India's Prime Miruster Dr. Manmohan Singh said, 
"The responsibility for the further development of China-India relations is a 
shared one in which besides the governments - the intellectuals, thinkers and 
scholars of both the states have an important role to play. It is only through a 
free flow of ideas and sharing of different perspectives that our two societies 
can build-upon the edifice of our civilisational links."» 
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In the same vein, Deng Xiaoping (the Chinese premier) once remarked 
that "if China and India are developed, we can say that we have made our 
contribution to mankind."^ His observation about the importance of Sino-
India cooperation has acquired more significance in the contemporary times 
as the world is moving towards a multi-polar system with a great impact on 
the economy, politics and foreign affairs of both China and India. Both the 
states are facing new opportunities as well as challenges and in future, they 
should exploit these opportunities and face challenges in a cooperative 
manner. On some international issues, both the states can support each other 
and cooperate as they have common or identical views on those issues. 
For example, China and India share common view points on the 
human rights issues. They oppose the attempt of some western countries 
(particularly U.S.A.) to capitalise on the so called 'Human Rights issue' to put 
pressure on developing countries.^o Thus, both have opposed the attempts by 
some developed countries to impose their human rights criteria on others and 
thereby interfere in the internal affairs of other countries under the guise of 
human rights. In future also, they can also take joint stand on this issue. 
Furthermore, both the states can jointly project the cause for the 
establishment of New International Economic and Political order devoid of 
uni-polarity in which the strategic, economic, and political independence of 
all countries all over the world must be taken into account. However, the 
most important field for future cooperation between China and India will be 
economics and trade. They can reduce their economic weakness by acquiring 
each other's strong points. It is in this context, that both the states have made 
a mutual decision to set aside fighting about their disputed border while the 
two giants develop their economies and enter world market known in China 
as the 'peaceful development'.^i Being the two largest and fastest growing 
economies with expanding markets in the world, it is projected that the 
Sino-India bilateral trade would be the world's largest trading partnership 
sometime between 2010 and 2020.^ 2 In 1991, bilateral trade between the two 
states was $265 million. In 1999, after a decade, it rose to $ 1.82 billion.i3 
105 
In 2000, the bilateral trade had reached $2.5 billion. Again in 2004, bilateral 
trade touched $13.6 billioni^. During the year 2008 and 2009, the Sino-Indian 
trade was $51.86 billion and $43.28 billion on respectively. India-China total 
trade crossed the target of $60 billion for 2010 and stood at $61.74 billion^s. 
The table given below highlights the growth of trade between India and china 
during last three years. 
(All figures in US $ billions) 
Indian Exports to China 
Growth % 
China Exports to India 
Growth % 
Total India-China trade 
Growth % 

























These figure for Sino-India bilateral trade (2010) xoere released by China customsJ^ 
Thus, it becomes clear that since the last two decades, Sino-India trade 
has continuously increased and in future also, this pace of increase in 
Sino-India trade is expected to continue. India's strength lays in information 
technology (IT), software engineering, management and financial services and 
China is strong in hardware, manufacturing, construction and engineering. 
Therefore, there is greater scope in future for collaboration and cooperation 
from each other's strong points. 
Besides the above mentioned fields, there are other areas as well where 
both China and India can cooperate in future, for example in the field of 
Science and Technology, both states have made tremendous progress and 
cooperation in this field will to a great extent reduce their technological 
dependence on the developed countries. In this regard, they need to 
cooperate in the fields like space, computer software, and genetic engineering, 
peaceful application of nuclear energy, hydro-electricity generation, and 
agriculture and in a number of other fields. 
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Thus, on the whole it can be stated that the cooperation between the 
two Asian giants in future at the bilateral and international level will continue 
in those fields or areas where there is convergence of interests and which will 
serve their respective national interests. That is why, despite their many 
disputes, both are likely to avoid overt rivalry and open conflict. They will 
build a more robust and substantive economic relationship and will also 
pursue cooperation in international forums on environment, trade, human 
rights, and on economic issues. In all these areas, they have far more reasons 
to cooperate than to collide. The more and more cooperation in all the above 
mentioned fields will be more beneficial for both the countries which would 
enable them to play a more assertive role in the international arena by 
increasing their negotiating position vis-^-vis developed countries. 
Although, there has been increasing cooperation between the two 
Asian giants in the political, economic or other fields in the past and is likely 
to remain so in the future also, but the misperceptions, distrust, suspicion and 
hostility towards each other has not fully vanished and in future also, these 
features will characterise Sino-India relations along with cooperation. While 
India has always remained suspicious about China, the Chinese on the other 
hand, remain sceptical about India's future course of policies and action. It 
will be not acceptable for China to see India playing the role beyond South 
Asia or emerge as an equal competitor to China. For example, India's 
aspirations to play a more active role in East Asia are not encouraged by 
China; the latter prefers that India remain in South Asia although, it plays lip 
service to the notion that India should be a major player in the global affairs. 
India's entry to the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) was endorsed by the 
United States and Singapore and not by China. In terms of economic and 
military capabilities, China has went far ahead of India and the existing 
power status between the two serves, the interests of China more than India.i'' 
However, in spite of such an advantageous position of China vis-a-vis India, 
China is concerned about India aligning with any other significant powers 
notably (U.S.) against China. That is why; China is prepared to make some 
107 
concessions to India so that India may not align itself with any outside power 
to challenge Chinese supremacy in the region. However, to Mohan Malik, on 
balance, China seems to have limited expectations from India which can be 
broadly described as "Five no's"^^ 
1) do not peddle "the China threat theory", 
2) do not support Tibet or Taiwan's independence, 
3) do not object to the Sino-Pakistani strategic partnership, 
4) do not align with the United States and/or Japan to contain China, 
5) do not see or project yourself as an equal of China or as a nuclear 
and economic counter weight to China in Asia. 
It is on the basis of these 'five principles' that China seeks to establish 
future relations with India as part of its friendly neighbourhood strategy. 
Earlier, especially during Nehruvian era, and soon after the end of bi-polarity 
it was expected that Sino-India partnership would produce an Asian century, 
but Chinese has not shown any sign so far for sharing leadership of Asia with 
any one including India. China will not allow any power to emerge as a peer 
competitor that will challenge its status as the Asia Pacific's sole "Middle 
Kingdom" and in this regard an old Chinese saying goes, "one mountain 
cannot accommodate two tiger's".^^ Thus, on the side of India, to challenge or 
to try to undermine China's influence and power or any attempt to achieve 
strategic parity with China, will be strongly resisted by China through its 
military, economic and diplomatic means. 
Moreover, as the two Asian giants move forward in the 21** century, 
with increasing need for energy resources^o to feed their growing economies 
both will try to forge closer and deeper security ties with energy rich nations 
and will also develop strategies to safeguard sea lanes through which the bulk 
of their trade takes place. That is why, in the recent past, China is pumping 
more and more money in developing the ports and naval bases in Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Although, no Chinese territory borders 
the Indian ocean, the same (Indian Ocean) is now being described in Chinese 
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circles as 'China's next frontier'.21 But on the other side, India has not been a 
mute spectator to all these developments. It has countered all these moves by 
enhancing and upgrading military ties with Maldives, Madagascar, Seychelles 
and U.S in the Indian ocean and with Myanmar, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, Japan and U.S in the 
East.22In the context of above mentioned developments, it is predicted that in 
the future, the maritime competition between two Asian giants will intensify 
as the Indian and Chinese navies meet in the Indian and Pacific ocean. 
Maritime rivalry would be the new dimension to the traditional Sino-Indian 
geopolitical rivalry. 
Further, the future relations between China and India* will remain 
delicate and sensitive and there is possibility of sudden deterioration of 
relations as a result of misperceptions, hostile attitudes especially on border 
issue. In addition, the competition for resources, overlapping spheres of 
influence, rival alliance relationships^ shows that the future relations 
between the two Asian giants will be characterized more by competition than 
cooperation. However, it must be reiterated here once again that in such a 
complex and delicate atmosphere, neither side would do anything that would 
destabilise their current bilateral economic or other relations. But at the same 
time, both the states will try to consolidate their power and position while 
striving to resolve their domestic and internal problems.24 However, along 
with such a strategy, they will also continue to monitor closely each others 
activities to expand influence and gain advantage in the wider Asian region. 
India will also like to maintain the independence in its foreign policy by not 
entering into any alliance that is aimed at countering China or any other 
power. Nonetheless, a pro U.S./pro-Japan tilt in India's national security 
policy, a reaction to the power projection capabilities of China will be a 
defining characteristic of an increasingly globalised world order.^s Moreover, 
the nature of future Indo-U.S. relations, Sino-U.S. relations and Sino-Pak 
relations will be very significant for Sino-India relations. During the 1960's 
and 1970, one of the main reasons of hostility between India and China was 
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the Indo-Soviet alliance and still in the present times, Chinese antagonism 
towards Japan is its alliance with the United States. In the same way, in 
future, if the U.S. adopts a policy of containment against China and recognise 
India as its natural ally, the result would be a hostile relationship between 
China and India as well as between China and United States.^^ It is in this 
respect that China's behaviour towards India is not much different from that 
of United States behaviour towards China for the simple reason that China is 
a status-quoits power with regard to India while the US is a status quoits 
power with respect to China.^7 
Thus, the future of the Asian Security environment depends to a great 
extent on how the U.S. manages the rise of China and how China, in turn, 
manages the rise of India. 
Though, in the short and medium term, neither side would do 
anything that would destabilise their current bilateral economic or other 
relations, but in the long term, there is possibility of confrontation and even 
conflict between the two Asian giants over a number of issues ranging from 
border issue to encirclement policies.^s However, the extent and nature of 
their rivalry will be determined by how domestic, political and economic 
developments in both these countries affect their power, their perceptions, 
their attitudes and above all, their security policies. It can be asserted and is 
also possible that militarily strong and economically prosperous China and 
India might come to terms with each other eventually as their mutual 
containment policies start yielding diminishing results. 
Till then, both the states would like to maintain the status quo 
focussing on their economic, political, military and strategic development and 




In the concluding remarks, it can be asserted that despite 
improvement, the Sino-India relations will remain competitive. Both will 
attempt to acquire the power and status which will be suitable to their 
populations, geographical location, their country's size, and so on. 
Furthermore, the emergence of both the states as great powers and economic 
giants in the 21^' century is likely to result in significant new geo-political 
alignments. Both will try to enhance their presence in different parts of Asia 
and Africa. Moreover, the new economic prosperity and military strength of 
both the states will create new tensions as both will try to register their 
authority in different parts of the world, especially in South Asia, South East 
Asia and Central Asia. 
At the strategic level, India will continue to expand the strength, scope 
and reach of its naval capabilities. The growth of such capabilities will 
provide Chinese further reason to be wary of Indian intentions. 
So far as the Sino-Pak ties and its impact on Sino-Indian relations are 
concerned, it will also remain an important irritant in the Sino-India relations. 
Though China, no longer supports Pakistan on Kashmir issue,^^ but it does 
not also endorse India's position either and nor it is likely to do so in the 
foreseeable future.^^ Further, in many other areas such as boundary issue, 
Arunachal Pradesh, competition for energy resources, etc., both will held 
divergent views and will stick to their respective stands. 
However, it must be reiterated here, that the range of issues, 
confronting the two states are sufficiently varied so as to engender complex 
national strategies. In most of the cases, China and India will be faced with 
the task of deterring, defending and reassuring each other simultaneously in 
the presence of multiple actors, each with its own capabilities, preferences and 
constraints. In this context, according to Ashley J. Tellis, "Sino-Indian 
relations - on balance - will be defined more by competition than by 
cooperation, but such competition is unlikely to become malignantly 
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rivalrous, as U.S - Soviet Competition was during the cold war. It is because, 
both China and India are still subordinate states in global system that lack 
untrammelled freedom of action, have sufficiently different strategic 
orientations in Asia that, while intersecting, offer hope of avoiding 
unvarnished confrontations, and have defence capabilities wherein 
geography nuclear weaponry, and conventional forces combine to produce 
fairly robust defence dominance vis-a-vis each other. If and when, these three 
conditions change, however, the stage would be set for serious dyadic 
rivalry."3i 
In the end, the Sino-Indian future relations can be summed-up with the 
statement of Jay Taylor which he made in the mid-1980's, but remain relevant 
even today, notably in the second decade of 21*' century. He noted: 
"Over the long term, India and China... will always tend towards a 
rival relationship and thus, each will seek a security link with a different 
super power... Both India and China want to avoid war and concentrate on 
development.... Yet the volatile agents of nationalism and history produce a 
mysterious chemistry.... Strength and size carry with them their own 
rationale for status and influence, and both India and China may well find 
themselves drawn into future regional conflicts or possibly intervening in 
neighbouring countries because of some instability or action that is produced 
as threatening... the odds are that over the long term there will be more 
rivalry than cooperation between Hind and Hun."^^ 
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Chapter - VI 
CONCLUSION 
The Post Cold War phase in international relations has witnessed the 
disintegration of Soviet Union which provided the strategic space for the sole 
super power USA to dominate the world with the sole aim of promoting 
capitalist ideology through the tools like globalisation, privatisation and the 
integration of national economies with the world economy. In response, the 
developing countries initiated restructuring their economic system with new 
laws for an open economy. These global changes compelled the international 
actors (states) to shed their inhibitions and forge solid economic bonds and 
enter into a mutually beneficial relationship. The two major developing 
countries of the world, China and India were no exceptions to this general 
rule. The global economic drive has made it essential for both these states to 
look afresh at each other as friends and cooperate to address varied problems 
whether at the regional or global level. As being the two fastest growing 
economies of the world, they cannot afford any potential confrontation which 
may upset their economic development and their ambitions of big pov^ e^r 
status. 
China and India have co-existed peacefully for centuries and never 
confronted each other (except in the 20* century). Both had a glorious past 
with the cultural, material and spiritual (Buddhist) linkages with each other. 
All these interactions enabled them to undertake many religious pilgrimages 
which gave further impetus to their trading intercourse. 
- However, after their independence, India in 1947 and China in 1949, 
relationship between the two states have not been smooth. It was 
characterized by jealousy, hatred, mistrust and armed conflict. It was during 
the initial phase of 1950s that both the states attempted to forge friendly 
relations which ultimately resulted into the signing of Panchsheel Agreement 
in 1954 which was followed by the 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' (Indians and 
Chinese are brothers) phase. In spite of that, mutual suspicion and mistrust 
115 
over the border and Tibet issues resulted into an open armed conflict in 1962 
and the defeat of Indians at the hands of Chinese. 
After the Sino-lndian war in 1962, two external factors influenced the 
Sino-India relations that were: 
(a) The cold war between USA and the USSR and its impact on Sino-lndia 
relations; and 
(b) The growing Sino-Pak friendly relations that further strained the 
Sino-India relations. 
But it was the border issue that was the most dominant factor for 
unfriendly relations between China and India. 
However, the demise of Mao Tsung was a turning point in Chinese 
modern history. After his demise, the new Chinese leadership initiated a 
policy of open door and reforms which gave priority to economic 
development and construction. From the 1990s onwards in general and from 
mid-nineties in particular, the foreign policy of India confronted drastic 
changes both at the internal as well as external level. Thus, in the context of 
changing national and international environment, the foreign policy 
approaches of both the states towards each other now focused on economics 
and de-emphasized their border and other political issues. 
India and China, as the two largest developing countries of the world, 
share a number of interests especially in the field of domestic development 
and econoniic reform. They are experiencing a period of rapid economic 
growth. Both India and China are also struggling to define their role in the 
world given their new found influence on the global economy. Both promote 
the notion of multi-polarity in which they may serve as major international 
players alongside the sole super power - USA. 
So far as China is concerned, its strategic interests in India follows from 
its desire to maintain a peaceful international envirorunent create friendly 
relations with other nations especially with neighbours to prevent any 
attempt towards the formulation of anti-China blocs and finally developing 
markets, investment opportunities and resources to fuel its economic growth. 
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It also wants to address its critical domestic problems (extremism) in a 
coherent manner. For realizing all these objectives, good neighbourly 
relations with India are indispensable. In the same way, India's own focus on 
internal development and to sustain current economic growth rates 
encourages it to cultivate positive relations with China. 
But on the other side, there is also growing competition between the 
two states to affirm their presence from an economic, political and military 
point of view in Asia and other parts of the world. Besides the border issue, 
the Sino-Pak nexus and their implications on Sino-India relations, Indo-US 
growing relations and their impact on Sino-India relations, the growing 
maritime competition especially in the Indian Ocean and thereby China's 
encirclement policies of India by arming its inunediate neighbours and the 
competition for energy resources in different parts of Asia and Africa, other 
issues such as China's intention to divert Brahmaputra water in recent years 
have also eclipsed the good neighbourly relations between the two countries. 
In the above mentioned context, it is difficult to predict whether 
Sino-India relations will lean towards more cooperation or competition or 
even conflict in the foreseeable future. However, it can be safely assumed and 
observed that the nature of their future relations will remain mixed i.e., 
cooperation in those fields or areas where there is convergence of interests 
and competition, distrust and even hostility where there is divergence of 
interests. 
Thus, in the foreseeable future, both the giants will forge cooperation 
with each other in such fields where both the states share common goals like 
economics, political stability, fighting terrorism, taking advantages from 
globalization, maintaining access to capital and markets, taking joint stand on 
climate change vis-a-vis West, international human rights issues, promoting 
the cause of the establishment of New International Economic and Political 
Order in which the strategic, economic and political independence of all the 
countries all over the world must be taken into account, cooperation in the 
field of Science and Technology and thereby reducing their technological 
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dependence upon the developed countries, etc. In all these areas, they have 
far more reasons to cooperate than to collide. It is in this context, that a joint 
document entitled, "A shared vision for the 21«' century of the Republic of 
India and the People's Republic of China", v^as signed on January 14, 2008 to 
include and indicate all these fields where both the countries will cooperate in 
future for their peaceful rise and development. That is why; this document 
can be regarded as a road-map or blue print for future bilateral relations 
between China and India. 
On the other side, the major irritants in the bilateral relations between 
the two states as stated earlier such as border problem, encirclement policies 
of each other, Sino-Pak nexus, growing Indo-U.S. relations, maritime rivalry, 
so on and so forth, will in fact, continue to haunt the Sino-India relations in 
the 21*' century and are capable of turning the relations sour due to their 
hyper sensitive nature. 
In the end, it must be emphasized that in spite of all these irritants in 
the bilateral relations, the willingness of both to strengthen economic and 
cultural relations will in fact, promote and enhance the mutual understanding 
and might pave the way for final resolution of the border and other issues. 
Realistically, it is possible and even inevitable that economically prosperous 
and militarily strong China and India might come to terms with each other 
eventually as their mutual containment policies start yielding diminishing 
results. 
Major Findings 
In the light of preceding discussion about the Sino-India relations, the 
major findings of this study can be highlighted under the following points: 
1. China and India have co-existed peacefully for the last 2000 years. The 
peaceful co-existence of these two great civilizations for such a long period 
of time without coming into conflict with each other is in fact, a great and 
surprising fact in itself. The reasons and manifestations of such a long 
friendly relations have been: Absence of any clear-cut and demarcated 
border as the mighty Himalayas stood between these two great nations as 
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a natural barrier; Material and spiritual (Buddhism) links which promoted 
peaceful and friendly relations in the ancient times; Trading and 
commercial links between the two states during the medieval period; 
Common sufferings and humiliations of both the nations at the hands of 
Europeans and thereafter, the struggles for liberation of their motherlands 
from the colonial powers in the modern period. 
2. In the post independence era, both the states adopted different models of 
development and different political systems, while India adopted the path 
of Parliamentary democracy, model of mixed economy and non-
alignment, China followed one party rule of communism, state- controlled 
economy and joined the communist camp of Soviet Union. However, in 
spite of all these divergent paths, both the states maintained good 
neighbourly relations which ultimately resulted into the signing of 
Panchsheel Agreement between the two nations in 1954, which was 
followed by Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) 
phase. The main reason for such a cordial and friendly relationship during 
this period was that both the states were new born nations needing 
peaceful environment so that each side can concentrate upon its economic, 
political and social development with limited resources. That is why; the 
period between (1947-1958) is often described as 'Honeymoon period' or 
'Friendship Hype period' between China and India. 
3. During the late fifties, Sino-India relations began to deteriorate due to the 
unsettled border and other problems. The growing distrust and hostility 
between China and India culminated in an open armed conflict in 1962. 
The Sino-India war (1962) was the watershed in the history of Sino-Indian 
relations. From 1962 onwards until 1970, the Sino-Indian relations 
remained in a state of constant suspension due to diplomatic freeze. It was 
during this period that Pakistan factor was born in the China-India 
relations when China supported Pakistan in its war against India in 1965. 
This Pakistan factor continues to haunt the Sino-India relations even 
today. It was also during this period that India leaned towards Soviet 
Union. Further, during this period, both the states adopted various 
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counter-balancing measures against each other e.g., China incited naxal 
violence, trained Naga and Mizo insurgents and supplied them arms and 
ammunition to foment violence in India, supported India's arch rival 
Pakistan against India, etc. These entire moves were justified by China 
against India on the grounds that India was following the imperialist 
policies and is responsible for unrest in Tibet. It is due to these hostile 
attitudes towards each other and particularly the diplomatic freeze, the 
relationship between China and India during this period (1959-1970) is 
often described as 'Animosities period'. 
4. The normalization of relations between China and India began after 1970. 
It was due to the facts that: 
Sino-India relations were restored at the ambassador level in 1976 after 15 
years; With the death of Mao Tsung far reaching changes were initiated in 
China's domestic and foreign policies, e.g., the modernization programme 
was started by Deng Xiaoping in the post- Mao period, an "open door" 
liberal policy towards trade and foreign investment was launched in late 
1970's (1978-79), China's desire to improve security environment, 
encouraging trade and commerce and the desire to resolve all its 
outstanding disputes with India amicably, so on and so forth. Thus, the 
normalization and upturn in China's relations with India, has therefore, its 
roots in China's internal power shifts and a new course in ideology, 
economic strategy and defence policies; In addition, the relaxation in 
international tensions as a result of detente in U.S. - Soviet relations, 
improvement of Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-U.S. relations also 
provided impetus for improvement in Sino-India relations. It was in this 
back drop that Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India made a 
landmark visit to China in December, 1988 to further Sino-India relations 
in a more dynamic and positive direction. 
5. In the post-cold war period, the relations between the two giants further 
matured and were advanced in diverse fields. Both the giants reoriented and 
refashioned their foreign policies towards each other due to the changing 
domestic and global, economic, political and strategic environment. 
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The most important change at the global strategic level was the end of the 
cold war and the disintegration of Soviet Union which drastically changed 
the global power-structure. The bi-polarity was replaced by uni-polarity 
with U.S. as the sole super power. In fact, it was a big challenge for both 
the states to reframe their foreign policies in such a hegemonic world 
order. 
Another important factor in the post Cold War era which compelled both 
the states to come closer to each other and to leave aside their political 
issues was the economic factor. With a shift from geo-politics and geo-
strategic to geo-economic, the economic dimension of international politics 
has become prominent with economic issues taking precedence over 
political ones. To take more and more benefits from such a changed global 
economic order which was controlled by the developed world, both the 
sides felt it imperative upon themselves to cooperate with each other. That 
is why, the ideology of non-alignment which was important detriment of 
India's foreign policy during the cold war era, has to be sacrificed. 
Moreover, at the internal level, the era of coalition politics had began 
especially after mid-1990s which affected India foreign policy-making in a 
number of ways e.g., under the coalition governments, the foreign policy 
could not find an adequate place on the priority basis, the frequent 
changes of government at the national level led to the adhocism in the 
foreign policy-making. Further, the Indian economy was in a bad shape 
which made India vulnerable to external pulls and pressures. All these 
factors both internal and external compelled both the states to come closer 
to each other. 
6. Though, India has restructured its foreign policy in a number of ways due 
to some internal and external factors, it has been unable to make a clear-
cut response towards China that affects its security interests in a number 
of ways. It becomes clear from the fact that China has shown a remarkable 
consistency in its dealing with India but India has remained satisfactory 
only with one high level visit to another. There have been three major 
reasoris for such a weak foreign policy in India vis-a-vis China. 
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(a) Lack of strategic culture 
(b) Lack of institutionalization of Foreign policy; 
(c) Lack of power and capabilities. 
(These three variables have been sufficiently discussed and elaborated in the 
Chapter No. Ill) 
The natural corollary of these three constraints in India's foreign policy 
have in fact impeded the evaluation of a long term China policy which has 
ultimately led to the confusion in Indian Foreign Policy-making. It is reflected 
by the way India has dealt with China in the past years. For example, though 
it seems overtly that Sino-India relations have improved a lot but it is not 
clear as to what strategic objectives India wants to achieve from this 
improvement. 
Far eliminating all these constraints in India's Foreign policy making, it 
is imperative upon India to advance, understand and study not only its own 
strategic culture but also the strategic traditions of other states especially of 
China so that a balanced and effective policy can be evolved regarding China. 
Secondly, for the institutionalization of foreign policy, the National 
Security Council (NSC) should be made an effective and professional body to 
study the military, economic and political threats to the nation and to advice 
the government to meet these challenges in a coherent and systematic 
manner. 
Third, India should enhance, its capabilities in various fields because it 
still lags behind China in a number of areas which are a main cause of 
weakness in India's Foreign Policy towards China. 
7. After a brief set-back to the Sino-India relations due to the India's nuclear 
tests in 1998, both the Asian giants entered 21^' century with forging a 
cooperative partnership with each other. During this period, a number of 
high level visits were exchanged by both the states and thereby a number 
of important agreements were signed relating to promotion of trade and 
commerce and enhancing Confidence and Security Building Measures 
(CSBM). 
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8. In spite of growing relationship in the 21*' century between China and 
India, there are still some areas where the respective claims of both the 
states clash with each other and therefore, is a constant source of rivalry 
and competition between them; the most notable among them are: 
(i) Border, Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet issues are the major factors of 
Sino-India unfriendly relations. Border issue is one of the most 
complicated issues between the two states. India still claims 43,180 
square kilometres of Jammu and Kashmir occupied by China 
including 5,180 square kilometres ceded to China by Pakistan under 
a 1963 Sino-Pakistan Boundary agreement. Likewise, China claims 
90,000 square kilometres of territory held by India in Arunachal 
Pradesh. Though the serious attempts were taken by both the sides 
to resolve the border problem with the agreements signed in 1993 
and 1996 and more importantly in 2003 when both the sides 
appointed special representatives. Though these special 
representatives have held a number of talks to resolve the border 
issue, but so far no breakthrough has been achieved. The main 
reason has been that the unsettled border provides China the 
strategic leverage to keep India uncertain about its intentions and 
nervous about its capabilities and thereby ensuring India's good 
behaviour on issues of vital concern to China. Further, an unsettled 
boundary also suits Chinese interests for the present because China's 
claim in Western Sector are complicated by the Indo - Pak dispute 
over Kashmir, and China's interest to keep India under strategic 
pressure on two fronts i.e. China and Pakistan. 
Likewise, though India has officially recognized Tibet as a part of 
China, but at the popular level, there remains significant sympathy 
for the Tibetan cause within India. The presence of more than 1, 
00,000 Tibetan refugees in India and India's continued willingness to 
provide shelter to the Dalai Lama is also a major source of irritation 
in Sino-Indian relations. In Arunachal Pradesh, China demands 
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major territorial concessions in Twang area because Chinese claim it 
to be central to Tibetan Buddhism given that the Sixth Dalai Lama 
was born there. On the other side, India seeks the return of the 
Sacred Mount Kailash Man Sarovar in Tibet since it is a sacred place 
associated with the Hindu religion. Thus, border issue, is one of the 
prime cause of rivalry between China and India which needs a 
pacific resolution through bilateral dialogue so that both the 
countries can focus on the political and economic development of 
their respective countries. 
(ii) Water issue is another important issue in the Sino-lndia relations 
which is closely related to border issue. The four main rivers such as 
Ma Cha Khabab, Lang Chen Khabab (Sutlej), Senge Khabab (Indus) 
and Tackok Khabab (Brahmaputra) which originates in Tibet and 
flows into India gives a strategic advantage to China because it is an 
upper riparian vis-a-vis India. This strategic advantage of China on 
water resources coupled with differing positions on Line of Actual 
Control (LAC) further complicates the water issues between the two 
states. The more and more complicating problem is that there exist 
no agreements between China and India relating to water resources. 
This problem gets more complicated in the absence of any 
international law on shared waters and when one such was 
attempted, China voted against the convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Water Resources in the UN 
General Assembly in 1997. Though India and China have entered 
into agreements in the recent past (2003) on sharing of hydrological 
data for flood control, but Chinese have not been consistent in 
sharing of the information. China's plan of constructing big dams 
and diverting the water of rivers to its own advantage has created 
discontent in India. More recently, to build a number of water 
projects in the Tibet including a dam on Brahmaputra, Chinese 
scientists have completed a comprehensive satellite study of cross 
border Tibetan rivers determining their exact sources besides 
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measuring the length of their drainage basins. Thus, in future, China 
is likely to use water as a tool to pressurize India and to extract 
concessions on boundary question. 
9. The two important countries that affects the Sino-lndian relations are, 
Pakistan and U.S.A. while Pakistan is an immediate one, with limited 
regional influence, the U.S. remains a long term one with global nieanings. 
The inter connection of relations between China, India, U.S. and Pakistan, 
i.e., Indo-U.S., Sino-U.S., and Sino-Pak has a special bearing on the 
relationship between China and India. 
China's unique relationship with Pakistan has been regarded by India as a 
part of China's strategy to contain India within the sub-continent. China 
continues to maintain close relations with Pakistan because of the 
combined strategic and political advantages, it receives from its 
relationship with Pakistan, e.g., China's desire to extend its influence into 
South and Central Asia in order to maintain a stable periphery; gain easy 
access to markets and natural resources and to maintain friendly relations 
with Muslim Countries for reducing the Islamic insurgency in Xingjian 
province. Above all, Pakistan is the only country that can prevent the 
Indian hegemony, thus fulfilling a key strategic objective of China's South 
Asia Policy. Though China had adopted a neutral position over Kashmir 
issue, rather than siding with Pakistan, but China has not completely 
abandoned its traditional loyalty to Pakistan. China continues to use the 
Pakistan card in showing its displeasure over Indian behaviour. 
Moreover, China's offer to support Pakistan's civilian nuclear programme 
following the conclusion of the Indo-US civil nuclear programme deal 
proves the fact that China continues its two track approach i.e. to engage 
India economically and also not to displeasure its historical partner 
(Pakistan). It is for these reasons that China continues to supply different 
types of arms and weapons to Pakistan. It is estimated that 80 percent of 
Pakistan military hardware, including 60 percent of military aircrafts has 
came from China. It is due to this whole sale transfer of weapons from 
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China to Pakistan that K. Subrahmanyam, a noted defence analyst said 
that Islamabad derives its capabilities to threaten India from China. Thus, 
after Sino-India border issue, Pakistan is the major factor which continues 
to be a major source of irritation in the Sino-India relations. 
Similarly, the USA as the sole super power plays an important role in the 
Sino-Indian relations. The US-China-India strategic triangle has been 
seriously taken by all the three countries. The U.S. plays a complex role in 
this strategic triangle and has a lot of influence on Sino-India relations. 
When one country tries to forge the close relations with USA, it increases 
the apprehensions in the other country. In such a confusing situation, US 
can play the Indian card in its dealings with China or can play the China 
card in developing its relations with India. 
For India, it is possible to make use of US factor in dealing with China 
because both share the same challenge of a rising China to their respective 
dominance in the world and South Asia. China on the other side held the 
perception, that India by virtue of its geopolitical situation, naval 
capabilities and unresolved bilateral disputes with China is an ideal 
country for the United States to have it (India) on its side in the eventuality 
of any conflict with China. China still is not clear that whether India will 
side with US against China or join China and Russia for a multi-polar 
world order against the uni-polar world dominated by U.S. However, 
China views the US attempts to develop a strategic relations with India to 
contain China. In June 2005, India and US signed the New Framework for 
the US - India Defence Relationship paving the way for joint weapons 
production, cooperation on missile defence and in other military fields. 
Due to China's growing dependence on oil imports particularly through 
the Indian Ocean, the Indo-U.S. joint military cooperation in this area has 
become a particular source of concern for China. Further, China also 
expressed her discomfort over the Indo-US Civil Nuclear deal in March, 
2006. In spite of such close and emerging warmth in the Indo-US relations, 
India is aware of the fact that the US and Chinese interests in their mutual 
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relationship are more than that of India. This is the main reason that 
neither China nor US will be ready to oppose each other for India. 
However, if US adopts a policy of containment against China and 
recognizes India as its natural ally, the result would be a hostile 
relationship between China and India as well as between China and 
United States. It is in this respect that China's behaviour towards India is 
not much different from that of United States behaviour towards China for 
the simple reason that China is a status- quoist power with regard to India 
while the U.S. is a status quoist power with regard to China. In such a 
complex situation, India will maintain its strategic independence by 
following a multilayered approach combining both cooperation and 
competition with China in a way that serves its own unique political, 
economic and security interests. 
10. The rise of China and India in terms of economic growth and military 
build-up will have an inevitable regional implication. There are at least 
three sub-regions in Asia namely South Asia, South East Asia and Central 
Asia, where the economic, military, political and energy interests of both 
the state have met or will meet. 
(i) So far as the South Asia is concerned, except Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
Maldives, China shares borders with the rest of all South Asian states. 
This geographical intimacy between China and South Asian states 
makes it a special area in the Chinese foreign policy considerations. The 
widening and deepening defense cooperation between China and 
India's immediate neighbours are perceived as encircling India. In this 
regard, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka which are perceived 
by India to be within its territorial sphere of influence, have deepened 
their ties with China. In these states, India exercises considerable 
influence in domestic politics and has always opposed outside power's 
involvement. It is in this context, that India has always seen itself as the 
prime power in South Asia and is not willing that China might also 
have some influence in South Asia while on the other side, China is 
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rapidly strengthening its presence in the Indian Ocean and South Asia 
by building ports and military bases in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan 
and Burma. Though, China have been granted an observer status in the 
SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) during 
Dhaka Summit in November, 2005, still both are viewing at each other 
with suspicious motives concerning the region. 
(ii) In the South East Asian region, there has been more competition 
between China and India due to their conflicting and overlapping 
interests. However, in this tussle between China and India to gain more 
and more strategic, economic and political influence in ASEAN 
(Association for South East Asian Nations) region, it must be noted here 
that China has more intimate relations with ASEAN than India. It is 
reflected from the gradual rise of trade between China and ASEAN 
which reached to US $94.54 billion in 2004 making ASEAN China's fifth 
largest trading partner. Moreover, China and ASEAN are also 
cooperating with each other in wider regional organizations such as 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Council of Security 
Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and Asia Cooperation Dialogue 
(ACD). But at the same time, China does not want India to emerge as an 
equal competitor in South East Asia. That is why, India has on her own 
part started cultivating strong relations with Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Thailand, etc. for rebalancing Chinese influence in the area. 
Thus, it can be said, that in the South East Asia both states have 
conflicting as well as overlapping interests with China having deep and 
strong links with ASEAN. 
(iii) Likewise, in the central Asia, the relationship between China and India 
are same as are in the South and South East Asia i.e., overlapping and 
divergent. The Central Asian region is mostly important for its geo-
strategic location and natural resources. China shares the border with 
most of the Central Asian states. In order to enhance its influence in the 
Central Asian states, China initiated the Shanghai Cooperation 
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organization (SCO). This regional forum provides broad perspectives 
for intimate cooperation between China and Central Asian states. This 
rapidly growing influence of China in the Central Asian region is of 
prime concern for India. Like South and South East Asia, in Central 
Asia also, China has an upper hand vis-a-vis India and it has become 
more pertinent with the establishment of SCO. It is important to note 
here that there have been two reasons for such a close and deep 
relationship between China and Central Asian States which India does 
not have: 
a) Close geographical proximity between China and Central Asian 
states; 
b) Chinese huge investments in the infrastructure development within 
these countries. 
However, in recent years, India has also intensified its efforts to forge 
cooperative relationship with these countries. In future, there are 
chances of competition and also of cooperation in this part of the world 
as both India and China are major energy consumption countries, both 
of them will try to enhance their influence in this region more and more. 
11. The energy (oil and gas) factor also assumes an important place in Sino-
Indian relations because the sustained growth rate of their growing 
economies depends to a large extent on the uninterrupted supply of 
energy like oil and gas as both are major energy importer countries. 
However, in this field also, there has been competitive rather than 
cooperative interaction. The competition for oil assets have been 
witnessed in different parts of the world like Ecuador, Angola, 
Kazakhstan and in many other countries. As usual, China fared well 
also in this field also than India. The Chinese success has not been 
because it offered higher bid than India but because of its tactics and 
above all its abilities to integrate financial incentives with aid, 
infrastructure projects, diplomatic incentives and arms packages. 
However, there have been some rare occasions when both the sides 
cooperated in this field also, e.g., Chinese and Indian Companies have 
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cooperated in developing energy assets in Syria, Sudan, and Columbia, 
Iran and in many other countries. Nevertheless, it must be reiterated 
here that China's and India's energy interests does not completely 
converge. China is cooperating with India only in those areas where its 
interests can be best secured than by aligning with others (particularly 
with western companies). Furthermore, China will not like that India 
should became co-equal to it in the energy sector. 
Therefore, in order to acquire and maintain energy resources from 
outside countries in a more coherent and systematic manner without 
coming into direct collusion with China, India should also maintain 
relations with energy exporting countries on the same line on which 
China maintains i.e., to invest into the infrastructure development like 
roads, railways, ports, mining, airports, electricity generation, so on 
and so forth. It will be more advantageous for the Indian interests in 
the long run. 
12. The economic reforms in China in the late 1970s and in India during 
the initial years of 1990s and thereafter, fast growing economic growth 
rates of India and China compelled both the states to shun the political 
inhibitions and forge a more cooperative bilateral relationship 
especially in the field of trade and commerce. Moreover, with the end 
of cold war, geo-strategic and geo-political considerations were 
replaced by geo-economics factors which gave further impetus to Sino-
India economic relations. Since then, both the countries have expedited 
the process of integration in the global economy as well as bilateral 
economic cooperation. In the begirming of 1990, bilateral trade between 
China and India was $ 260 million which crossed the $ 60 billion in 
2010 and stood at $ 61.74 billion. This makes China the third largest 
export market for India and its single source of imports. India's exports 
to China are mainly natural resources such as iron ore on the other 
hand. China's exports to India are primarily electronic goods and other 
finished products. However, there have been some limitations in Sino-
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India trade, e.g. 
(i) The trade balance has been tilting consistently against India. 
(ii) The major hurdles in Sino-India trade are China's non-tariff 
barriers, language gap, lack of transparency in rules an smuggling 
of Chinese goods. 
(iii) There is also fear in India that the relatively cheaper Chinese goods 
might displace Indian goods in the international market due to 
their lower costs. 
(iv) The cooperation in the fields of China's hardware and 
manufacturing industries and India's software and service sector 
expertise which can boast the bilateral trade between the two, has 
been limited so far. 
(v) The only field in which India is ahead of China is the software and 
service sector but it is believed that due to the Chinese impressive 
record of export of hi-tech products, China may overtake that 
sector (software) also from India. 
(vi) Moreover, China has emerged as a major player in strategic and 
economic terms with its entry into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) on December 11,2001. 
Thus, it becomes evident that since 1990's, Sino-India trade has made 
tremendous strides, but still there are some limitations in such an economic 
relationship which cannot be eliminated totally, nevertheless, their negative 
effects can be minimized. It can be asserted that though the trade related 
competition between the two giants cannot be ruled out in future but at the 
same time, economic sphere is the only sphere where there is more 
convergence of interests since both are developing countries with fast 
growing economies. This convergence of economic interests between the two 
states can be exploited to create an environment conducive for solving more 
difficult bilateral political and other issues. 
In the concluding remarks it can be observed that despite 
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improvement, the Sino-India relations will remain competitive. Both will 
attempt to acquire the power and status which will be suitable to their 
population, geographical location, their country's size, etc. In addition, the 
rise of both the countries in the 21** century is likely to result in significant 
new geopolitical alignments. Moreover, the military strength and new 
economic prosperity of both the states will create new tensions as both will 
try to register their authority in different parts of the world. 
It is in this context that in the short and medium term, neither side 
would do anything that would destabilize their current bilateral economic or 
other relations, but in the long-term, there is possibility of confrontation and 
even conflict between the two Asian giants over a number of issues ranging 
from border issue to encirclement policies. 
However, the nature and extent of their rivalry is likely to be 
determined by how domestic, political and economic developments in these 
two countries affect their power, their perceptions, their attitudes and above 
all their security policies. Till then, both the states would like to maintain the 
status quo, focusing on their economic, political, military and strategic 
development and keep the competition and rivalry as flexible and 
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
ON TRADE AND INTERCOURSE BETWEEN TIBET REGION OF CHINA AND INDIA* 
Peking, 29 April 1954 
The Government of the Republic of India and The Central People's Government of the People's 
Republic of China, Being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between Tibet Region of 
China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India, Have 
resolved to enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles : 
(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
(2) mutual non-aggression, 
(3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) 
peaceful co-existence. And for this purpose have appointed as their respective 
Plenipotentiaries: 
The Government of the Republic of India, 
H.E. Nedyam Raghavan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India accredited to 
the People's Republic of China; the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, H.E. 
Chang Han-fu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government, who, having 
examined each other's credentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the 
following :- Article I The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish Trade Agencies : 
(1) The Government of India agrees that the Government of China may establish Trade Agencies at 
New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong. 
(2) The Government of China agrees that the Government of India may establish Trade Agencies at 
Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok. The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be accorded the same status 
and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while 
exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who 
are dependent on them for livelihood, freedom from search. The Trade Agencies of both Parties 
shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail-bags and communicatioiw in code. 
Article II The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily 
and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India may trade at the 
following places 
(1) The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Yatung, (2) Gyantse and (3) Phari as markets for 
trade. The Government of India agrees that trade may be carried on in India, including places like 
(1) Kalimpong, (2) Siliguri and (3) Calcutta, according to customary practice. 
(2) The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Gartok, (2) Pulanchung (Taklakot), (3) Gyanima-
Khargo, (4) Gyanima- Chakra, (5) Ramura, (6) Dongbra, (7) Pulang-Sumdo, (8) Nabra, (9) Shangtse 
and (10) Tashigong as markets for trade; the Government of India agrees that in future, when in 
accordance with the development and need of trade between the Ari District of Tibet Region of 
China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in the corresponding district 
in India adjacent to the Ari District of Tibet Region of China, it will be prepared to consider on the 
basis of equality and reciprocity to do so. 
Article III 
The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries 
shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions :-
(1) Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths may visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and 
Mavern Tso (Manasarovar) in Tibet Region of China in accordance with custom. 
(2) Pilgrims from Tibet Region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Samath, 
Gaya and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom. 
(3) Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom. Article IV 
Traders and Pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route : (1) Shipki La pass. 
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(2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass and (6) Lipu Lekh pass. Also, the 
customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may 
continue to be traversed in accordance with custom. Article V For travelling across the border, the High 
Contracting Parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall 
hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visas by the other Party except as provided 
in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Article. 
(1) Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet 
Region of China and India, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood and 
their attendants will be allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or Tibet Region of China, as 
the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the 
local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and examined by the border 
check-posts of the other Party. 
(2) Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade 
or to visit friends and relatives may proceed to the border districts of the other Party as they have 
customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified in Article 
IV above and shall not be required to hold passport, visas or permits. 
(3) Porters and mule team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary 
transportation services need not hold passports issued by their own country, but shall only hold 
certificates good for a definite period of time (three months, half a year or one year) duly issued by 
the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and produce them for 
registration at the border checkposts of the other Party. 
(4) Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border 
checkposts of the other Party and receive a permit for pilgrimage. 
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article, either Government may 
refuse entry to any particular person. 
(6) Persons who enter the territory of the other Party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of 
this Article may stay within its territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the 
other Party. Article VI The present Agreement shall come into effect upon ratificationi by both 
Governments and shall remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of the present Agreement may 
be negotiated by the two Parties if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to the expiry of 
the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other Party. DONE in duplicate in Peking on the 
twentyninth day of April, 1954 in Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all texts being equally 
valid. 
(Sd.) NEDYAM RAGHAVAN, Plenipotentiary of the Government of India 
(Sd.) CHANG HAN-FU. Plenipotentiary of the Centa-al People's Republic of China. 
NOTES EXCHANGED 
Peking, April 29,1954 
NOTE: Your Excellency Mr. Vice-FoREIGN MINISTER, In the course of our discussions regarding the 
Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India, which has been happily 
concluded today, the Delegation of the Government of the Republic of India and the Delegation of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China agreed that certain matters be regulated by an exchange 
of notes. In pursuance of this understanding, it is hereby agreed between the two Governments as 
follows: 
(1) The Government of India will be pleased to withdraw completely within six (6) months from date 
of exchange of the present notes the military escorts now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet 
Region of China. The Government of China will render facilities and assistance in such withdrawal. 
(2) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable 
price the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment operated by 
the Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be 
decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign 
Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes. 
(3) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable 
price the twelve (12) rest houses of the Govenment of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete 
measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian 
Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the 
I l l 
exchange of the present notes. The Government of China agrees that they shall continue as rest 
houses. 
(4) The Government of China agrees that all buildings within the compound walls of the Trade 
Agencies of the Government of India at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China may be 
retained by the Government of India. The Government of India may continue to lease the land 
within its Agency compound walls from the Chinese side. And the Government of India agrees that 
the Trade Agencies of the Government of China at Kalimpong and Calcutta may lease lands from 
the Indian side for the use of the Agencies and construct buildings thereon. The Government of 
China will render every possible assistance for housing the Indian Trade Agency at Gartok. The 
Government of India will also render every possible assistance for housing the Chinese Trade 
Agency at New Delhi. 
(5) The Government of India will be pleased to return to the Government of China all lands used or 
occupied by the Government of India other than the lands within its Trade Agency compound 
walls at Yatung. If there are godowns and buildings of the Government of India on the above 
mentioned lands used or occupied and to be returned by the Government of India and if Indian 
traders have stores, godowns or buildings on the above-mentioned lands so that there is a need to 
continue leasing lands, the Government of China agrees to sign contracts with the Government of 
India or Indian traders, as the case may be, for leasing to them those parts of the land occupied by 
the said godowns, buildings or stores and pertaining thereto. 
(6) The Trade Agents of both Parties may, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the local 
governments, have access to their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases. 
(7) The Trade Agents and traders of both countries may hire employees in the locality. 
(8) The hospitals of the Indian Trade Agencies at Gyantse and Yatung will continue to serve personnel 
of the Indian Trade Agencies. 
(9) Each Government shall protect the person and property of the traders and pilgrims of the other 
country. 
(10) The Government of China agrees, so far as possible, to construct rest houses for the use of pilgrims 
along the route from Pulanchung (Taklakot) to Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso 
(Manasarover); and the Government of India agrees to place all possible facilities in India at the 
disposal of pilgrims. 
(11) Traders and pilgrims of both countries shall have the facility of hiring means of transportation at 
normal and reasonable rates. 
(12) The three Trade Agencies of each Party may function throughout the year. 
(13) Traders of each country may rent buildings and godowns in accordance with local regulations in 
places under the jurisdiction of the other Party. (14) Traders of both countries may carry on normal 
trade in accordance with local regulations at places as provided in Article II of the Agreement. (15) 
Disputes between traders of both countries over debts and claims shall be handled in accordance 
with local laws and regulations. On behalf of the Government of the Republic of India I hereby 
agree that the present Note along with Your Excellency's reply shall become an agreement between 
our two Governments which shall come into force upon the exchange of the present Notes. I avail 
myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency Mr. Vice-Foreign Minister, the assurances 
of my highest consideration. 
(Sd.) N. RAGHAvAN, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of India. 
His Excellency Mr. CHANG HAN-FU, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Central People's Government, 
People's Republic of China. April 29,1954 
Your Excellency Mr. AMBASSADOR: 
I have the honour to receive your note dated April 29, 1954 which reads: [Not reprinted] On 
behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, I hereby agree to Your 
Excellency's note, and your note along with the present note in reply shall become an agreement 
between our two Governments, which shall come into force upon the exchange of the present notes. I 
avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency, 
Mir. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration. 
(Sd.) CHANG HAN-Fu. Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
People's Republic of China. 
IV 
H.E. NEDYAM RAGHAVAN, 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Republic of India. 
(Original in English.) NOTES REGAIMING RATIFICATION Peking, the 17th August, 1954 
EXCELLENCY, I have the honour to state that WHEREAS an agreement between the Government of 
the Republic of India and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on trade 
and intercourse between Tibet region of China and India was signed at Peking on the 29th Day of April, 
1954, by the respective plenipotentiaries of the two Governments, namely. For the Government of the 
Republic of India. His Excellency Nedyam Raghavan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
of India, For the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, His Excellency Chang 
Han-fu, Which Agreement is reproduced, word for word, in the Annexure hereto, 
AND WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of India has ratified this Agreement on the 3rd June, 
1954. I request you to convey information of the said ratification to the Central People's Government of 
the People's Republic of China. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you. Excellency, the 
assurances of my highest consideration. 
NEDYAM RAGHAVAN. Ambassador of the Republic of India. 
His Excellency Mr. CHOU EN-LAI, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Central People's Government of the 
People's Republic of China, Peking. (Original in Chinese.) 
EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN INDIA (TranslaHon) No. M/680/5417 
August, 1954 
EXCELLENCY, 
I have the honour to inform you that the Agreement between the People's Republic of China 
and the Republic-of India on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, which 
was signed at Peking on the 29th of April, 1954, by Chang Han-fu, Vice-Minister, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, for the central People's 
Government of the people's Republic of China and Nedyam Raghavan, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of India to the People's Republic, of China, for' the Government of the 
Republic of India, was subsequently ratified on the 3rd June, 1954, by the Central People's Government 
of the People's Republic of China. I hereby request you to convey information of the said ratification to 
the Government of India. 
The Agreement is reproduced, word for word, in the annexurel hereto. I avail myself of this 
opportunity to renew to you. Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. 
(Sd.) YUAN CHUNG-HSIEN, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic 
of China. 
His Excellency PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, 
Minister for External Affairs, 
Government of Republic of India, New Delhi. 
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Appendix-II 
Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the 
Republic of India on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual 
Control in the China-India Border Areas* 
2002/01/16 
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Republic of India 
(hereinafter referred to as the two sides). 
Believing that it serves the fundamental interests of the peoples of China and India to foster a long-term 
good-neighbourly relationship in accordance with the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, 
Convinced that the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the line of actual control in the China-
India border areas accords with the fundamental interests of the two peoples and will also contribute to 
the ultimate resolution of the boundary question. 
Reaffirming that neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means or seek 
unilateral military superiority. 
Pursuant to the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Government of Republic of India on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Along the Line of Actual 
Control in the China-India Border Areas, signed on 7 September 1993, 
Recognizing the need for effective confidence building measures in the military field along the line of 
actual control in the border areas between the two sides. 
Noting the utility of confidence building measures already in place along the line of actual control in the 
China-India border areas. Committed to enhancing mutual confidence and transparency in the military 
field. 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side. No armed forces deployed by either 
side in the border areas along the line of actual control as part of their respective military strength shall 
be used to attack the other side, or engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine 
peace, tranquillity and stability in the China-India border areas. 
ARTICLE II 
The two sides reiterate their determination to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement 
of the boundary question. Pending an ultimate resolution of the boundary question, the two sides 
reaffirm their commitment to strictly respect and observe the line of actual control in the China-India 
border areas. No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control. 
ARTICLE III 
The two sides agree to take the following measures to reduce or limit their respective military forces 
within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the China-India border 
areas: 
1. The two sides reaffirm that they shall reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually 
agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the China-India border areas to minimum 
levels compatible with friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries and 
consistent with the principle of mutual and equal security. 
2. The two sides shall reduce or limit the number of field army, border defence forces, para-military 
forces and any other mutually agreed category of armed force deployed in mutually agreed 
geographical zones along the line of actual control to ceilings to be mutually agreed upon. The major 
categories of armaments to be reduced or limited are as follows: combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles. 
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guns (including howitzers) with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, 
surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles and any other weapon system mutually agreed upon. 
3. The two sides shall exchange data on the military forces and armaments to be reduced or limited and 
decide on ceilings on military forces and armaments to be kept by each side within mutually agreed 
geographical zones along the line of actual control in the China-India border areas. The ceilings shall be 
determined in conformity with the requirement of the principle of mutual and equal security, with due 
consideration being given to parameters such as the nature of terrain, road communication and other 
infrastructure and time taken to induct/deinduct troops and armaments. 
ARTICLE IV 
In order to maintain peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control in the China-India border 
areas and to prevent any tension in the border areas due to misreading by either side of the other side's 
intentions: 
1. Both sides shall avoid holding large scale military exercises involving more than one Division 
(approximately 15,000 troops) in close proximity of the line of actual control in the China-India border 
areas. However, if such exercises are to be conducted, the strategic direction of the main force involved 
shall not be towards the other side. 
2. If either side conducts a major military exercise involving more than one Brigade Group 
(approximately 5,000 troops) in close proximity of the line of actual control in the China-India border 
areas, it shall give the other side prior notification with regard to type, level, planned duration and area 
of exercise as well as the number and type of units or formations participating in the exercise. 
3. The date of completion of the exercise and deinduction of troops from the area of exercise shall be 
intimated to the other side within five days of completion or deinduction. 
4. Each side shall be entitled to obtain timely clarificatigf from the side undertaking the exercise in 
respect of data specified in Pargragh 2 of the present Article. 
ARTICLE V 
With a view to preventing air intrusions across the line of actual control in the China-India border areas 
and facilitating overflights and landings by military aircraft: 
1. Both sides shall take adequate measures to ensure that air intrusions across the line of actual control 
do not take place. However, if an intrusion does take place, it should cease as soon as detected and the 
incident shall be promptly investigated by the side operating the aircraft. The results of the investigation 
shall be immediately communicated, through diplomatic channels or at border personnel meetings, to 
the other side. 
2. Subject to Paragraphs 3 and 5 of this Article, combat aircraft (to include fighter, bomber, 
reconnaissance, military trainer, armed helicopter and other armed aircraft) shall not fly within ten 
kilometres of the line of actual control. 
3. If either side is required to undertake flights of combat aircraft within ten kilometres from the line of 
actual control, it shall give the following information in advance to the other side, through diplomatic 
channels: 
(a) Type and number of combat aircraft; 
(b) Height of the proposed flight (in meters); 
(c) Proposed duration of flights (normally not to exceed ten days); 
(d) Proposed timing of flights; and 
(e) Area of operations, defined in latitude and longitude. 
4. Unarmed transport aircraft, survey aircraft and helicopters shall be permitted to fly up to the line of 
actual control. 
5. No military aircraft of either side shall fly across the line of actual control, except by prior permission. 
Military aircraft of either side may fly across the line of actual control or overfly the other side's airspace 
or land on the other side only after obtaii\ing the latter's prior permission after providing the latter with 
detailed information on the flight in accordance with the international practice in this regard. 
Notwithstanding the above stipulation, each side has the sovereign right to specify additional 
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conditions, including at short notice, for flights or landings of military aircraft of the other side on its 
side of the line of actual control or through its airspace. 
6. In order to ensure flight safety in emergency situations, the authorities designated by the two sides 
may contact each other by the quickest means of communications available. 
ARTICLE VI 
With a view to preventing dangerous military activities along the line of actual control in the China-
India border areas, the two sides agree as follows: 
1. Neither side shall open fire, cause bio-degradation, use hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations 
or hunt with guns or explosives within two kilometres from the line of actual control. This prohibition 
shall not apply to routine firing activities in small arms firing ranges. 
2. If there is a need to conduct blast operatioi« within two kilometres of the line of actual control as part 
of developmental activities, the other side shall be informed through diplomatic channels or by 
convening a border personnel meeting, preferably five days in advance. 
3. While conducting exercises with live ammunition in areas close to the line of actual control, 
precaution shall be taken to ensure that a bullet or a missile does not accidentally fall on the other side 
across the line of actual control and causes harm to the personnel or property of the other side. 
4. If the border personnel of the two sides come in a face-to-face situation due to differences on the 
alignment of the line of actual control or any other reason, they shall exercise self-restraint and take all 
necessary steps to avoid an escalation of the situation. Both sides shall also enter into immediate 
consultations through diplomatic and/or other available channels to review the situation and prevent 
any escalation of tension. 
ARTICLE VII 
In order to strengthen exchanges and cooperation between their military personnel and establishments 
in the border areas along the line of actual control, the two sides agree: 
1. To maintain and expand the regime of scheduled and flag meetings between their border 
representatives at designated places along the line of actual control; 
2. To maintain and expand telecommunication links between their border meeting points at designated 
places along the line of actual control; 
3. To establish step-by-step medium and high-level contacts between the border authorities of the two 
sides. 
ARTICLE VIII 
1. Should the personnel of one side cross the line of actual control and enter the other side because of 
unavoidable circumstances like natural disasters, the other side shall extend all possible assistance to 
them and inform their side, as soon as possible, regarding the forced or inadvertent entry across the line 
of actual control. The modalities of return of the concerned personnel to their own side shall be settled 
through mutual consultations. 
2. The two sides shall provide each other, at the earliest possible, with information pertaining to natural 
disasters and epidemic diseases in contiguous border areas which might affect the other side. The 
exchange of information shall take place either through diplomatic channels or at border persoimel 
meetings. 
ARTICLE IX 
In case a doubtful situation develops in the border region, or in case one of the sides has some questions 
or doubts regarding the manner in which the other side is observing this Agreement, either side has the 
right to seek a clarification from the other side. The clarifications sought and replies to them shall be 
conveyed through diplomatic channels. 
ARTICLE X 
1. Recognizing that the full implementation of some of the provisions of the present Agreement will 
depend on the two sides arriving at a common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual 
control in the China-India border areas, the two sides agree to speed up the process of clarification and 
confirmation of the line of actual control. As an initial step in this process, they are clarifying the 
alignment of the line of actual control in those segments where they have different perceptions. They 
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also agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the line of 
actual control as soon as possible. 
2. Pending the completion of the process of clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control, 
the two sides shall work out modalities for implementing confidence building measures envisaged 
under this Agreement on an interim basis, without prejudice to their respective positions on the 
alignment of the line of actual control as well as on the boundary question, 
ARTICLE XI 
Detailed implementation measures required under Article I to Article X of this Agreement shall be 
decided through mutual consultations in the China-India Joint Working Group on the Boundary 
Question. The China-India Diplomatic and Military Expert Group shall assist the China-India Joint 
Working Group in devising implementation measures under the Agreement. 
ARTICLE XII 
This Agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of 
instruments of ratification. It shall remain in effect until either side decides to terminate it after giving 
six months notice in writing. It shall become invalid six months after the notification. 
This Agreement is subject to amendment and addition by mutual agreement in writing between the two 
sides. 
Signed in duplicate in New Delhi on 29 November 1996 in the Chinese, Hindi and English languages, all 
three texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence, the English text shall prevail. 
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Appendix-Ill 
Text of India-China agreement* 
This is the text of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government 
of the People's Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement 
of the India-China Boundary Question 
The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China 
(hereinafter referred to as the two sides). 
Believing that it serves the fundamental interests of the peoples of India and China to foster a long-term 
constructive and cooperative partnership on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, 
mutual respect and sensitivity for each other's concerns and aspirations, and equality. 
Desirous of qualitatively upgrading the bilateral relationship at all levels and in all areas while 
addressing differences through peaceful means in a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable manner. 
Reiterating their commitment to abide by and implement the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace 
and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, signed on 7 
September 1993, and the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the 
Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, signed on 29 November 1996, 
Reaffirming the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India 
and China, signed on 23 June 2003, 
Recalling that the two sides have appointed Special Representatives to explore the framework of 
settlement of the India-China boundary question and the two Special Representatives have been 
engaged in consultations in a friendly, cooperative and constructive atmosphere. 
Noting that the two sides are seeking a political settlement of the boundary question in the context of 
their overall and long-term interests, 
Convinced that an early settlement of the boundary question will advance the basic interests of the two 
countries and should therefore be pursued as a strategic objective. 
Have agreed on the following political parameters and guiding principles for a boundary settlement: 
Article I 
The differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of 
bilateral relations. The two sides will resolve the boundary question through peaceful and friendly 
consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. The final 
solution of the boundary question will significantly promote good neighborly and friendly relations 
between India and China. 
Article II 
The two sides should, in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, seek a fair, 
reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question through consultations on an 
equal footing, proceeding from the political perspective of overall bilateral relations. 
Article III 
Both sides should, in the spirit of mutual respect and mutual understanding, make meaningful and 
mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary question, so as to arrive 
at a package settlement to the boundary question. The boundary settlement must be final, covering all 
sectors of the India-China boundary. 
Article IV 
The two sides will give due consideration to each other's strategic and reasonable interests, and the 
principle of mutual and equal security. 
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Article V 
The two sides will take into account, inter alia, historical evidence, national sentiments, practical 
difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border areas. 
Article VI 
The boundary should be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features to be 
mutually agreed upon between the two sides. 
Article VII 
In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled 
populations in the border areas. 
Article VIII 
Within the agreed framework of the final boundary settlement, the delineation of the boundary will be 
carried out utilising means such as modern cartographic and surveying practices and joint surveys. 
Article IX 
Pending an ultimate settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should strictly respect and 
observe the line of actual control and work together to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border 
areas. The India-China Joint Working Group and the India-China Diplomatic and Military Expert 
Group shall continue their work under the Agreements of 7 September 1993 and 29 November 1996, 
including the clarification of the line of actual control and the implementation of confidence building 
measures. 
Article X 
The Special Representatives on the boundary question shall continue their consultations in an earnest 
manner with the objective of arriving at an agreed framework for a boundary settlement, which will 
provide the basis for the delineation and demarcation of the India-China boundary to be subsequently 
undertaken by civil and military officials and surveyors of the two sides. 
Article XI 
This Agreement shall come into force as of the date of signature and is subject to amendment and 
addition by mutual agreement in writing between the two sides. 
Signed in duplicate in New Delhi on 11 April, 2005, in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all 
three texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence, the English text shall prevail. 
For the Government of the Republic of India 





A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India* 
H.E. Mr. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and H.E. 
Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India, meeting in Beijing on 14 January 2008, 
resolve to promote the building of a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity 
through developing the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity between the 
two countries. 
China and India (hereinafter referred to as the "two sides") are the two largest developing iwtions on 
earth representing more than one-third of humanity. The two sides recognize that both China and India 
bear a significant historical responsibility to ensure comprehensive, balanced and sustainable economic 
and social development of the two countries and to promote peace and development in Asia and the 
world as a whole. 
The two sides are convinced that it is time to look to the future in building a relationship of friendship 
and trust, based on equality, in which each is sensitive to the concerns and aspirations of the other. 
The two sides reiterate that China-India friendship and common development will have a positive 
influence on the future of the international system. China-India relations are not targeted at any 
country, nor will it affect their friendship with other countries. 
The two sides believe that in the new century, Panchsheel, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, 
should continue to constitute the basic guiding principles for good relations between all countries and 
for creating the conditions for realizing peace and progress of humankind. An international system 
founded on these principles will be fair, rational, equal and mutually beneficial, will promote durable 
peace and common prosperity, create equal opportunities and eliminate poverty and discrimination. 
The two sides hold that the right of each country to choose its own path of social, economic and political 
development in which fundamental human rights and the rule of law are given their due place, should 
be respected. An international system founded in tolerance and respect for diversity will promote the 
cause of peace and reduce the use, or threat of use, of force. The two sides favour an open and inclusive 
international system and believe that drawing lines on the ground of ideologies and values, or on 
geographical criteria, is not conducive to peaceful and harmonious coexistence. 
The two sides believe that the continuous democratization of international relations and multilateralism 
are an important objective in the new century. The central role of the United Nations in promoting 
international peace, security and development should be recognized and promoted. The two sides 
support comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including giving priority to increasing the 
representation of developing countries in the Security Council. The Indian side reiterates its aspirations 
for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. The Chinese side attaches great importance to 
India's position as a major developing country in international affairs. The Chinese side understands 
and supports India's aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations, including in the Security 
Council. 
The two sides support and encourage the processes of regional integration that provide mutually 
beneficial opportunities for growth, as an important feature of the emerging international economic 
system. The two sides positively view each others' participation in regional processes and agree to 
strengthen their coordination and consultation within regional cooperation mechanisms including the 
East Asia Summit, to explore together and with other countries a new architecture for closer regional 
cooperation in Asia, and to make joint efforts for further regional integration of Asia. The two sides will 
strengthen their coordination under the framework of Asia-Europe Meeting, and are committed to 
strengthening and deepening Asia-Europe comprehensive partnership. 
The two sides take a positive view on each other's participation in sub-regional multilateral cooperation 
processes between like-minded countries, including South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation and Shanghai 
Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, at C:\ Documents and Settings\ 
mal_bl68\ Desktop\A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the People's Republic of China and the 
Republic of India.htm 
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Cooperation Organization. The two sides hold that this does not affect either country's existing friendly 
relations or cooperation with other countries. 
The two sides welcome the positive facets of economic globalization, and are ready to face and meet its 
challenges, and will work with other countries towards balanced and mutually beneficial economic 
globalization. The two sides believe that the establishment of an open, fair, equitable, transparent and 
rule-based multilateral trading system is the common aspiration of all countries. The two sides favour 
the early conclusion of the Doha Development Round, placing the issues that affect the poorest of the 
poor at its core. The two sides are determined to strengthen their coordination with other developing 
countries in order to secure their shared objectives. 
The two sides are convinced that it is in the common interest of the international community to establish 
an international energy order that is fair, equitable, secure and stable, and to the benefit of the entire 
international community. The two sides are committed to making joint efforts to diversify the global 
energy mix and enhance the share of clean and renewable energy, so as to meet the energy requirements 
of all countiies. 
The two sides welcome the opportunity for their outstanding scientists to work together in the 
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, which is of great potential 
significance in meeting the global energy challenge in an environmentally sustainable manner. As two 
countries with advanced scientific capabilities, the two sides pledge to promote bilateral cooperation in 
civil nuclear energy, consistent with their respective international commitments, which will contribute 
to energy security and to dealing with risks associated with climate change. 
The two sides recognize the challenge that humankind faces from climate change. The two sides take 
the issue of climate change seriously and reiterate their readiness to join the international community in 
the efforts to address climate change. The two sides also stand ready to enhance technological 
cooperation between the two countries. The two sides welcome the outcome of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Bali in December 2007 and agree to 
work closely during the negotiation process laid out in the Bali Road Map for long term cooperative 
action under the Convention. The two sides emphasise the importance of addressing climate change in 
accordance with principles and provisions of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, in particular the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. 
The two sides appeal to the international community to move forward the processes of multilateral 
arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Outer space is the common heritage of humankind. It 
is the responsibility of all space-faring nations to commit to the peaceful uses of outer space. The two 
sides express their categorical opposition to the weaponisation and arms race in outer space. 
The two sides strongly condemn the scourge of terrorism in all its forms and manifestatior\s, and in all 
regions of the world. The two sides pledge to work together and with the international community to 
strengthen the global framework against terrorism in a long-term, sustained and comprehensive 
manner. 
The two sides believe that cultural and religious tolerance and dialogue between civilizations and 
peoples will contribute to overall peace and stability of our world. The two sides endorse all efforts to 
promote inter-civilizational and inter-faith dialogues. 
The two sides believe that their bilateral relationship in this century will be of significant regional and 
global irifluence. The two sides will therefore continue to build their Strategic and Cooperative 
Partnership in a positive way. As major economies in their region, the two sides believe that the strong 
growth in their trade and economic relations is mutually beneficial, and welcome the conclusion of a 
Feasibility Study on a Regional Trading Arrangement (RTA) between the two countries. According to 
the report of the Feasibility Study, a China-India RTA will be mutually advantageous. Against the 
backdrop of accelerating regional economic integration in Asia, the two sides agree to explore the 
possibility of commencing discussions on a mutually beneficial and high-quality RTA that meets the 
common aspirations of both countries, and will also benefit the region. 
The two sides will continuously promote confidence building measures through steadily enhanced 
contacts in the field of defence. The two sides therefore welcome the commencement of the China-India 
Defence Dialogue and express their satisfaction at the successful conclusion of the first joint anti-
terrorism training between their armed forces in December 2007. The two sides also welcome their 
efforts to set an example on trans-border rivers by commencing cooperation since 2002. The Indian side 
highly appreciates the assistance extended by China on the provision of flood season hydrological data 
which has assisted India in ensuring the safety and security of its population in the regions along these 
rivers. The two sides agree that this has contributed positively to building mutual understanding and 
trust. 
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The two sides remain firmly committed to resolving outstanding differences, including on the boundary 
question, through peaceful negotiations, while ensuring that such differences are not allowed to affect 
the positive development of bilateral relations. The two sides reiterate their determination to seek a fair, 
reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question and to build a boundary of peace 
and friendship on the basis of the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the 
Settlement of the China-India Boundary Question concluded in April 2005. The Special Representatives 
shall complete at an early date the task of arriving at an agreed framework of settlement on the basis of 
this Agreement. 
The Indian side recalls that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one China and 
that its one China policy has remained unaltered. The Indian side states that it would continue to abide 
by its one China policy, and oppose any activity that is against the one China principle. The Chinese 
side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position. 
The two sides recognize the responsibilities and obligations of the two countries to the international 
community. The two sides are determined to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between 
the peoples of China and India, for the betterment of both countries and to bring about a brighter future 
for humanity. 
Wen Jiabao Dr. Manmohan Singh 
Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Prime Minister of the Republic of India 
Beijing 
January 14, 2008 
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Appendix-V 
FULL TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT OF CHINA, INDIA* 
The following is the full text of the Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of 
India signed by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi 
Monday: 
Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India 
I. H.E. Mr. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, is currently 
paying a state visit to the Republic of India from 9 to 12 April 2005 at the invitation of H.E. Dr. 
Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India. During the visit. Premier Wen Jiabao held 
talks with Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, called on President Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and Vice 
President Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat and met with Chairperson, United Progressive Alliance 
Smt. Sonia Gandhi. External Affairs Minister Shri K. Natwar Singh and Leader of Opposition, 
Lok Sabha Shri L.K. Advani will call on him. Premier Wen paid a visit to Bangalore and will deliver a 
speech at the Indian Institute of Technology in New Delhi .Leaders of the two countries had an in-depth 
exchange of views in a sincere, friendly and constructive atmosphere and reached broad consensus on 
bilateral relations and international and regional issues of common concern. 
II. The two sides reviewed the friendly contacts and progress in their bilateral relations in recent j'ears 
and agreed that China-India relations have entered a new stage of comprehensive development. Both 
sides noted with satisfaction that with the frequent exchange of visits between leaders of the two 
countries, the process of building trust and understanding has gained momentum. Rapid growth of 
trade and economic cooperation has been coupled with the expansion of exchanges and cooperation in 
other fields. The two sides have made incremental progress in addressing outstanding issues. The two 
sides have also maintained good communication and collaboration in international and regional affairs. 
Both sides agreed that China and India have made satisfying progress in developing their long-term 
constructive and cooperative partnership.The two sides recalled the Declaration on Principles for 
Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the two Prime Ministers on 23 June 2003 and 
reiterated that the Declaration provided a shared vision of bilateral relations and an agreed framework 
for cooperation. 
III. In tlie light of the development of their bilateral relations, in order to promote good neighborliness, 
friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation and taking into account the profound changes in the 
regional and international situation, the two sides agreed that China-India relations have now acquired 
a global and strategic character. The leaders of the two countries have, therefore, agreed to establish an 
China - India Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. Such a partnership is 
based on the principles of Panchsheel, mutual respect and sensitivity for each other's concerns and 
aspirations, and equality; provides a sound framework for an all around and comprehertsive 
development of bilateral relations based on mutual and equal security, development and prosperity of 
the two peoples; and contributes to jointly addressing global challenges and threats. It reflects the 
readiness of the two sides to resolve outstanding differences in a proactive manner without letting them 
come in the way of the continued development of bilateral relations. 
IV. The two sides agreed that high-level exchanges between the governments, parliaments and political 
parties of the two countries play an important role in expanding overall bilateral cooperation. They 
conveyed their determination to maintain and strengthen the momentum of such exchanges in future 
and agreed to hold regular meetings between the leaders of the two countries. In this context, the two 
sides also reiterated their intention to promote regular ministerial-level exchanges and make full use of 
the China-India strategic dialogue and other bilateral dialogue mechanisms. 
V. The year of 2005 marks the 55th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
China and India. To mark the occasion, the two countries will organize a series of commemorative 
activities. It was noted that "Cultural Festival of China" was currently underway in India and that a 
corresponding "Cultural Festival of India" would be organized in China later in the year. The two sides 
would also organize other cultural activities to further promote mutual awareness and deepen the 
friendship between the two peoples. The two sides declared 2006 as the "year of China-India 
friendship".Both sides expressed satisfaction with strengthened exchanges in the area of culture, and 
affirmed that mutual understanding and cultural exchanges would facilitate development of 
Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
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cooperation in other areas as well. In order to reinforce traditional cultural links, an agreement was 
concluded for the construction of an Indian style Buddhist temple at Luoyang in Henan Province of 
China. 
VI. The two sides stressed that an all-round expansion of China-India economic cooperation, includii\g 
trade and investment, constitutes an important dimension of a stronger China-India relationship. The 
two countries agreed to make joint efforts to increase the bilateral trade volume to US$ 20 billion or 
higher by 2008. The two sides welcomed the report of the Joint Study Group 0SG) that was set up to 
examine the potential complementarities between the two countries in expanded trade and economic 
cooperation. The JSG in its Report has identified a series of measures related to trade in goods, trade in 
services, investments and other areas of economic cooperation, and recommended their 
expeditious implementation to remove impediments and facilitate enhanced economic engagement 
between China and India. The two Prime Ministers tasked the Ministerial-level China-India Joint 
Economic Group (JEG) to consider these recommendations and coordinate their implementation. For 
this purpose, the two sides will make their best endeavor to hold the next meeting of JEG within the 
next six months. The JSG has a\so recommended a China-India Regional Trading Arrangement, 
comprising of trade in goods and services, investments, identified understandings for trade and 
investment promotion and facilitation, and measures for promotion of economic cooperation in 
identified sectors. The Prime Ministers agreed to appoint a Joint Task Force to study in detail the 
feasibility of, and the benefits that may derive from, the China- India Regional Trading Arrangement 
and give recommendations regarding its content. Both sides noted that the Agreement on the 
Establishment of a Financial Dialogue Mechanism would further facilitate the dynamic and diversifying 
economic cooperation between the two sides. They will continue consultations on concluding the 
Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. The two sides noted with satisfaction that 
the two countries have signed the SPS Protocols for the export of grapes and bitter gourd from India to 
China. The two sides also agreed to constitute a Joint Working Group to implement expeditiously the 
MOU on Application of SPS between the Chinese General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and the Indian Ministry of 
Agriculture. China positively evaluates market access for Indian rice to the Chinese market and will 
launch as early as possible the risk analysis procedure of the Indian rice in accordance with relevant 
Chinese laws and regulations. 
VII. The two sides agreed to further promote the cooperation in the spheres of education, science and 
technology, healthcare, information, tourism, youth exchange, agriculture, dairy development, sports 
and other fields on the basis of mutual benefit and reciprocity. The two sides decided to establish a 
China-India Steering Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation chaired by their Ministers 
for Science and Technology, and start consultations on an agreement on mutual recognition of academic 
certificates and degrees between China and India. The two sides announced the launching of regular 
youth exchange activities.China will invite 100 Indian youth to China within the year of 
2005 and hold an exhibition this year on advanced and applicable technologies in India. 
VIII. The two sides recognized the importance of strengthening mutual connectivity and agreed to 
jointly work towards further enhancement of direct air and shipping links, tourism and people-to-
people contacts. It was noted with satisfaction that an MOU on major liberalization of civil aviation 
links between China and India was concluded during the visit. 
IX. The two sides will continue to cooperate in exchanging flood-season hydrological data of the trans-
border rivers as agreed between them. In response to concerns expressed by the Indian side, the Chinese 
side agreed to take measures for controlled release of accumulated water of the landslide dam on the 
river Parechu, as soon as conditions permit. It was noted with satisfaction that an agreement concerning 
the rovision of hydrological data on Langqen Zangbo / Sutlej was concluded during the visit and that 
the two sides had also agreed to continue 
bilateral discussions to finalize at an early date similar arrangements for the Parlung Zangbo and Zayu 
Qu / Lohit Rivers. The two sides agreed to cooperate in the field of energy security and conservation, 
including, among others, encouraging relevant deparhnents and units of the two countries to engage in 
the survey and exploration of petroleum and natural gas resources in third countries. 
X. The two sides noted the useful exchanges and interaction in the military field and decided to further 
promote such exchanges and interaction. They agreed that broadening and deeperung of defense 
exchanges between the two countries was of vital importance in enhancing mutual trust and 
understanding between the two armed forces, and to ensuring a peaceful environment in which they 
could pursue their respective national development objectives. The two sides decided to further 
strengthen effective contacts and exchanges in this field. 
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XI. During the visit, the two sides exchanged views on the China-India boundary question and 
reiterated their readiness to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution, through equal and 
friendly consultations and proceeding from the overall interests of bilateral relations. They expressed 
satisfaction over the progress made in the discussions between the Special Representatives of the two 
countries and welcomed the conclusion of the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding 
Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question. Both sides are convinced that an early 
settlement of the boundary question will advance the basic interests of the two countries and should 
therefore be pursued as a strategic objective. They expressed their commitment to the mechanism of 
Special Representatives for seeking a political settlement of the boundary question in the context of their 
long-term interests and the overall bilateral relationship. Pending a final resolution, the two sides will 
continue to make joint efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas in accordance with 
the Agreements of 1993 and 1996. Both sides agreed that while continuing the discussions between the 
Special Representatives, it is also important that the Joint Working Group (JWG) continues its work to 
seek an early clarification and confirmation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Progress made so far 
on the clarification of the LAC in the China-India border areas was noted. It was agreed to complete the 
process of exchanging maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the LAC 
on the basis of already agreed parameters, with the objective of arriving at a common understanding of 
the alignment, as soon as possible. The two sides expressed satisfaction at the progress achieved in the 
implementation of the agreements of 1993 and 1996 and agreed to fully implement them expeditiously. 
Towards that end, they concluded a Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence 
Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border 
Areas. 
XII. The Indian side reiterated that it recognized the Tiet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of 
the People's Republic of China and that it did not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political 
activities in India. The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that 
there is one China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Indian side stated it would continue 
to abide by its one China policy. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the Indian positions. 
XIII. Both sides reviewed with satisfaction the implementation of the memorandum on the border trade 
through the Nathula Pass between the Tibet Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China and 
the Sikkim State of the Republic of India. 
XIV. The two sides noted with satisfaction that through friendly consultations an agreement in principle 
had been reached between the two countries to solve the long-pending issue of property originally 
belonging to Indian Consulate General in Shanghai with the Chinese side agreeing to provide a plot of 
land in lieu of the premises of the original Consulate General of India. 
XV. As two large developing countries, both Chiria and India were aware of each other's important role 
in the process of promoting the establishment of a new international political and economic order. Both 
sides share common interests in the maintenance of peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the 
world at large, and share the desire to develop closer and more extensive understanding and 
cooperation in regional and international affairs. 
The two sides are supportive of democratization of international relations and multilateralism, stand for 
the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair, rational, equal and 
mutually beneficial, and promote North-South Dialogue and South-South Cooperation. The two sides 
believe that the international community should eliminate poverty, narrow the gap between North and 
South, and achieve common prosperity through dialogue and cooperation. 
XVI. The two sides reiterated the importance of the United Nations in global peace, stability and 
common development and expressed their determination to continue their efforts, together with the 
international community, in strengthening the UN system to develop a sound multilateral basis to 
address global issues. Both China and India agree that reform of the United Nations should be 
comprehensive and multi-faceted and should put emphasis on an increase in the representation of 
developing countries. The Indian side reiterated its aspirations for permanent membership of the UN 
Security Council. The Chinese side also reiterated that India is an important developing country and is 
having an increasingly important influence in the international arena. China attaches great importance 
to the status of India in international 
affairs. It understands and supports India's aspirations to play an active role in the UN and international 
affairs. The two sides reaffirmed their readiness to conduct close consultations and cooperation in the 
process of the UN reforms. 
XVII. The two sides, aware of the threats posed by terrorism to the peace and security of the two 
countries and the whole world, resolutely condemn terrorism in any form. The struggle between the 
international community and global terrorism is a comprehensive and sustained one, with the ultimate 
objective of eradication of terrorism in all regions. This requires strengthening the global legal 
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framework against terrorism. Both sides noted the positive outcome of the meetings held so far of their 
bilateral dialogue mechanism on counter-terrorism and agreed to further strengthen and corwolidate 
their discussions and cooperation. It was agreed to hold the next meeting of the dialogue mechanism on 
counter-terrorism later this year. 
XVIII. Both sides agreed to conduct regular exchange of views on major international and regional 
issues, strengthen cooperation in the WTO and other international multilateral organizations, and to 
continue the consultations on other issues of common concern. They agreed to work together to 
preserve stability and growth in the global economy and reduce disparities between developed and 
developing countries. They supported an open, fair, equitable and transparent rule-based multilateral 
trade system and resolved to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the developing countries. 
XIX. Aware of their linked destinies as neighbors and the two largest countries of Asia, both sides 
agreed that they would together, contribute to the establishment of an atmosphere of mutual 
understanding, trust and cooperation in Asia and the world at large, and facilitate efforts to strengthen 
multilateral coordination mechanisms on security and cooperation. 
XX. During the visit, the two sides signed and/or released the following documents: i Agreement on 
Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the China-India Boundary Question ii. 
Report of China-India Joint Study Group on Comprehensive Trade and Economic Cooperation iii. 
Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of CBMs in the Military Field along the Line of Actual 
Control in the China-India Border Areas iv. Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance and 
Cooperation in Customs Matters v. MOU on the Launch of the China-India Financial Dialogue vi. MOU 
on Civil Aviation vii. Protocol of Phytosanitary Requirement for Exporting Grapes from India to China 
viii. Protocol of Phytosanitary Requirement for Exporting Bitter Gourds from India to China ix. MOU on 
provision of Hydrological Irvformation of the Langqen Zangbo/Sutlej River in Flood Season by China to 
India x. Protocol on China-India Film Cooperation Commission xi. MOU on Cooperation between the 
Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and the Indian Council of World Affairs xii. Memorandum 
on the Construction of an Indian-style Buddhist Temple on the Western side of the White Horse Temple 
in Luoyang, China. 
XXI. The two sides believed that Premier Wen Jiabao's highly successful state visit to the Republic of 
India marked a new level of China-India relationship and opened a new chapter in the friendly relations 
and cooperation between the two countries. 
Premier Wen Jiabao, on behalf of the Chinese Government and people, expressed his appreciation to the 
Government and people of India for their warm hospitality, and invited Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh to visit China at a mutually convenient time. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh appreciated the 
invitation and accepted it with pleasure. The Indian side also reiterated the invitation to President Hu 
Jintao to visit India. The exact time of the visit will be decided through diplomatic channels. 
Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Prime Minister of the Republic of India. 
New Delhi, 11 April 2005 
